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

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Phasis 20, 2017

ON THE GREEK CHIROMANTIC FRAGMENT: AN UPDATE*

ALBERTO BARDI

Abstract. This paper provides an update to Roger Pack's 1972 article "On the Greek Chiromantic Fragment" (*TAPA* 103: 367-380). The discovery of several new witnesses to the text warrants a reconsideration of the scholarly questions about Greek chiromancy. This paper presents the results of recent scholarship on the Greek chiromantic fragment, alongside a new edition of the text and a survey of its reception.

1. INTRODUCTION

The title of this paper refers explicitly to an article by Roger Pack, published in 1972,[1] which dealt with the sole surviving witness to chiromancy (or palmistry) written in ancient Greek. Surveying the recent scholarship on Greek astronomical texts led me to detect further witnesses to the text. The latter are provided in manuscripts preserved in

* I am grateful to Rosa Maria Piccione for her useful suggestions. In addition to staff at the libraries holding the manuscripts cited above, I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers of this article, to the *LMU Institute of Byzantine Studies* (prof. Albrecht Berger), and to the cultural association *Comitato per la rivalutazione di Luciano di Samosata*. This research has benefitted from financial support provided by the *German Center for Venetian Studies*.

[1] Pack 1972.

European libraries, and I have collated the new witnesses. As the new text-variants are significant in comparison to the last edition (1908), it was necessary to establish a new critical text. In this paper, I not only provide a new edition of the Greek chiromancy, but also present a discussion of the variants and the editorial principles. The philological side of this survey also sheds new light on questions pertaining to the date and provenance of the text, as well as the problem of its authorship and reception. As we will see below, renowned humanists such as Pico della Mirandola and Regiomontanus took this text into consideration when conducting their own studies.

The Greek chiromantic text was discovered by the renowned German philologist Franz Boll, who published the first edition in 1908 in the 7th volume of the *Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum*.[2] His edition was established by collating two manuscripts: the *Parisinus Graecus* 2506 (14th century) and the *Erlangensis* 1227 (89) (mid-15th century). No expositions of this non-conventional subject had previously come to light, and this discovery received no scholarly attention before R. Pack had his article published in 1972. Boll's discovery opened up an area of general interest for the history of astrology and chiromancy, for his findings showed – as both Boll and Pack noted – that the union between these two methods of inquiry could have occurred in antiquity and not in the 16th century, as had been hitherto supposed.[3]

Pack commented on the text by comparing it with some published and unpublished Latin chiromantic treatises.[4] As he noticed, chiromancy (or investigations of the hand) was not new to Greek tradition. Indeed, in his introduction to the Greek text, Boll had already included a number of references to chiromancy, taken from classical literature. These references were also taken up by Pack in his own comparative study. In addition, Pack wrote a paper on the indirect sources of ancient Greek palmistry in 1978.[5] Briefly, it is clear that the hand was

[2] *CCAG*, 236-244.
[3] *CCAG*, 236-237.
[4] Pack 1972, 370-380.
[5] Pack 1978.

seen as a special part of the human body, and was deemed to be a particularly important area of speculation for what was later called *physiognomy*. As no further evidence about the chiromantic tradition in ancient Greek sources has been discovered, I shall omit details of the Greek chiromantic tradition and direct the reader to Pack's paper of 1978.

The current paper provides an updated account of extant Greek chiromancy from a philological perspective and on the basis of the evidence uncovered by studies into the text's reception. The paper sheds new light on the text, its composition, its possible author, and its reception. Witnesses to the text will be analysed and collated, and the principles for the edition will also be given (sections 2 and 3); section 4 will contain the edition with *apparatus criticus;* a commentary will be offered in section 5; the text's reception will be discussed in section 6; and finally, section 7 will draw some conclusions.

2. TEXT WITNESSES

Greek chiromancy is extant in the following manuscripts. As previously discovered by Boll, the text witnesses are:

E *Erlangensis* 1227 (89), ff. 192v-196r

P *Parisinus graecus* 2506, ff. 188v-190v

A survey of Greek astronomical texts allowed me to discover further witnesses, who were already revealed in published catalogues:

L *Laurentianus graecus* 28.13, ff. 17r-19r

J *Laurentianus graecus* 28.16, ff. 20v-23r

M *Marcianus graecus Z*. 336, ff. 28r-30r

N *Ambrosianus* N 284 sup., ff. 56r-60r

Q *Ambrosianus* Q 13 sup., ff. 247r-252v

The text of L was composed no later than 1374, for the manuscript on f. 1r contains a horoscope casted for the year 6882 from the creation of the world, a year that corresponds to A.D. 1374.[6] The scribe is the Byzantine mathematician and astronomer Isaac Argyros; its hand was

[6] Gentile 1994, 88-94.

recognized by Brigitte Mondrain.[7] The Greek chiromancy is transcribed as the last chapter of a handbook on how to use a set of Persian astronomical tables, entitled *Παράδοσις εἰς τοὺς περσικοὺς κανόνας τῆς ἀστρονομίας (Instructions for the Persian Tables of Astronomy)*.[8] Both texts are anonymous.

The witness J, composed no later than A.D. 1382, copies the aforementioned astronomical handbook alongside the chiromancy.[9] The scribe was recognized by Alexander Turyn as a collaborator of the Byzantine astrologer John Abramios.[10] From J derives the witness M, which stems from the first half of the 15th century.[11] In this instance too, the chiromancy is added to the astronomical handbook.

The witness E is part of a selection of Greek astrological texts copied by the astronomer Regiomontanus in the second half of the 15th century.[12] No attribution to an author is provided.

P copies the text into a selection of physiognomic-astrological texts. I could not recognize the scribe, but this hand is certainly no older than 14th century.

Both N and Q are 16th-century copies. The former provides the text in a carefully written minuscule style in a miscellaneous volume among selections from rhetorical and philosophical texts. The scribe is unknown.[13] The latter is transcribed from an unknown hand in a selection of astrological and physiognomic texts.[14]

[7] Mondrain 2012.
[8] Tihon 2009, 406; Bardi 2018.
[9] Turyn 1972, 245-248.
[10] On the scribe, see Turyn 1972, 245-248; On Abramios, see Pingree 1971.
[11] Mioni 1985, 77-83.
[12] Thurn and Stählin 1980, 24-28.
[13] See Martini and Bassi 1906, 674-675.
[14] Martini and Bassi 1906, 747-751.

3. EDITION PRINCIPLES

The following table provides a comprehensive view of the most significant text variants in all the witnesses. The columns identify manuscripts; while the rows indicate the paragraphs adopted in the critical text (see section 4). The sign ≡ stands for coincidence of *lectiones*, the second term of the relationship is the manuscript on the right-hand side of the sign.

	L	J	M	E	N	Q	P
1	Προγνωστικὸν – γραμμῶν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	υϚγ' Περὶ τῆς ζωηφόρου
2	ὅροι	≡ L	om.	om.	≡ L	om.	om.
3	τὶ ὁρίζειν	≡ L	≡ L	διορίζειν	≡ L	≡ E	οἰορίζειν
4	ἀκρόχειρα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἀκρόχειρον
4	καλοῦσι δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι τοῦτο καὶ παλάμην	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*
5	ῥίζα βραχίονος	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ῥίζαι καὶ βραχίονος
5	τὴν ῥίζαν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τὰς χεῖρας

6	μερῶν τῆς παλάμης	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*
7	τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*post* τούτων *add.* ὑπόκοιλον
9	ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὸ θέναρ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἀπὸ τοῦ μεταθέναρος (*lectio difficilior*)
9-10	τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸ θέναρ ὁ τόπος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ λιχανοῦ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	μετάθεναρ ὅ ἐστι ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ τελ. τ. λιχ. τόπος
11	ἐπὶ πλεῖστον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	εἰς τὸ πλεῖστον
13	τοῦτων	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*
15-16	ὁτὲ … ὁτὲ	≡ L	ὁτὲ … ποτὲ	≡ M	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L
17	χειρὸς πολλάκις ὑποκαταβαίνουσιν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	χειρὸς αὐτὴ πολλάκις ὑποκαταβαίνουσα

20	παρακείμενα μέρη τῶν τῆς χειρὸς ὑψηλῶν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	περικείμενα μέρη αὐτῶν τῇ χειρὶ ὑψελά
25	ὁ δὲ ἀντίχειρ δακτυλόποδα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*post* ἀντίχειρ *add*. τὸν
26	τὸν μεσοδάκτυλον ἔχει μόνον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*post* μεσοδάκτυλον *add*. αὐτὸν : *om*. μόνον
26-27	ὅπου σημεῖον τῷ υ στοιχείῳ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι	≡ L	≡ L	ὅπου σημεῖον τὸ υ στοιχεῖον παραπλήσιό ν ἐστι	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L
28	ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς χειρὸς κατάδεσμος	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*post* οὖν *add*. καὶ
30	τὸ μεταστήθιον καὶ αἱ γραμμαί	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τὸ μεταστήθιον καὶ (*om*. αἱ) γραμμαί
31	μετὰ θέναρ	≡ P	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	μετὰ τὸ θέναρ	μεταθέναρ

31	ὁ πρῶτος λεγόμενος δάκτυλος τοῦ Διός	≡ L	*om.* τοῦ	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L
37	τοὺς ὁρῶντας	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*
37	πάλιν τε	πάλιν	*ante* πάλιν *add.* καὶ	≡ M	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L
38	γὰρ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τε
38	τούτῳ πείσεται καὶ οὗτος	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.* οὗτος	*post* πείσεται *add.* κέντρα : *om.* καὶ οὗτος (κέντρα, *quod inepte pro* φάσεις *dictum*, Boll)
49	συνεζευγμένας	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	συνεζευμένα ς (sic.)	≡ L
50-51	ἐλεύθερος δὲ καὶ κληρονομίας ἀπολήψεται	≡ L	ἐλεύθερος δὲ (*om.* καὶ) κληρονομίας ἀπολήψεται	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L	ἐλεύθερος δὲ κληρονόμοις ἐκλείψεται

55	τοῦ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ δακτυλόποδος γραμμὰς ἀμυχαῖς	τοῦ (*om.* τοῦ) Ἑρμοῦ δακτυλόποδ ος γραμμὰς ἀμυχαῖς	≡ J	≡ J	≡ L	≡ L	τῶν Ἑρμοῦ δακτυλόποδι ἔχοντες γραμμὰς ἀμηχανῶν
56	καὶ τῆς τοῦ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*
56	ὄντες οὗτοι ἔσονται	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἔσ. οἱ τοιοῦτοι
56	ὀλέθριοι	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	λάθριοι
57	ἐν βίῳ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	βίου
58	πάσχοντες	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	παρέχοντες
58	ἀστέρι	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	θεῷ
59	ἀποτόμως	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ποτόμως
59	αὐτοῖς	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἀνθρώποις
70	ὑπερβαίνῃ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ὑπερβῇ
70	τόνδε τὸν ἀστέρα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τήνδε τὴν θεάν
71	αὐτὴν ταύτην	≡ L	τήνδε αὐτὴν	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L
73	καὶ μὴ ἔχουσαν	≡ L	καὶ (*om.* μὴ) ἔχουσαν	≡ M	≡ M	≡ L	≡ M

76-77	Ἐὰν – δηλοῖ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	bis	≡ L
79	εἰς μέσον	≡ L	ἐπὶ μέσον	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L
85	ἐπενηνεγμένα αὐτῳ ἤγουν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης αὐτῳ ἐπικλωσθέντα οἷον
89	σιδήρῳ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	δώρῳ	≡ L
92	εὔρης γραμμήν	≡ L	γραμμὴν εὕρῃς	≡ M	≡ L	εὑρήσῃ	≡ L
99	τὸ μήν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τιμήν	≡ L
101	διακλαίουσα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	διακλάνουσα
102	τουτὶ τὸ σημεῖον	≡ L	τοιοῦτό τι	≡ M	≡ L	τοῦτο τό	τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον
102-103	εἰ δὲ μὴ πεπήρωται, πηρωθήσεται τὸν πόδα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	λέγε οὖν καὶ τῷ μηδέμω (sic) ἐπειρωμένω ὅτι πειρωθήσεται τὸν πόδα
105	ἰσχιακοὺς σημαίνει ἔσεσθαι	ἰσχιαδικούς σημ. ἔσ.	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἰσχιακοὺς ἔσεσθαι σημαίνει

107	ἐλικοειδὴς ᾗ καὶ μελανοειδὴς	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.* ᾗ
122	ἔσται	≡ L	λέγε	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L
124	δίκτυον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	δίκτυα
124	ἐφαπτομένας αὐτῶν	*om.*	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*	≡ L	≡ L
127-128	σημαινόμενον ὑπέρμεγα ἔσται	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L ὑπέρμεσα *pro* ὑπέρμεγα	≡ L	πεπρωμένον ἐκ μοίρας· πάντως γὰρ ἄφευκτος καὶ ἀπαράβατα τὰ ἐκ ταύτης
136	ἀποτελούσας	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἀποτελοῦσιν
136-137	σιδήρῳ αἰφνιδίῳ τιμηθήσεται αἰφνιδίως ἢ ἐνδείᾳ τροφῆς ὀλεῖται	τμηθήσεται	τρωθήσεται	≡ M	σιδήρῳ τρωθήσεται αἰφνιδίως ἢ ἐνδείᾳ τροφῆς ὀλεῖται	σημείῳ αἰφνιδίῳ τμηθήσεται ἐξαίφνης ἢ ἐνδείᾳ τροφῆς ὀλεῖται	post ἢ add. ἀλλήλαις συνερείδουσαι P
139	προσιοῦσαν	προιοῦσαν	≡ J	≡ J	≡ J	≡ J	≡ L

141-142	τόξῳ ἐοικυῖαν ἔχῃ γραμμὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχῃ ἐπὶ τὸν βραχίονα ῥέπον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τόξῳ εἴκελον ἔχῃ γεγραμμένον καὶ τούτο ῥεπῃ ἐπὶ τὸν βραχίονα
144	ὁ δή	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	τὸ δὲ
144	ἕτερον μέρος	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*post* μέρος *add.* αὐτῆς
144	μέρος	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	γένη
144	αὐτό	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	αὐτός
149	κατὰ μέρος	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	κατὰ μέσον
151	ᾗ διακεκριμένον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	διακέκριπται
152	ζ. εἰρημένων κοινῶς	ζ. εἰρημένος κοινῶς	ζ. κοινῶς (*om.* εἰρ.)	≡ M	≡ L	≡ L	≡ M
156	ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου δάκτυλον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	αὐτῆς εἰς τόν τοῦ Κρόνου δάκτυλον
158	φιλοκάλους	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	φιλολόγους
161	οὐ	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	οὔτε
162	τὰ ἀναγκαῖα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*
162	περισσεύσουσιν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	περισσεύει

165	ἐλαττωθέντα	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἐλαττώματα
168	ἐάν τις ἀστέρα ἔχῃ μεταξὺ τῆς ἀναγκαίας καὶ τῆς ζωηφόρου, ἔσται δίκαιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς *ex loco* 111 *hic repetita*, *ut vidit* Boll.	≡ L	≡ L	*non repetit*	*non repetit*	*non repetit*	≡ L
171	ἐκτρέχωσιν	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*	ἐκτρέχουσιν
171	ἐντίμους	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*	ἐντίμως
171-173	ἐκτρέχωσιν – δάκτυλον	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*	≡ L
174	*om.*	*om.*	*om.*	*om.*	*om.*	*om.*	οὖν
174	ἔσται	≡ L	≡ L	*om.*	*om.*	≡ L	≡ L
174 et 175	ἐγκεκλιμένην	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	≡ L	ἐγκεκλεισμένην

It is evident that L, J, M, E, N, and Q share a consistent amount of variants. This shows that they constitute a family of manuscripts, whose head is the witness L. This family consists of direct copies from L, as outlined by the following sequence: L > J, L > M, M > E, J > N, and E > Q.

Significant variants are provided by P, which indicate that P does not belong to the family of L. Variants of P not shared by L and its apographs are provided in the passages listed here (see the table above): 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 9-10, 11, 13, 17, 20, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31 (μεταθέναϱ), 37 (see *om.*), 38, 50-51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 70, 85, 101, 102, 102-103, 107, 124, 127-128, 136, 137, 141-142, 144, 149, 151, 156, 161, 165, 171, 174, 175.

Compared to them, the variants shared by P and the L family are few: 15-16, 26-27, 31, 37, 71, 79, 92, 105, 122, 168, 171-173, 174.

In the family of L, the following relationships were detected by analyzing variants. The witness J shares all of the above listed readings except the variants 31, 37, 105, 120, 136-137, 139, and the omissions 38, 55, 124. Moreover, it transcribes the chiromancy directly after the astronomical handbook like L. In this position, the text was also copied by M, which shares with J the omission 55 and provides its own variants at 2, 15-16, 31, 50-51, 71, 73, 79, 92, 102, 122, 136-137, 152, and its own omissions at 31 and 152, as well as an addition at 152. All of this demonstrates that L is their common antigraph.

The witness E shares with J and M the variant 55. It is an apograph of M because it transcribes all the variants and omissions carried by M, which M does not share with J and L, see: 15-16, 31, 37, 50-51, 71, 73, 79, 92, 102, 122, 136-137, 152. Moreover, E provides its own variants at 3, 26-27, and it does not repeat the sentence at 168, which is copied from line 111. As this sentence is coherent in both sections, I would not describe it as an error; as such, I left it in place within the critical text. However, the scribe of E understood this as a double occurrence.

Witnesses N and Q share a significant amount of common variants with the other manuscripts of the family of L. This makes it difficult to detect their stemmatic relationships. The small title *ὅροι* (line 2) of N speaks in favour of a transcription from L or J. A transcription from J

is confirmed by the omission at 124, shared only by J and N. Moreover, N does not copy the sentence from 111 at 168, a common variant with E and Q. The scribe of Q transcribes from E, for it is the only witness that adopts διορίζειν (3) as incipit. Q contains notably more errors than the other witnesses. The most evident are the repetition of the sentence 76-77 and the omission at 171-173, a "saut du même au meme."

The stemmatic relationships can be summarized in the following stemma.

Stemma Codicum



At this point, only L and P should be considered for the *constitutio textus*. There are several reasons to take L as the collation manuscript: it is an antigraph of several witnesses; it is as old as P; and it contains a "good text." Its *lectiones* are not always better than those of P, and the latter might sometimes be closer to the original. In the following I provide the most significant cases in which I have preferred P:

7) ὑπόκοιλον P : *om.* L. In this passage, there is clearly a missing word.

10) μεταθέναρος P] μετὰ τὸ θέναρ L. P provides a *lectio difficilior*.

85-86) τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης αὐτῷ ἐπικλωσθέντα οἷον P] τὰ ἐπενηνεγμένα αὐτῷ ἢ L. The reference to the εἱμαρμένη ("what is decreed by the fate") is in accordance to the reference to the fate at 128 (see below) and it is evidence of an ancient vocabulary.

128) τὸ πεπρωμένον ἐκ μοίρας· πάντως γὰρ ἄφευκτος καὶ ἀποράβατα τὰ ἐκ ταύτης P] τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑπέρμεγα ἔσται L. The reference to unavoidable fate makes more sense. It is also in accordance with what the scribe of P wrote at 85-86 (see above).

149) κατὰ μέσον P] κατὰ μέρος L. The variant of L does not make sense; it is clearly a mistake.

As far as the *mise en page* of the critical text is concerned, I took the freedom to organize the text into paragraphs following the coherence of the topics treated in the discourse. From line 61, the text is basically a list of conditional clauses based on the model "if → then." As such, I decided to give each sentence a paragraph. The main clauses of the conditional phrase are always separated by commas.

4. EDITION

Προγνωστικὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ παλάμῃ γραμμῶν[15]

Ὅροι[16]

Τὶ ὁρίζειν[17] χρὴ καὶ καλεῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν γραμμῶν μέρος τῶν πρὸς τῷ καρπῷ μέχρι τῶν δακτύλων ὅλων ἀκρόχειρα,[18] καλοῦσι δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι τοῦτο καὶ παλάμην·[19] τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὰς (5) γραμμὰς εὐθὺς μέρος ῥίζα βραχίονος[20] καὶ χειρὸς λέγεται, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ῥίζαν[21] ὑψηλοτέρων μερῶν τῆς παλάμης,[22] τὸ μὲν πρὸς τῷ μεγάλῳ δακτύλῳ στῆθος ἀντίχειρος ὀνομάζεται, τὸ δὲ κάτω μέρος στῆθος τῆς χειρός, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων ὑπόκοιλον,[23] ὅπου γραμμαί τινες εἰώθασιν εἶναι, μεταστήθιον· ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ στῆθος τοῦ μεγάλου δακτύλου γραμμῇ τῇ ληγούσῃ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεταστήθιον, ἀρχομένῃ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεταθέναρος,[24] ἥτις ὀνομάζεται (10) χρονική· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸ θέναρ ὁ τόπος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ λιχανοῦ[25] μέχρι τῆς ῥίζης τοῦ ἀντίχειρος· ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου μέσου γραμμή τις ἀρχομένη καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον[26] τῆς χρονικῆς ἐφαπτομένη, κατὰ τὴν ῥίζαν δι᾽ αὐτῆς δὲ ἀπολυθεῖσα φέρεται διὰ τοῦ κοίλου τῆς χειρός, αὕτη προσαγορεύεται ζωηφόρος· τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς χρονικῆς καλεῖται τρίγωνον· τῶν δὲ δύο τούτων[27] γραμμῶν τῆς τε χρονικῆς καὶ

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[15] Προγνωστικὸν – γραμμῶν *rubro pictum*] υζγ' Περὶ τῆς ζωηφόρου *rubro pictum* P
[16] *supra lineam* L: *om.* P
[17] Τὶ ὁρίζειν] οἰορίζειν P
[18] ἀκρόχειρα] ἀκρόχειρον P
[19] καλοῦσι – παλάμην *om.* P
[20] ῥίζα βραχίονος] ῥίζαι καὶ βραχίονος P
[21] τὴν ῥίζαν] τὰς χεῖρας P
[22] μερῶν τῆς παλάμης *om.* P
[23] ὑπόκοιλον *om.* L
[24] μεταθέναρος] μετὰ τὸ θέναρ L
[25] τὸ – λιχανοῦ] μετάθεναρ ὅ ἐστι ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ τελ. τ. λιχ. τόπος P
[26] ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον] εἰς τὸ πλεῖστον P
[27] τούτων *om.* P

τῆς ζωηφόρου τὰ μέρη ἐκεῖνα καθ᾽ ἃ (15) προσάπτονται ἀλλήλων καὶ ἑνοῦνται συναφὴ καλείσθω· ταύτην δὲ τὴν συναφὴν ὁτὲ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ συνιδεῖν τῶν γραμμῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀφεστηκυιῶν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ θέναρος ἀυτοῦ μέχρι τοῦ κοίλου τῆς χειρὸς[28] πολλάκις ὑποκαταβαίνουσα[29]· ἀναγχαίαν δὲ λέγομεν γραμμὴν τὴν ὑποκλῶσαν τοῦς τρεῖς δακτύλους, Κρόνον λέγω καὶ Ἥλιον καὶ Ἑρμῆν, διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπικλάσεως τῶν δακτύλων φυσικῶς ἀνατετυπῶσθαι· τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς (20) ζωηφόρου τετράγονον ὀνομάζομεν· στήθη δὲ δακτύλων ὀνομάζομεν τὰ παρακείμενα μέρη τῶν τῆς χειρὸς ὑψηλῶν·[30] τὸ δὲ στῆθος αὐτῆς τῆς χειρὸς ὁρίζεται ταῖς ῥίζαις τοῦ βραχίονος ταῖς ὑπὸ τῇ χρονικῇ γραμμῇ ὑποκειμέναις καὶ τῇ ἀναγκαίᾳ, προσεικὸς κοιλίᾳ (κοιλία γὰρ λέγεται χειρὸς διὰ τὸ μικρῶς παρωγκῶσθαι)· τριῶν δὲ ὄντων ἐν τοῖς δακτύλοις φαλαγγίων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἐπιπεφυκὸς τῇ χειρὶ καὶ διορίζον τὴν χεῖρα δακτυλόπους ἢ ῥιζοδάκτυλος· τὸ δὲ (25) δεύτερον μεσοδάκτυλος· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὀνυχοφόρον, ἀκροδάκτυλον ἢ μετόνυχον· ὁ δὲ ἀντίχειρ[31] δακτυλόποδα καὶ τὸν μεσοδάκτυλον ἔχει μόνον·[32] ἀστὴρ δὲ λέγεται, ὅπου σημεῖον τῷ υ στοιχείῳ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι· γίνεται δὲ ὅπου ἂν τύχοι, οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς χειρὸς κατάδεσμος τοιοῦτός τίς ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ φάναι, καὶ τὰ τῶν γραμμῶν τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ὀνόματα ταῦτα· ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ φράζειν τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τὰς (30) δυνάμεις αὐτῶν ἴωμεν· Σελήνης τὸ μεταστήθιον καὶ αἱ γραμμαί· Ἀφροδίτης ὁ ἀντίχειρ· τὸ δὲ μεταθέναρ[33] καὶ ἡ ζωηφόρος Ἄρεως· ὁ δὲ λιχανὸς καὶ ὁ πρῶτος λεγόμενος δάκτυλος τοῦ Διός· Κρόνου δὲ ὁ μέσος· Ἡλίου δὲ ἢ Ἀπόλλωνος ὁ παράμεσος· ὁ δὲ μικρὸς Ἑρμοῦ.

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[28] *post* χειρὸς *add*. αὐτὴ P

[29] ὑποκαταβαίνουσα] ὑποκαταβαίνουσιν L

[30] τῶν – ὑψηλῶν] αὐτῶν τῇ χειρὶ ὑψελά P

[31] *post* ἀντίχειρ *add*. τὸν L

[32] ἔχει μόνον] αὐτὸν ἔχει P

[33] μετὰ θέναρ L

Ἐπισκέπτεσθαι μὲν οὖν χρὴ τὰς γραμμὰς τῆς δεξιᾶς χειρός, χρὴ δὲ καὶ πολλὰς ὁρᾶν χεῖρας τὸν σπουδαῖον, ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἡ πεῖρα τῆς προρρήσεως προβαίνοι ἄν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσφαλές.

(35) Οἱ τῆς σεληνιακῆς γενέσεως μετειληχότες ἔξουσιν ἐν τῷ τετραγώνῳ τῆς χειρὸς σημεῖον παραπλήσιον τῷ χ στοιχείῳ· ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ οὖν ἡλικίᾳ ὁ τοιοῦτος πένης ἔσται, ἐν τῇ μέσῃ δὲ εὐπορήσει παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα, ὥστε ἐκπλήττεσθαι τοὺς ὁρῶντας,[34] πάλιν τε εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναλύσει, εἰς ὃ ἦν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡλικίᾳ· ὅμοια γὰρ τῷ ἀστέρι τούτῳ πείσεται[35] καὶ οὗτος[36] αὐξόμενός τε[37] καὶ κατὰ τὴν τύχην λήγων.

(40) Οἱ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Ἡλίου γενέσεως μετειληχότες ἔξουσιν γραμμὰς λεπτὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτυλόποδος αὐτοῦ οἱονεὶ ἀμυχάς· ἔσονται δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὐφυεῖς, μιμηταὶ παντὸς ἔργου, ἃ οὐκ ἔμαθον ταῦτα πράττοντες, οὐδέποτε δὲ λείψει τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ μὲν πάνυ συνήθεις καὶ φίλοι αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς λειτουργοῦντες ἀχαριστοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ πόρρω προσφιλέστατοι γίνονται.

(45) Οἱ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Κρόνου γενέσεως μετειληχότες ἔσονται ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες, κοινοὶ φίλοις, ἁπλοῖ τε καὶ τὰ ἄριστα συμβουλεύοντες, βαρεῖς τῇ διανοίᾳ, οὐ ταχὺ συνιέντες, εὐχερῶς πιστεύοντες τοῖς πράγμασι, βλάπτονται δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάλιστα ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τέκνων, γῆρας δὲ λιπαρὸν ἔξουσι.

Τῆς Ἄρεως δὲ εἴ τις ἔσται γενέσεως, ἐὰν μὲν ἔχῃ τὰς δύο γραμμὰς ταύτας συνεζευγμένας, τήν (50) τε χρονικὴν καὶ τὴν ζωηφόρον, δοῦλος μὲν ὢν ἐλευθερωθήσεται, ἐλεύθερος δὲ κληρονομίας ἀπολήψεται·[38] ἐὰν δὲ ἀπεζευγμένας ἔχῃ ταύτας καὶ μηδεμίαν λεπτὴν ἐκτρέχουσαν καὶ παρεκκλίνουσαν, δοῦλος μὲν ὢν οὐδέποτε ἐλευθερωθήσεται, ἐλεύθερος δὲ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται· ἔσονται δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνδρεῖοι

[34] τοὺς ὁρῶντας *om.* P
[35] *post* πείσεται *add.* κέντρα P
[36] καὶ οὗτος *om.* P
[37] τε *om.* P
[38] ἐκλείψεται P

ἐπίπονοι, ἄοκνοι, διὰ παντὸς κακοπαθοῦντες· ἕνεκα δὲ ἐφημέρου τροφῆς τοῦτοις οὔτε λείψει οὔτε περισσεύσει.

(55) Οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ δακτυλόποδος γραμμὰς ἔχοντες ἀμυχαῖς[39] παραπλησίους καὶ τῆς τοῦ[40] Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως ὄντες οὗτοι[41] ἔσονται κλέπται, ὀλέθριοι,[42] ἄκριτοι, ἀηδεῖς, ἀπροσφιλεῖς, ἐπιθέται, ψεῦσται· οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ στάσιν ἐν βίῳ[43] ἢ θεμέλιον ἕξουσιν οὐδέποτε, παραπλήσια πάσχοντες[44] τῷ ἀστέρι[45] τούτῳ καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἀστάτῳ φύσει ἀποτόμως[46] γένεσιν αὐτοῖς[47] κακὴν ἐργάζεται.

(60) Περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας

Ἐὰν δέ τις τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν ἀποτείνουσαν ἔχῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς δάκτυλον ἢ καὶ ἐγκεκλιμένην ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν δάκτυλον, Διὸς οὗτος γενέσεως ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν μὲν ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, κρείττων ἡ γένεσις τούτου ἔσται, ἢν δὲ ἐγκεκλιμένη, ἧττον καλή. Οἱ οὖν ταύτης ὄντες τῆς γενέσεως ἔσονται εὐτυχεῖς, ἀμέριμνοι, ἀμελεῖς διὰ τὰ ἀγαθά, ἀλαζόνες, οὐδὲν πικρὸν ἔχοντες (65) ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, εὐχερῶς ἀπατώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Ἢν δέ τις τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν ἔχῃ ἄνω νεύουσαν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς ῥιζοδάκτυλον καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ θέναρος ὁρίοις στηρίζουσαν ἐπικλασθέν τε αὐτῆς τὸ ἄκρον ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ῥιζοδάκτυλον, οὗτος ἔσται ἐπαφρόδιτος, ὥστε καὶ ὑφ᾽ ὧν ποτὲ ἔδοξεν ἠδικῆσθαι γυναικῶν, ὑπὸ τούτων εὐεργετηθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ γραμμὴ ἕως τοῦ μεσοδακτύλου στηρίζῃ καὶ μὴ (70) ὑπερβαίνῃ τοῦτον, ἕξει μὲν τὸνδε τὸν

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[39] τοῦ[1] – ἀμυχαῖς] τῶν Ἑρμοῦ δακτυλόποδι ἔχοντες γραμμὰς ἀμηχανῶν P
[40] καὶ τῆς τοῦ *om.* P
[41] ὄντες οὗτοι] οἱ τοιοῦτοι P
[42] λάθριοι P
[43] ἐν βίῳ] βίου P
[44] παρέχοντες P
[45] θεῷ P
[46] ἀποτόμως] ποτόμως P
[47] ἀνθρώποις P

ἀστέρα[48] ἀρωγόν, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ ἐπαφρόδιτος· τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν ταύτην γραμμήν, λέγω δὴ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν, ἐάν τις ἔχῃ ἐγκεκλιμένην, εὐκαταφρόνητος ἔσται πρὸς πάντων καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων, ἐπιβουλευόμενός τε καὶ ἀδικούμενος· ὁ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην γραμμὴν ἐπιτεταμένην ἔχων ὀρθὴν καὶ μὴ[49] ἔχουσαν ὄζους μεγάλους ἀπὸ τῆς ῥίζης δυσκόλως βλαβήσεται ὑπὸ ἀντιδίκου.

(75) Περὶ τῆς ζωηφόρου[50]

Ἐὰν δὲ ἡ ζωηφόρος γραμμὴ συσταλῇ, πολυχρονίους δηλοῖ, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν συνεσταλμένη ὑπάρχῃ, πολυχρονιωτέρους δηλοῖ.

Ἐὰν δὲ ἡ ζωηφόρος πάλιν παρεκτείνῃ ἑαυτὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν μικρὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ὑποσημαίνουσαν μονὴν ποιήσῃ εἰς μέσον τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ δάκτυλον, ὀλιγοχρονίους δηλοῖ.

(80) Ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ἔχῃ τὴν ζωηφόρον τελείαν, αἰφνιδίῳ ῥοπῇ πληγεὶς ἀπολεῖται ἀναισθήτως.

Ἐὰν δέ τις εἰς μέσην τὴν γαστέρα τῆς ζωηφόρου ἔχῃ κύκλον παραπλήσιον τῷ ο στοιχείῳ, ἐὰν μὲν εὔγραμμον ᾖ καὶ εὔρυθμον, ὁ τοιοῦτος κινδυνεύσας ὑπὸ θηρίων ἀπολεῖσθαι σωθήσεται, ἐὰν δὲ ἄρρυθμος, προφανῶς ὑπὸ θηρίων ἀπολεῖται.

Ἐὰν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ζωηφόρου νεύσῃ τις γραμμὴ ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς δάκτυλον καὶ στηρίζῃ εἰς τὸν (85) δακτυλόποδα αὐτοῦ, περὶ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν στήσεται τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης αὐτῷ ἐπικλωσθέντα οἷον[51] δίκαι ἢ δεσμὰ ἢ θάνατος· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου, περὶ μέσην ἡλικίαν· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ἢ Ἡλίου, ἐν γήρᾳ.

Ἐὰν ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει τῆς ζωηφόρου δύο γραμμαὶ ὦσιν δὲ[52] ἐξεχόμεναί τε ἀλλήλων ἢ παρακείμεναι, τρωθήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος σιδήρῳ.

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[48] τὴνδε τὴν θεὰν P

[49] μὴ *om.* P

[50] *rubro pictum*.

[51] τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης αὐτῷ ἐπικλωσθέντα οἷον] τὰ ἐπενηνεγμένα αὐτῷ ἢ L

[52] δὲ *om.* P

(90) Ἐάν τις τὴν ζωηφόρον ἔχῃ διεσπασμένην εἰς τὰ κάτω μέρη, εἰς ἐσχάτην ἥξει καὶ ὑγείαν καὶ πραγμάτων εὐδαιμονίαν.

Ἐαν ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ζωηφόρου γραμμὴν εὕρῃς ἐπὶ τὴν χρονικὴν φέρουσαν καὶ ταύτῃ συνάπτεται ἢ καὶ διαιρῇ αὐτήν, τρωθήσεται ἢ κινδυνεύσει τρωθῆναι.

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος γραμμὴ ὑπὸ πλαγίων γραμμῶν διαιρῆται, ὅσαι ἂν ὦσιν αἱ διαιροῦσαι τὴν (95) τοιαύτην γραμμήν, τοσαῦται σωματικαὶ ἀσθένειαι τὸν τοιοῦτον θλίψουσιν· αἱ δ᾽ ἑλικοειδεῖς οὖσαι ἀηδίαν ἢ νοσήματα δηλοῦσι· τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μέρη γινόμεναι καὶ διαιροῦσαι ταύτην περὶ κεφαλὴν καὶ τράχηλον δηλοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὰ μέσα, περὶ θώρακα καὶ γαστέρα ἢ νῶτα ἢ ἰσχία· αἱ δὲ περὶ τὰ κάτω τούτων, περὶ τὰ γόνατα ἢ τοὺς πόδας.

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος χωρὶς ἐλαττώματος ᾖ καὶ παντὸς σίνους ἀπολελυμένη μὴ τέ τινα ἔχῃ τὸ μὴν (100) ἐν ἑαυτῇ, οὔτ᾽ ἐνόσησεν ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε νοσήσει.

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει διακλαίουσα[53] ὑπάρχῃ, χωλείαν σημαίνει. Σκόπησον οὖν τὴν τοῦ χωλοῦ χεῖρα καὶ πάντως εὑρήσεις ἔχοντα τουτὶ τὸ[54] σῆμειον· εἰ δὲ μὴ πεπήρωται, πηρωθήσεται τὸν πόδα.[55]

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος ᾖ μείζων τοῦ δέοντος καὶ ἐπικλᾶται ὑπάρχῃ τε κλαδαρὰ οἷον ἱμάς, (105) ἰσχιακούς σημαίνει ἔσεσθαι.

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος ὑγιὴς ᾖ καὶ εὐθεῖα καὶ κάτω νεύῃ, μὴ δὲ σκαμβή τις ᾖ, τοιοῦτοι φαίνοντ᾽ ἂν δὴ καὶ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ἐὰν δὲ ἑλικοειδὴς καὶ μελανοειδὴς ᾖ,[56] φαῦλοί τε καὶ σκαιοὶ καὶ κακότροποι.

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος ἐπὶ τὸν βραχίονα νεύῃ, οὗτος ἔσται φιλάργυρος, ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμῶν, (110) αἰσχροκερδής.

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[53] διακλίνουσα P

[54] τουτὶ τὸ] τοῦτο τὸ P

[55] εἰ δὲ μὴ πεπήρωται, πηρωθήσεται τὸν πόδα] λέγε οὖν καὶ τῷ μηδέμω (*sic*) ἐπειρωμένω ὅτι πειρωθήσεται τὸν πόδα P

[56] ᾖ *om.* P

Ἐάν τις ἀστέρα ἔχῃ μεταξὺ τῆς ζωηφόρου καὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ἔσται δίκαιος καὶ εὐσεβής.

Ἐάν τις διεστώσας ἔχῃ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων τήν τε ζωηφόρον καὶ τὴν χρονικὴν καὶ μηδεμία αὐτῶν μεταξὺ συνδέουσα αὐτὰς, ἔσται ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀπάνθρωπος, ἀναιδής, ψεύστης, ἀπρόκοπος, ἀποστερητής, ὀκνηρός, κοῦφος.

(115) Ἐὰν δὲ διεστώσας μὲν ἔχῃ τὰς γραμμάς, μεταξὺ δὲ αὐτῶν οἷον σκυτάλιον, μηδεμιᾶς αὐτῶν ἐφαπτόμενον, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ ἀπολελυμένον, οἰνόφλυξ ἔσται καὶ καπηλοδύτης.

Ἐὰν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ θέναρος τῆς χειρὸς ἐκ τῶν ἄνωθεν μερῶν συνάπτωνται αἱ γραμμαὶ ἀλλήλαις ἥ τε ζωηφόρος λέγω καὶ ἡ χρονική, ἐλεύθερος μὲν ὢν εὐτυχήσει καὶ ἀνεπίληπτον βίον διάξει, δοῦλος δὲ ὢν ἐλευθερωθήσεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερώσει· καὶ θᾶττον δέ, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς (120) δάκτυλον τὴν συναφὴν ποιῶνται, βραδίον δέ, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου (κάτοχος γὰρ ὁ ἀστήρ). Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ συνάπτωνται ἀλλήλαις αἱ εἰρημέναι γραμμαί, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπολείπωσι τὸν μεταξὺ αὐτῶν τόπον καθαρόν, τὰ ἐναντία ἔσται περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον, δοῦλος μὲν γὰρ ὢν, οὐδέποτε ἐλευθερωθήσεται, ἐλεύθερος δὲ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται.

Ἐὰν δὲ ὥσπερ δίκτυον[57] γραμμὰς ἔχωσι λεπτὰς ἐφαπτομένας αὐτῶν καὶ περικλειούσας αὐτάς, (125) ἕξει ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίονα βίον ἐκ χείρονος ἐπὶ τέλους δὲ τῆς ζωῆς εὐτυχήσει· εἰ μή τις ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχίονος εἰστρέχουσα γραμμὴ παράπτοιτο αὐτῶν, δηλοῖ γὰρ ταχεῖαν ἄμειψιν, οἰκέτῃ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν, πένητι δὲ πλοῦτον, πλουσίῳ δὲ ἢ βασιλεῖ εὐτυχίαν· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ πεπρωμένον ἐκ μοίρας· πάντως γὰρ ἄφευκτος καὶ ἀποράβατα τὰ ἐκ ταύτης.[58]

Ἐάν τις ἔχῃ τὴν ζωηφόρον οἱονεὶ φοίνικι παραπλησίαν, οὗτος μεγάλως εὐτυχήσει.

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[57] δίκτυα P

[58] τὸ πεπρωμένον ἐκ μοίρας· πάντως γὰρ ἄφευκτος καὶ ἀποράβατα τὰ ἐκ ταύτης] τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑέρμεγα ἔσται L

(130) Ἐάν τις πρὸς τοῖς κάτω μέρεσι τῆς ζωηφόρου καὶ τῆς χρονικῆς ἔχῃ πλαγίαν γραμμήν, ἀγαθὰς ἐλπίδας προσδεχέσθω.

Ἐὰν ἡ ζωηφόρος εἰς τὸ ἄνω μέρος ἐπικαμφθεῖσα τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἅψηται, μεγάλην ζημίαν ἔσεσθαι σημαίνει.

Ἐάν τις ἔχῃ τὰς δύο γραμμάς, τήν τε χρονικὴν καὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν, ἀλλήλαις συναπτούσας[59] (135) καὶ συνδεούσας ὄνπερ τρόπον ἡ ζωηφόρος καὶ ἡ χρονική, τὴν συναφὴν ἐπὶ τῷ μέσῳ θέναρι ἀποτελούσας,[60] τῆς μέντοι ζωηφόρου ἐστερημέναι ὦσι, σιδήρῳ αἰφνιδίῳ τιμηθήσεται αἰφνιδίως ἢ[61] ἐνδείᾳ τροφῆς ὀλεῖται.

Περὶ τῆς χρονικῆς γραμμῆς[62]

Ἐάν τις ἀπὸ τῆς χρονικῆς γραμμῆς εὐθεῖαν ἔχῃ γραμμὴν προσιοῦσαν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ (140) δάκτυλον καὶ οἱονεὶ ἀπολελυμένην, κινδυνεύσει ἢ σιδήρῳ τρωθήσεται.

Ἐάν τις μεταξὺ τῆς χρονικῆς καὶ τῆς ζωηφόρου πρὸς τοῖς κάτω μέρεσιν αὐτῶν τόξῳ ἐοικυῖαν ἔχῃ γραμμὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχῃ ἐπὶ τὸν βραχίονα ῥέπον,[63] ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ τυφλὸς ἔσται.

Ἐὰν τὰς δύο γραμμάς, τήν τε[64] χρονικὴν καὶ τὴν ζωηφόρον, διακόπτῃ τις ἄλλη γραμμὴ κυρτὴ ὁμοία τόξῳ, τὸ δὲ[65] ἕτερον[66] μέρος[67] τὸν βραχίονα,[68] ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ[69] πηρωθήσεται τὴν ὅρασιν.

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[59] *ex* συναπτούσαις *corr.* L

[60] ἀποτελούσας] ἀπολελοῦσιν P

[61] *post* ἢ *add.* ἀλλήλαις συνερείδουσαι P

[62] Περὶ – γραμμῆς *rubro pictum* P : *om.* L

[63] τόξῳ ἐοικυῖαν ἔχῃ γραμμὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχῃ ἐπὶ τὸν βραχίονα ῥέπον] τόξῳ εἴκελον ἔχῃ γεγραμμένον καὶ τούτο ῥεπῃ ἐπὶ τὸν βραχίονα P

[64] τε *om.* L

[65] τὸ δὲ] ὁ δὴ P

[66] *post* δὲ *add.* αὐτῆς P

[67] γένη P

[68] τὸ – βραχίονα *locus corruptus videtur*

[69] αὐτός P

(145) Ἐὰν ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἀπὸ τῆς χρονικῆς γραμμῆς εὑρεθῇ γραμμὴ φέρουσα ἐπὶ τὴν ζωηφόρον καὶ ταύτῃ συνεφάπτηται ἢ καὶ διαιρῇ αὐτήν, τρωθήσεται ὁ ἔχων ἢ κινδυνεύσει τρωθῆναι.

Ἐὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χρονικῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ζωηφόρον κλάδοι νεύοντες εὑρεθῶσι, ζημίαν ἢ δοῦλον ἔσεσθαι ἐπισημαίνουσιν.

Ἐὰν ἡ χρονικὴ κατὰ[70] τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ζωηφόρον ἢ κατὰ μέσον[71] νεύῃ, ἄμεμπτον βίον (150) καὶ ἀκέραιον βιώσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος.

Ἐὰν δέ τι μὴ ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς γραμμῆς, λέγω δὴ τῆς χρονικῆς, ἢ διακεκριμένον[72] ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ ζωηφόρῳ εἰρημένων κοινῶς περὶ δύο γραμμῶν μεταφέρων τεκμαίρου.

Περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας γραμμῆς[73]

Ἐάν τις ἔχῃ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν βλέπουσαν ἐπὶ τὴν ζωηφόρον, οὗτος εἰς μέγιστον φόβον (155) καὶ κίνδυνον ἥξει θανάτου, οὐδὲν δὲ πείσεται κακόν.

Ἐάν τις ἔχῃ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν ἐγκλίνουσαν κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ τὸν[74] τοῦ Κρόνου δάκτυλον, οὐδέποτε αὐτὸν λείψουσι δίκαι καὶ ἀηδίαι.

Ἐὰν ἡ ἀναγκαία γραμμὴ οἷον κλάδους ἔχῃ, χαρίεντας, φιλοκάλους,[75] μαθηματικούς, εὐέλπιδας, ἀγαθοὺς συμβούλους ὑπάρχειν δηλοῖ.

(160) Ἐάν τις ἔχῃ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν ὀρθὴν καὶ μὴ ὑπερορίζουσαν τὸ τοῦ Κρόνου δάκτυλον, ὡς ὄρνις τὸν ἐφήμερον βιώσεται βίον μετὰ κόπου καὶ μόχθου καὶ οὔτε[76] λείψουσιν αὐτὸν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα[77] οὔτε περισσεύσουσιν.[78]

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[70] *addidi* κατὰ ut Boll, cf. *infra* 156.
[71] κατὰ μέσον] κατὰ μέρος L
[72] ἢ διακεκριμένον] διακέκριπται P
[73] Περὶ – γραμμῆς *rubro pictum* P : *om.* L
[74] ἐπὶ τὸν] αὐτῆς εἰς τὸν P
[75] φιλολόγους P
[76] οὐ L
[77] τὰ ἀναγκαῖα *om.* P

Ἐάν τις ἔχῃ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν κατὰ τὰ ἄνω μέρη εἰς ὀξὺ λήγουσαν, ἐλαττώσει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν οὐσίαν. Ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τῶν κάτωθεν μερῶν ᾖ πλατεῖα καὶ εὐρεῖα καὶ ἀσφαλῶς (165) βεβηκυῖα, ἀναλήψεται τὰ ἐλαττωθέντα[79] καὶ ἀποκαταστήσει.

Ἐὰν ἡ ἀναγκαία γραμμὴ ἐπιστρέφηται καὶ ἐπινεύῃ ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης δάκτυλον, παρὰ γυναικῶν ἢ διὰ γυναικῶν κέρμα ἀποίσεται, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ χαρήσεται μεγάλως.

Ἐάν τις ἀστέρα ἔχῃ μεταξὺ τῆς ἀναγκαίας καὶ τῆς ζωηφόρου, ἔσται δίκαιος καὶ εὐσεβής.[80]

Ἐὰν ἡ ἀναγκαία γραμμὴ ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου δάκτυλον ἐπιστρέφηται, ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων οὗτος (170) βλαβήσεται.

Ἐὰν κλάδοι τινὲς τῆς ἀναγκαίας γραμμῆς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς δάκτυλον ἐκτρέχωσιν,[81] ἐντίμους[82] ποιοῦσιν.

Ἐάν τις τὴν ἀναγκαίαν γραμμὴν ἀνατείνουσαν ἔχῃ ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς δάκτυλον ἢ ἐγκεκλιμένην[83] ὑπ᾽ αὐτόν, ἢν μὲν οὖν[84] ὀρθὴν ἔχῃ, κρείττων ἡ γένεσις ἔσται τούτου, ἢν δὲ (175) ἐγκεκλιμένην,[85] καὶ οὕτως[86] καλή, οἱ γὰρ[87] ἔχοντες τοῦτο ἔσονται εὐτυχεῖς, ἀμέριμνοι, ἀμελεῖς, διὰ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀκόπως ζῶντες, εὐχερῶς ἀπατώμενοι ὑπὸ γυναικῶν.

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[78] περισσεύσει P
[79] ἐλαττώματα P
[80] *sententia ex loco* 111 *hic repetita*
[81] ἐκτρέχουσιν P
[82] ἐντίμως P
[83] ἐγκεκλεισμένην P
[84] οὖν *om.* L
[85] ἐγκεκλεισμένην P
[86] οὕτως *om.* P
[87] γοῦν P

5. COMMENTARY

The edited chiromantic text is an application of astrological theories to the hand, providing a system for astrological prognostication from the study of a person's palm. The hand is read as a microcosm of the sky, which is seen through the eyes of an astrologer. The connection between the sky and the fate of human beings is probably rooted in sympathetic theories, which can be traced back to the philosopher Posidonius of Apamea (see, for instance, Cic. *Div*. 1.125-127). This would be no surprise. The variants of P concerning fate (see section 3) are in accordance with such philosophical views.

The frequency of rare and technical terms is unusually high. As this text is unique among the extant Greek sources (to date at least), I will leave the task of producing a good English translation to further studies.

The following graphics offer a summary of the topographical description of the hand.

Sections of the Palm



1 = στῆθος τῆς χειρός ("mount of the hand"); 2 = μετάθεναρ ("middle palm"); 3 = μεταστήθιον ("hollow between the mounts"); 4 = στῆθος ἀντίχειρος ("mount of the thumb"); 5 = στῆθη δακτύλων ("mounts of the fingers").

On the discussion of the term μετάθεναρ see Pack 1972, 372-373: θέναρ is equivalent to παλάμη; I therefore propose *middle palm*.

Main Lines of the Palm



α = ἡ ἀναγκαία γραμμή ("the line of necessity"); ζ = ἡ ζωηφόρος γραμμή ("the line of life"); χ = ἡ χρονική γραμμή ("the line of time").

The Planetary Domains



The commentary provided by Pack[88] offers a translation of chiromantic Greek terms and compares the text with Latin chiromancies, which, for the most part, remain unpublished. This survey has not found any details that would substantively add to what Pack reported in his contribution. I will leave the discussion of the vocabulary to future and more in-depth studies.

6. RECEPTION

Inspecting the manuscripts containing the text prompts a new hypothesis concerning the author and the provenance of the Greek chiromancy. The analysis of section 3 allows the hypothesis of a lost original text. Two branches stem from the original witness (ω). The P branch shows that the text was incorporated in a collection of physiognomic texts. By contrast, the L branch shows that it was at first integrated as a chapter of an astronomical handbook; the copyist of E then copied it as an independent text. This format was still successful in the 16th century, as shown by witnesses N and Q: both provide the chiromantic fragment as an independent text. This puts into question the nature of the text. It could well be that it exists as part of a wider opus of physiognomy or astrology for prognostication, but in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Greek chiromancy was chiefly perceived as an independent text.

All the witnesses provide an anonymous text. The oldest of them is L, which was written before the year A.D. 1374 by Isaac Argyros (1300-1375).[89] Given the productivity of this Byzantine scholar in astronomy, it would have been no stretch for him to make astrological predictions – a common practice among scholars in 14th-century Byzantium. He could be the author of the horoscope on f. 1r of the ms L. As this casts a horoscope in favour of Manuel II (his proclamation as emperor in 1373), this goes against Andronicus IV Palaiologos, and could explain why Argyros did not mention his name in the folia directly after that.[90] On this account, further investigation into Argyros's

[88] Pack 1972.

[89] On Argyros, see *PLP*, entry 1285.

[90] Pingree 1971, 193.

astrological activity is required. However, he is not the author of the Greek chiromancy, although a Byzantine scholar active in astrology might well have been its first composer. In this respect, Franz Boll erroneously surmised that the religious beliefs reflected in the text are such as to exclude Byzantine authorship.[91] Recent scholarship on astrology in the Eastern Roman Empire shows that such practice was common among Byzantine scholars. In particular, it has been shown that astronomers used to practice astrology.[92]

In addition, the manuscript L provides further useful data for the reception of the Greek chiromancy. A notable figure within the scientific community of the 15th century, namely Pico della Mirandola (1470-1533), borrowed the manuscript in 1493.[93] There is no evidence to suggest that he consulted the Greek chiromancy properly, for his notes are provided on the folia 99r-v (identification by Sebastiano Gentile), but his interest in astrology and his criticism of astrological practice is well known. Moreover, Pack reports that Pico redacted a treatise against chiromancers printed in 1507 in Strasbourg.[94] Therefore, it is likely that he had read the Greek chiromancy in a preliminary phase in view of the composition of his pamphlet against chiromancers.

Again from L, the bilingual titles on f. 2r and f. 247r *Πρόχειρον Περσικόν* (*Tabulae Persarum*) show that this codex could have originated from Manuel Chrysoloras' library.[95] This scholar was invited by the scholar Coluccio Salutati to Florence to teach the Greek language, and he stayed there from 1397 to 1400 for that purpose.[96] There is no evidence that Chrysoloras took this manuscript with him to Italy. Demetrios Triboles[97] could also have possessed this manuscript. The private library of the Medici family acquired the manuscript from Tribo-

[91] See *CCAG* 1908, 236.
[92] Tihon 2006.
[93] Gentile 1994, 88-89.
[94] Pack 1978, 127-130.
[95] Mercati 1926, 98-99; Pontani 1995, 374; Rollo 2002a, 92, 95, 101 n. 64; Zorzi 2002, 108.
[96] Rollo 2002b, 47 n. 21.
[97] *PLP* 29298.

les'collection. In fact, the Byzantine scholar John Laskaris[98] reports that in 1491, during a trip to Greece in order to search for manuscripts on behalf of Lorenzo de' Medici, he found a manuscript in the library of Triboles in Arta. The content of that manuscript is very similar to L. After having been acquired for the Medici collection, it was borrowed by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on 2 October 1493.[99] It was then discovered by Zanobi Acciaioli, as reported in his note on f. 1^{v}: *Olim Petri de Medicis*, *repertus inter libros Comitis Iohannis Mirandulanj* ("once of Pietro de' Medici, found among the book of the Earl John of Mirandola."). In sum, the oldest witness to the Greek chiromancy was brought to Italy either by Manuel Chrysoloras or by John Laskaris.

The manuscript J was transcribed by the Byzantine scholar John Abramios and one of his collaborators. Although not a renowned personality, Abramios was very active in astrology, and as such, he might have studied and made use of the text.[100]

The manuscript E reports the Greek chiromancy as an independent text for the first time. The treatise appears among Greek astrological texts, which were all copied by the renowned German astronomer Regiomontanus in the second half of the 15th century, between 1461-1467. His antigraphs were the *Marcianus graecus Z* 335 and the abovementioned M.[101] During those years, Regiomontanus was working on behalf of Bessarion in order to accomplish a primer on the *Almagest*, i.e., the renowned *Epitoma Almagesti*, an opus aimed at correcting the errors introduced by the translations of Ptolemy's *magnum opus* into Latin.[102] On this account, Regiomontanus had to strive to improve his knowledge of Greek, in order to read the original text of the *Almagest*. The astrological texts he copied from M to E are evidence of his exercise in learning how to write in Greek. This is confirmed by the several Latin annotations in the margins, by the slow *ductus* he adopted and

[98] *PLP* 14536.
[99] Gentile 1994, 88-89.
[100] Pingree 1971, *passim*.
[101] Rigo 1991, 75 n. 173.
[102] Zinner 1968, 51-55, 213-214. See also Shank 2017, 87-98.

by the style of his writing habit: all of this suggests a scribe not well versed in Greek writing. This is also evidence of Regiomontanus' interest in the Greek chiromancy: since he could select the texts for his transcription, he chose the chiromancy out of personal interest. In addition, we can be sure that the codex is his personal copy, for he took it with him later when he settled in Hungary (1467-1471), and then in Nürnberg, Germany (1471-1475), and it was inventorized as part of his estate upon his death. Regiomontanus'astrological interests, as well his practice of astrology, need to be investigated in greater depth. His estate includes some renowned astrological works, such as commentaries on Alcabitius, Manilius's *Astronomica*, and Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*.[103] Furthermore, some astrological methods are ascribed to the astronomer of Königsberg (e.g., the casting of the astrological houses): Valentin Naibod's *Enarratio Elementorum Astrologiae* is an indirect source of the astrological methods of Regiomontanus (cf. *Enarratio* 115–122, 138). Moreover, two Latin chiromancies are attributed to Regiomontanus.[104] Such interests are not surprising: it is well known that all the astronomers of his age practiced astrology so as to make a living. On this account, it is very likely that he paid attention to the Greek chiromancy.

The manuscript N inserts the chiromancy into a selection of rhetorical and philosophical texts, copied by the Byzantine scholar Michael Sophianos[105] and the Italian humanist and collector Gian Vincenzo Pinelli,[106] both active in 16th-century Italy. The scribe of the chiromancy, as yet unrecognized, might be a collaborator of theirs, and this may also suggest the interest of an important Renaissance scholar like Pinelli in the Greek chiromancy.

7. FINAL REMARKS

Although the author of the Greek chiromantic fragment remains anonymous, the opus might originate from antiquity, but nothing ex-

[103] Zinner 1968, 254.
[104] Craig 1916, xxvi-xxvii.
[105] Meschini 1981.
[106] Grendler 1981.

cludes the possibility that it might be a Byzantine composition – a hypothesis that Boll rejected. The astrological and philosophical knowledge provided in the text does not conflict with the cultural background of Byzantine scholars such as Argyros and Abramios.

Studying the text's reception demonstrates that the Greek chiromancy was considered amid the debates on astrology and chiromancy generated by Italian humanism. For sure, the text piqued the interest of one of the most important astronomers of the 15th century. The dual nature of chiromancy is reflected in its reception: P inserts the text into a selection of physiognomic texts, while L and its family transcribe the text into selections of astronomical and astrological texts.

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UNMASKING HERCULES: TRACING COMEDY IN PROPERTIUS' FOURTH BOOK

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Abstract. This paper centers on the ninth elegy of Propertius' fourth book, remaking a neglected case for a reading as *paraclausithyron* and establishing a further case for siting it in a comic dramatic frame. The aim is to reveal the importance of the comic background to elegy 4.9, particularly in the *paraclausithyron* topos and the use of a cross-dressed Hercules. The analysis emphasizes the elegy's sources in stage comedy and contradicts the more typical claim that 4.9 absorbs Hercules into a specifically elegiac framework. Propertius 4.9, altogether, with its myth of Hercules, serves to acclimate an epic figure into the elegiac world, to explore the fluidity of gender in elegy as well as to access the specifics of comedy and mime as a genre important to Propertian poetics. The survey on *paraclausithyron* and gender play of transvestism in ancient poetry, shall indicate the relation of theatre with Propertius, who draws elegiac settings within the frame of a theatrical scene, veiling Hercules in the appearance of a comic lover.

Much has been written about the ninth elegy of Propertius' fourth book and the way it reflects the dual nature of a book that oscillates between political and amorous themes: elegies on a Roman theme, elegies on the love theme and elegies in which the two combined are found side by side. Elegy 4.9 has attracted a fair share of scholarly at-

tention over the years, and even more so, in recent years.[1] It has been argued that the elegy shows what Propertius' sophisticated elegiac mode can do with epic material and how the poet's identification with Hercules enables him to reject love poetry for other themes.[2] It has been proposed that by setting the episode in a public space, Propertius participates in an ideological trend of the Augustan principate: blurring the distinction between private and public.[3] Humorous details of the Bona Dea narrative are said to prove that Propertius imitates Callimachus' wit.[4] However, there must be more reasons why an elegy, which explains the origins of the Ara Maxima and the sanctuary of the Bona Dea, turns into a burlesque episode with a seeming embarrassment for Hercules' Roman career.

W. Anderson in 1964 had argued that Propertius blended epic and elegy by assimilating Hercules to the *exclusus amator* of a *paraclausithyron*.[5] Since then, scholars have neglected this view, suggesting political readings and programmatic theories to explain Hercules' liminal moment.[6] However, one should excavate the comic elements of Propertius 4.9 as a way of linking both the generic and programmatic theories with the embryonic idea of a *paraclausithyron*. The figure of Hercules who doesn't fit into his surroundings introduces gender fluidity and genre transgression (*iacit ante fores verba minora deo*, 4.9.32). The account of the thirsty semi-god attempting to gain entry to the grove of Bona Dea to drink from the spring within (4.9.21ff.) is almost without precedent and articulates the progress in the literary figure of Hercules, whose machismo is finally restored towards the end of Propertius

[1] See Holleman 1977; Warden 1982; DeBrohun 1994; Janan 1998; Lindheim 1998; Fox 1999; Spencer 2001; Welch 2004; Harrison 2005; Günther 2006; Panoussi 2016.

[2] See McParland 1970, who bases this theory on the concluding prayer of 4.9.

[3] Welch 2005.

[4] Pillinger 1969.

[5] Anderson 1964.

[6] For instance, see DeBrohun 2003, 134-143 and Cairns 1992.

4.[7] Elegy 4.9 is significant since it connects the long tradition of the *paraclausithyron* motif, originating from Greek poetry (Theocritus), with a theatrical episode of transvestism, effected through the person of Hercules, of all the heroes the most liminal. Therefore, three elements – *paraclausithyron*, transvestism, epic hero – converge in an elegy which illuminates a literary tradition that is now unknown or lost.

This paper intends to prove the importance of the comic background to Propertius 4.9, particularly in the *paraclausithyron* topos and the use of a cross-dressed Hercules. The main argument focuses on three separate points. Firstly, Propertius 4.9 seems to de-heroize the epic Virgilian Hercules in order to acclimate him into the elegiac world. Secondly, the poem explores the fluidity of gender in elegy by introducing an image of a cross-dressed Hercules. Thirdly, and more importantly, Propertius 4.9 imagines elegiac settings within the frame of a theatrical scene when shifting to a comic version of *paraclausithyron*. These points may indicate that comedy is a more important generic model for elegy 4.9 than has been previously realized, and thus making the poem distinct for its reading audience.

The examination proposes to revive a neglected case for a reading of 4.9 as mock-*paraclausithyron*, establishing a strong further case for siting it in a comic dramatic frame. In order to understand the elegy, one needs to emphasize its sources in stage comedy and down-play the typical claim that the poem absorbs Hercules into an elegiac framework. This reading deviates from the prevailing opinion that "the Hercules of 4.9 has fewer comic and more numerous serious aspects."[8] The paper examines closely the hero's encounter with the worshippers of Bona Dea – the elegy's second episode. Hercules' thirst separates the Ara Maxima from its *aition*, the killing of Cacus, but also renders

[7] Macrobius in his *Saturnalia* (1.12.27-28) may have cited Varro's (now lost) account.

[8] Cairns 2006; Harrison 2005; Warden 1982; Galinsky 1972 regards the elegy as humorous but only to an extent. Cf. DeBrohun 2003; Janan 2001; Lindheim 1998a; Holleman 1977. Anderson in 1964 does not look beyond the primary picture of the *exclusus amator* to find the hero's burlesque characterisation and behaviour.

Hercules a *sititor amans* on a mistress' threshold.[9] As soon as he is told the words of rejection (*limina linque*, 54), the hero pursues a violent entry, a crossing over from one genre to another – from elegy to comedy – mixing, through his movement, a variety of literary elements.[10]

The motif of the *exclusus amator* in Propertius 4.9 needs to be examined for its comic aspects, its epic touch, and relation to the *paraclausithyron* scene of the Roman stage. The comic traits of this episode deflate the ritual to a performance, wherein the participants (*adulescens-puella*) switch roles and where inclusivity is associated with female authority. Gender fluidity, identity simulation and the *paraclausithyron* as a scenario which turns Hercules into an actor, are aspects to be highlighted. The *exclusus amator* motif is only one elegiac theme, albeit an important one, within a larger context of comedy sketched in 4.9. When Hercules arrives on the threshold and entry has been denied to him by the priestess, he reacts in a way that offers a comic performance for his audience: he tries to convince the priestess that he may pass for a female. Thus, his mythological figure wishes to gain access to a different genre. Hercules' gendered transformation may also recall the famous Bona Dea scandal which upset Rome in 62 B.C., when Clodius, in violation of the sacred rites, disguised himself as a woman and invaded Caesar's house to pursue a sexual conquest.[11] Both Hercules' and Clodius' transgressions involve impersonation and the adaptation of signs of femaleness to gain admission.

The primary textual focus of this paper is elegy 4.9, but also draws on passages from throughout Book 4. The following sections survey the *paraclausithyron* and the gender play of transvestism in ancient poetry, especially comedy, covering a range of Greek and Latin texts. The first section examines previous expressions of the plea for admis-

[9] For V. Panoussi (2016, 179-194), Prop. 4.9 connects the religious framework of the cults of the Bona Dea and Ara Maxima with geographical distinctions between East and West.

[10] Rhinthon's farce (φλύαξ) under the title *Hercules* could have influenced Propertius' elegy.

[11] Cic. *Att*. 1.13.3.

sion to an exclusive space, focusing on key points of the Hercules episode which are of a dramatic rather than a lyric character. The second section focuses on the *paraclausithyron* components in Propertius 4.9 and the division of male and female space of dramatic action. In this elegy the female guardian, the priestess of the Bona Dea, is transformed into a comic *lena*, and the goddess' sanctuary into a lover's bedchamber. The third and fourth sections present the connection between Propertius' Hercules and comic characters such as the *meretrices*, *milites*, and *servi*. Hercules does not quite fit the effeminate role of the *amator* and thus, might be seen crossing the stage in the way of the lovers in comedy.

Before proceeding, it is worth bearing in mind that Hercules has behind him a long tradition of comic treatments. One may recall, for instance, the opening of Plautus' *Persa* with a comparison of the labours of the comic lover with those of Hercules, who is characterized by comic thirst and monstrous appetites. Moreover, in Plautus' *Bacchides* (155), a boastful *adulescens amans* warns his tutor that they might play Hercules and Linus. Well known is a lekythos, now in Vienna, that shows Hercules staging his own κῶμος: he has put down his club and is playing the flute as he is marching along, leading a procession with garlanded satyrs cavorting behind him.[12] Finally, Aristophanes' Hercules is both the champion of justice representing serious genre and a mad hero ideal for satiric treatment (*Ran*. 142-143). Therefore, reconsideration and reappraisal of an elegy like 4.9, which develops around a dramatic nucleus, could result into the "expansion" of the elegiac genre.

I. ON THE THRESHOLD

One should delve into the definition of the *paraclausithyron* to realize the combination of dramatic and elegiac tradition in the Hercules episode. The term refers to the sorrowful song of a drunk and garlanded lover who has come from a symposium and seeks vain admission at the door of his beloved. With a torch in his hand, he knocks, expecting to be granted admission or, otherwise, to be able to persuade the lady to come out. Yet the outcome is grim; the door remains closed, the

[12] Galinsky 1972, 82 (Plate 4).

lover is excluded. He protests the girl's cruelty, describes in picturesque detail his own sufferings, and scribbles verses on her door while staying awake in her doorway. The epigrams of Asclepiades, Callimachus and Meleager give a complete picture of this stock scene, which is assumed to have derived from features of the ancient κῶμος.[13]

The motif was treated in different ways, producing at times more narrative-oriented units, and at other times, truly dramatic performances. The latter gave special prominence to the lover's song while omitting details of the scene. The earliest, non-dramatic *paraclausithyron* is Theocritus' third *Idyll*, where all the violence of the κῶμος song disappears, to be replaced by the hopes and heartaches of the lover's pilgrimage to his beloved's door.[14] Theocritus' komast emphasizes his desires and the girl's cruelty (8-9, 15-17).[15] It is to this non-dramatic tradition that elegy owes the figure of the *exclusus amator*. The lover is never admitted and is left grieving at the doorway. It should be preliminarily stated that Hercules in elegy 4.9 is double-excluded, since his setting involves two doorways: Hercules, as another komast, rushes through the first door only to find further another gate shut.

In the hands of the Roman elegiac poets, who seem to be more daring than the Greeks, the song is transformed and new elements are added to its non-dramatic komastic version.[16] The girl in the Greek tradition was a ἑταῖρα who admitted or excluded lovers as she wished. In Roman elegy, however, dating from Catullus' Lesbia, a triangular relationship involves the poet, the girl and her husband, and this gives

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[13] AP 5.167, 5.145, 5.23, 5.191. The *paraclausithyron* motif in mimic performances was called θυροκοπικόν and κρουσίθυρον (*Trypho ap*. *Athen*. 618c). According to Copley (1956, 28), the theme was adopted with fervour by the Romans, due to the preexistence of a Roman "door-song."

[14] Copley 1956, 15. See Yardley 1978 for the Greek komastic *topoi*: inebriation, coming from symposium, torches, garlands, terrible weather, doorstep vigil, tears, kisses on door, abuse of door, invocations to gods, insults to beloved, suspicion that beloved is not alone.

[15] *Id*. 3.15-17, 52, 6-9, 24-27, 33, 36, 52-54. The komast in 2.121 wears a white poplar garland, which he identifies as Ἡρακλέος ἱερὸν ἔρνος.

[16] Tib. 1.2; Prop. 1.16; Ov. *Am*. 1.6.

prominence to the triangle-theme of *furtivus amor*.[17] Moreover, frequent personification and great concern with the door, are both characteristics of the Roman elegiac tradition. The lover's pilgrimage is also implied rather than described:[18] he is always drunk and always finds the door closed, because the lady and the *ianitor* (custodian) are heartless.[19]

It is important to note that the element of violence and physical attack on the door plays little or no part in the non-dramatic form of the motif; Tibullus in 1.2 imagines wandering onto Delia's threshold addressing the closed door, wishing upon it the misfortunes experienced by a lover (7-8). His girl is married and, since the door belongs to a master (*dominus*, 7) Tibullus requests that it open furtively (10). Ovid (*Am*. 1.6) constructs a *paraclausithyron* in its entirety and begins by asking the *ianitor* to admit him. When time passes, the drunken lover threatens to burn down the house with his torch (57-60). Threats and prayers have led nowhere and the lover, leaving his garland as a reminder of his wasted time, bids farewell to the *ianitor* and the doors (71-74). Ovid will then elevate the humble slave (*ianitor*) to the position of the god intending the word *orare* to carry its religious overtones, providing his elegy with humorous effect.

Nevertheless, as far as the dramatic tradition is concerned, the function of a *paraclausithyron* scene is very different. In Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* (938-975), a crowd of young men is sketched, roaming the streets and trying to gain admission to the girl's house. It is to such songs that Eupolis could have referred when mentioning Gnesippos as the inventor of νυκτερίν' ἄσματα, which bring women out of doors.[20] The earliest extant Roman *paraclausithyron* is detected in Plautus' *Curculio* where the procession of the lover Phaedromus opens the scene

[17] The status of Propertius' Cynthia fluctuates: at one moment she is a *matrona*, at the next she resembles a Greek-styled ἑταῖρα.
[18] Hor. *Epod*. 11.20; Tib. 1.227.
[19] *Ferreus ianitor* in Ov. *Met*. 14.712; Tib. 1.2.3; Ov. *Am*. 1.6.37.
[20] Fr. 366 Koch.

(1-64). The atmosphere of the original κῶμος is revealed:[21] mock heroics, Phaedromus' elaborate courtesy to the personified door, and the theme of *furtivus amor*. Phaedromus pours wine on the threshold (an action in harmony with the κῶμος's general character), to attract the attention of the girl's *custos*, Leaena, whereas the girl is a willing partner prevented from seeing her lover by the door and the *lena*.[22] Plautus also provides the young man, Phaedromus, with a slave, Palinurus, whose function is to mock his master's lament to the door.

A close reading of the *paraclausithyron* scene in the *Curculio* could establish the comic form of the practice which will be later applied in Propertius' elegy. There are specific points of convergence between the two treatments that contribute to the visuality and theatricality of Hercules in elegy 4.9. Propertius gives a clear picture of a *paraclausithyron* which involves not a complicated elegiac affair, but the failed assignation of a young man with a *meretrix*.[23] In this elegy, the door's personification and the *furtivus amor* (the most important Roman addition in the motif) revive the original scene in the *Curculio*, and Propertius presents his effort as he strives to open the door to a more dramatic incident.

In *Curculio*, Phaedromus, holding a torch, attempts to meet Planesium, a young woman in the possession of Cappadox and guarded by a duenna, Leaena. Knowing Leaena's weakness for drinking, Phaedromus plans to sprinkle the door with wine, so that she will be induced to open it; he pours wine on the *fores*, begging the closed doors to send out Planesium (147): "Come drink, thou jolly door, drink, be willing kindly unto me" (trans. by P. Nixon). The likeness of the door-keeper to god,

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[21] The Romans use the form *comissarii* for κῶμος (Plaut. *Persa* 567) and other terms like *occentare fores* (Plaut. *Curc*. 145; *Merc*. 408; *Persa* 569). Cf. Theophr. *Char*. 12.

[22] The bribery of servants in order to obtain the girl's favour is frequent in comedy. On the contrary, in the Greek tradition it is the girl who is responsible for the lover's exclusion.

[23] In Copley's words (1956, 121), "Propertius made the motif a door-song once more, stripping it down to its basic components and bringing back the band of drunken revelers."

made openly in Tibullus, is here, in Roman drama, made implicitly; in *Curculio*, the *lena* and the door receive wine, the typical offering to the gods. The lover's lament has the strategic advantage of revealing devotion. Moreover, originating from Roman comedy, the theme of *furtivus amor* (stolen love) is one of the most important alterations on the *paraclausithyron* scene that would become conventional in the later Roman *paraclausithyron*, especially in Roman elegy. According to this, the woman, Planesium, is unable to choose for herself whom she may love, since her custodian acts as the essential impediment to the union of the lover and his beloved. In *Curculio*, the blocking character is the *custos*, Leaena. This guardian may sometimes become a harsh, unyielding obstacle in the *paraclausithyron* of Roman New Comedy, and features prominently later on in the poetry of the Roman elegists who developed the *paraclausithyron* as a prime example of male amatory persuasion.[24]

Following the example of the comic *paraclausithyron*, Propertius' Hercules in 4.9 addresses the door with prayer-formulae as a worshipper would treat an altar.[25] Such deification of the *limen* goes back to the komastic song of Plautus' Phaedromus who gives the door the position of sole importance (*Curc*. 88-89). Propertius' door is addressed with a descriptive phrase in the vocative case (17) while the lover acts as a devotee (43-44), but never receives what he prayed for (*preces*, 19-20). The door is the only figure in the poem and the only point of interest. The temple of the Bona Dea is transformed into a typical erotic threshold with garlands and incense (27-28) and Hercules' encounter with the old priestess, the guardian of the threshold, gets centre stage. Propertius, aware of the Greek komastic tradition, presents Hercules addressing the *ianitor* who guards the door and who is elevated to divine status. Therefore, much of the poem's humour lies in the deification of the Bona Dea's priestess, who is the blocking character.[26]

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[24] Yardley 1978, 19-34.

[25] See Catull. 67; Hor. *Carm*. 3.10.16; Tib. 1.2.14; Ov. *Ars am*. 2.527. Cf. the highly-emotional *o* in Prop. 4.9.33 and Hor. *Carm*. 1.30.

[26] See the doorkeeper in Ar. *Ran*. 465-478. For *cede* (54), cf. Plaut. *Aul*. 40: *exi*, *inquam*, *age exi* and *Mostell*. 460.

Apart from comparing the doorkeeper in the comedy *Curculio* with the priestess (*alma sacerdos*, 51; *anus*, 61), this author suggests that the wine offering to the door is a gesture implicitly identifying Hercules with the comic young man, the *adulescens*. It is worthwhile that in 1.16 Propertius clearly describes the activity of a devotee in prayer (43) who brings votive offerings on his mistress' threshold. Hence, when writing both 1.16 and 4.9, the poet probably thinks of Phaedromus in *Curculio* bringing wine for the door and the *lena*.[27] Hercules is presented as another Phaedromus in front of a personified door (*implacidas fores*, 4.9.14).[28] He is afflicted with such an overwhelming thirst (*sicco torquet sitis ora palato*, 21) that his only literary counterpart is Leaena in the *Curculio* (*da vicissim meo gutturi gaudium*, 106; *siti sicca*, 118). The "narrator," Propertius, plays the role of Palinurus who follows Phaedromus and whose function is to describe and mock his master's lament to the door (*Curc*. 1-160). By transferring to Hercules' song the trick which he utilized in 1.16, Propertius renders his hero a comic young man, an *adulescens* who prays to the girl inside using the conventional *lenia verbia* (*precor*, *preces*).[29]

As far as the dramatic *paraclausithyron* is concerned, it should be noted that the image of inclusion/exclusion becomes a central theme and thus is emphasized. Therefore, in both Plautus' *Curculio* and Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, the lover is not rejected; the door is opened so that

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[27] It is unclear on which side of the door the priestess is speaking; she may be situated outside like the Leaena in *Curculio*. In Euripides' *Syleus*, the door is used differently for comic purposes; Hercules handles it as a table for his repast, helping himself to Syleus' food and best wine (fr. 687 N.2).

[28] The word *implacidas* is a Propertian neologism which catches the reader's attention, not only because it suggests *clausas fores*, but also because it looks back to Catull. 67, where the personification of the door is a characteristically Italian element.

[29] For *preces* in a komastic situation, cf. Prop. 1.16.20; Ov. *Am*. 1.6.2, 2.1.22; Hor. *Carm*. 3.10.13; Alc. fr. 374 LP λίσσομαι. Copley (1956, 123) argues that Ovid breaks with Propertius and Tibullus by addressing, in *Am*. 1.6, not the door but the doorkeeper. However, Propertius addresses both in 4.9 and thus he makes a contrast with elegy 1.16.

the plot can be developed. Terence and Aristophanes parody the exclusion theme in the *Eunuchus* (771-816) and the *Lysistrata* (845-979), and Plautus makes references to it in the *Mercator* and *Persa*.[30] Sometimes the young men go to the extent of breaking or burning down the door, or even of kidnapping or inflicting injury on the girl.[31] Plautus' *Persa* (564-572) shows that the violence of the incident before the door, when the lover attacks it with axes, crowbars and torches, figures prominently for a particular dramatic effect. Other times, the comic door opens or lovers flexibly find their way around a closed *limen*.[32] Conclusively, the non-dramatic and dramatic tradition of the *paraclausithyron* feature different characteristics and explore new dynamics.

The pattern or topos of a sleepless lover and the *paraclausithyron* of comedy seem to infuse the whole corpus of Propertius' elegies. The poet extensively uses the image of closed doors, of *clausae fores*, when sketching himself watching at Cynthia's closed door and singing his plaint (1.8.21-22, 2.9.41-44). Propertius also reminds Gallus of his own capacity for opening stubborn doors (1.10.15-16); Gallus is presented performing *vigilationes* at the door of his mistress (1.13.33). To Propertius, the door is *mollis* (2.14.21-24, 2.20.23) and in his lady's arms he hears the vain knocking of his rejected rivals.[33] The poet bids farewell to his love with Cynthia, by using the *exclusus* incident at the *limen*, at the shut door (3.25.9-10).

Propertius has staged an actual parody of the *paraclausithyron* scene in 1.16, where the whole poem turns out to be a monologue by the door. The Capitoline hill, and more specifically the temple to Fides, is the setting for the exclusion incident. Via the door's speech, the elegist claims to have a long history in writing *paraclausithyra* (*deduxi carmina*,

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[30] Also, examples of *paraclausithyron* mime can be found in Herod. 2, the *Pornovoskos*. Cf. Κωμαστής (Page 332).

[31] Ar. *Vesp*. 1253-1255; *Eccl*. 957-977; *Lys*. 248-251; Plaut. *Bacch*. 1118-1119; Plut. *Am*. *narr*. 772f-773a.

[32] Ar. *Eccl*. 938-975; Plaut. *Curc*. 147-190; *Men*. 698-699, 1140-1145; also in Prop. 1.8.21-46.

[33] Even the dead Cornelia is said to have passed behind doors, which cannot be opened by any power (Prop. 4.11.1-8).

41); the same door witnessed triumphal processions in the past, but now tolerates disgraceful behaviour from the mistress' lovers (5-12). In lines 17-44, the *ianua* quotes the song of a particular suppliant who complains about the door's cruelty. Propertius makes explicit references to the komasts who come with the standard equipment of *corollae* and *faces* (7-8), weeping and kissing the threshold.[34] The door has been subjected to the graffiti inscribed by the komasts and been unable to ward off (*defendere*) the mistress's nights of shame. It has often been wounded by the *rixae* of lovers (metapoetically, by previous poets), though not by this lover, the author Propertius, who claims (37) that he has not even verbally abused it.[35]

II. PROPERTIUS ON THE THRESHOLD

Copley has argued that Propertius writes his single *paraclausithyron* in 1.16 as an action of revolt against Tibullus' treatment of the theme.[36] I argue that Hercules in elegy 4.9 represents another example of the *paraclausithyron*, as the whole poem leads up to and is motivated by the hero's final plea for admission. It should be mentioned that this elegy is introduced by the image of Cynthia purifying her threshold, as if it was a sanctuary, from the women (*puellae*) who engaged her lover and who should be excluded from her own realm (*externae*, 4.8.83). Within elegy 4.9, Propertius exploits a set of areas enclosed by the structure of the poem: the rites of the Bona Dea, which are secret and enacted by a limited number of women, and the rites of the Ara Maxima involving public male feasting.[37] This inclusion or exclusion caused by a door dividing the public street where the action takes

[34] The door sees the *faces* as the military standards (*signa*) of the komast. Yardley (1979, 157) compares the situation with that in Apuleius (*Apol*. 75) who criticizes the frequent komastic activity outside Herennius Rufinus' house.

[35] The elegy bears a close connection to Hellenistic examples, drawing its inspiration especially from Theocritus (*Id*. 3.6-7, 3.18); cf. Asclep. AP 5.167. The talking door, like Catullus' talking *phaselus*, can be traced back to Greek epigrams where inanimate objects are given voice.

[36] Copley 1956.

[37] Hutchinson 2006, 206.

place (male space) and the private space where offstage indoor scenes develop (female space) is reminiscent of theatre. Propertius in 4.9 uses the specific allocation of space for the dramatic plot and the depiction of his Hercules episode. His *paraclausithyron* plays with oppositions such as inside/outside; closed/open; feminine/masculine.

As already mentioned, in the non-dramatic tradition, the lover is never admitted. However, when Hercules, the *receptus amans*, crosses the stage to the shrine door, he does not confine himself to threats. He actually violates the shrine by breaking down the doors, a movement that furnishes the poem with comedy. Hercules, that is, does not play by the *paraclausithyron* rules. His violent entry indicates his eagerness to defy the elegiac pattern: he crosses over from one genre and literary style to another (from elegy to comedy and vice versa). Propertius chooses Hercules as the ideal figure since he is already related to the komastic tradition and often depicted participating with Dionysus and Hermes in Dionysiac κῶμος.[38] This section will underline comic elements of Hercules' episode wherein the participants switch roles as soon as the demi-god clashes with the door-keeper.[39]

After slaying the monstrous Cacus and founding the Forum Boarium, the battle-weary Hercules is placed in a situation that is altogether appropriate to the elegiac lover; that is, begging to be admitted to the women-only Bona Dea shrine to drink from its fountain. The episode inverts the thematics of the *Hecale* in Callimachus, where Theseus is accepted by Hecale. Just as in the *Hecale*, the epic element is marginal, and the elegiac central; but where Hercules is excluded, Theseus is welcomed. Propertius converts the epic topic into an elegiac one, by devoting twenty lines to Cacus' episode and nearly fifty lines to the resulting portrait of Hercules, who is reduced to being a pathetic sufferer and a conventional *amator* outside the closed door of a *puella*. In

[38] Galinsky 1972, 82 (Plate 3).

[39] The priestess episode in 4.9 becomes more humorous based on the door's religious and magical significance in Rome. The *lena* who craves wine is replaced by a thirsty suppliant, Hercules. Cf. Yardley 1979, 159 and DeBrohun 2003.

the elegy, the enclosed space (*loca clausa*, 24; *lucus*, 23; *luci sacro ... antro*, 32; *lucoque ... verendo*, 52) is a locus of female authority and power:

> *lucus ubi umbroso fecerat orbe nemus,*
> *femineae loca clausa deae fontesque piandos*
> *mpune et nullis sacra retecta viris* (4.9.24-26)

Scholars have come close to the truth arguing that Propertius intends a story congenial to elegy for Hercules' major adventure.[40] However, the generic interplay of elegiac conventions and epic not only renders the hero a mediator between lyric and epic, but also offers a thirsty, amorous, unprecedented comic Hercules who smashes the entrance of the shrine (*et cava succepto flumine palma sat est*).[41]

The poem borrows the outline of its story from Hercules' encounter with Cacus from the *Aeneid* (8.184ff.). Evander recounts the story while urging the proto-Roman Aeneas to align himself with Greek Hercules as an icon of masculine austerity (*haec limina victor Alcides subiit*, 362).[42] Propertius chooses to reshape Hercules' victory and to suppress heroic aspects of the battle which are fully described in Vergil and Livy.[43] In Vergil, Hercules is reinvented and his foundation of the Ara Maxima symbolizes the re-foundation of Rome by Augustus. Hercules' defeat of Cacus offers an allegorical reworking of Actium in which Cacus takes the role of Antony.[44] Nevertheless, the hero of Propertius 4.9 may not be such an honorific parallel for the princeps because he seems undignified and exists alongside more comic elements.[45] He resembles a

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[40] Anderson 1964, 3; Grimal 1952, 14ff.; Heinze 1919, 81ff.

[41] Ath. 10.441: An Italian woman tries to persuade her husband to give the thirsty Hercules water, not wine.

[42] Hercules' patronymic *Amphtryoniades* creates a tone more appropriate for epic.

[43] In Liv. 1.7.10 and Ov. *Fast*. 1.583-584, Hercules learns directly after killing Cacus that he will become a god.

[44] Morgan 1998; Spencer 2001, 263-73. Within the developing Augustan city, there are six places of Hercules' worship.

[45] On the contrary, Harrison (2005, 125) argues that the encomiastic aspect of the comparison of Hercules and Augustus, established in previous poetry, holds in 4.9.

small-scale hero like the "world-beating mini-Hercules" praised in Statius' *Silvae* 4.6.[46]

Why does Propertius bring the particular masculine voice and relate him to the aetiology of the origins of Rome? Is this narrative more or less political than Vergil's? An epic-comic Hercules invades elegy and becomes the poet's right hand and guardian of his poetry (72), exactly because he adopts the figure of an *exclusus amator*. Propertius is not backing off from writing a political/epic work; he is rather reestablishing epic by means of comedy and by using an increasingly ludicrous Hercules. Bona Dea's cult and image get pushed away when the hero takes revenge on the *puellae* who excluded him, wishing for them to be always stuck outside the threshold. The position of the word *feminae* at the beginning of the couplet (25-26) and *viris* at the end underlines the separation of women from men. The god is sanctified as a result for his actions, for cleansing not just the world (*orbem*, 73) but also the Bona Dea's grove (*orbe*, 24). He points to his encounter with Atlas (*tergo qui sustulit orbem*, 4.9.37) and his journey to the underworld (4.9.41). He then adopts a new feminine identity next to a "dominating" queen (4.9.48) whose role is that of the *domina puella* in love elegy.

The prominent issue is the link between Augustus and the Ara Maxima.[47] Hercules' route via the Velabrum (5) passing the Ara Maxima repeats the way taken by the victorious Augustus on his return to Rome in 19 B.C.[48] Even if the reference to the Bona Dea is somehow erased, this does not hinder Propertius in lavishing his attention on Hercules' adventure at the shrine. The establishment of the Ara Maxima is postponed until after the less heroic, albeit major, adventure of

[46] Henderson 2007.

[47] The prominent issue is the reason why women are not permitted to worship in the Ara. The temple of the Bona Dea on the Aventine was restored by Livia but it is uncertain whether this event predates Propertius' elegy (Ov. *Fast*. 5.148-158). The next day of Hercules' rites at the Ara Maxima (29 B.C.), Augustus began his triple triumph, *CIL* 244.

[48] Harrison 1995, 127.

Hercules.[49] The hero rushes towards the sacred grove pleading with the women to give him access to the water within (34). The tale of Hercules before the shrine mirrors the story of his duel with Cacus and together they introduce the image of closed doors and intrusion.[50] Hercules' elegy becomes a double *paraclausithyron*. The superlative *exclusissimus* coined by Plautus (*Men*. 698-700) for the caricature of the scorned, "thirsty" lover would be ideal for the hero. Propertius sets the reader before the door and keeps him there. Hercules' expectations of hospitality in both Cacus' cave and the Bona Dea's shrine are thwarted and the hero ends up angrily breaking down the doors of the cave (9) and finally the shrine (61).

Hercules occupies a liminal moment on the threshold – *iacit ante fores verba minora deo* (32) − where he adopts the pathetic figure already sketched for him in the lament of Megara.[51] His exact phraseology will be later adopted by Latona in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (6.352-368), who is thirsty and begs the Lycians to permit her to drink: *supplex peto ... verba minora dea tollensque*. The laughter and merriment that Hercules hears from within the shrine signify amatory situations and echo victorious Cynthia's laughter near the end of 4.8, from within her threshold. Married Roman matrons and the Vestal Virgins carried out the rites of the Bona Dea.[52] Since the *paraclausithyron* incident traditionally belongs to the world of the ἑταῖρα, the women enclosed within the Bona Dea's grove are not called *virgines*, but *puellae*, the term of elegy's beloved.

Elegy 4.9 provides an example of the poet's shifting voice, for he assumes two roles: one a larger than life masculine figure and one a female priestess, on opposing sides of the threshold. There are two sides of the door; there are the *exclusus amator* and the *inclusae puellae*. Similarly, in Plautus (*Curc*. 147-152), the lover Phaedromus is locked out;

[49] Unlike Vergil, Livy and Ovid who all insist that the conquest of Cacus accounts for the origin of the Ara Maxima.

[50] In Varro's version, Hercules is described neither as lingering before the doors nor as breaking down the entrance of the cave-shrine (in Macrob. *Sat*. 1.12.28).

[51] Mosch. *Meg*. 4, esp. line 11. If in Varro Hercules invaded the sanctuary, we should expect Macrobius to include it.

[52] Spencer 2001, 274.

his lover Planesium locked in. Horatian *paraclausithyra* also turn the door around, with amusing results. Horace's favoured variation is the *inclusa amatrix*. When the poet tells Chloris (*Carm.* 3.15) to stop playing love-games (4-5), go home and attend the household tasks (13-140), he effectively shuts her in behind the door. Chloris' daughter, Pholoe, an *exclusa amatrix*, assumes a position of power exactly the opposite of Lydia (*Carm.* 1.25). The door's duplicity is what makes Propertius' *paraclausithyron* lock certain authors (the poet, the hero) and certain audiences (the reader, the priestess) inside and outside the text. Pindar's *Paean* 6 presents a similar situation to the Bona Dea's incident. A κῶμος is performed by young men who beg the elderly priestess Pythia for admission to Delphi from within they can hear the sound of water. Κόραι sing and dance (16) in Apollo's grove which nourishes garlands and banquets. The same way the Bona Dea's grove is forbidden to men (26, 55) the grove of Delphi is "bereft of the dancing of men."

The rites of the Bona Dea were reserved for married women but in their elegiac version *meretrices* or unmarried *puellae* are also present. Women prayed to Vesta, the virgin goddess of the hearth, home, and family in Roman religion who represented the nucleus of the house and kept enclosed private spaces safe.[53] However, in a poem of the same book (4.4), Propertius has Vesta rather than Venus inspiring Tarpeia's forbidden passion for Tatius. According to Propertius' version of the legend, Tarpeia is an impure Vestal Virgin (just like Rhea Silvia) who betrays Rome to be Tatius' lover.[54] This elegiac mingling of what is proper and what is forbidden is typical of Propertius who seems to question the Roman national representation of sexuality: Bona Dea and the Vestals were associated with chastity and fertility in Roman women. However, in both elegies, 4.4 and 4.9, Propertius pic-

[53] Even if the rites of the Bona Dea are enclosed into Hercules' story and nothing is said about the goddess and her cult, the feminine element is elaborately treated and predominates in the poem. On the contrary, Hutchinson (2006, 205) argues that the elegy as a whole subordinates females to males.

[54] Welch 2005; Janan 1999, 430.

tures the force of elegy to disrupt Roman binary oppositions and violate female, sacred realms.

Hercules' πάθος and reference to weariness achieve no results and thus he resorts to what Tibullus calls *fortia verbia* (2.6.12). He boasts of his *fortia facta* (39) and calls attention to his feat of carrying the world on his back (38-39).[55] The change of tone from threatening to wheedling is a common feature of the *paraclausithyron*. The great hero begs to be admitted, but unsuccessfully once again, on the grounds that he had been a proper maiden, an *apta puella*, in the past, as Queen Omphale's slave, sewing feminine attire and sporting a luxurious shawl (47-50).[56] Instead of warning the girl inside, Hercules is determined to refashion himself (changing from a virile and epic hero carrying his *Maenalius ramus* (15) and wearing his facial hair (*siccam barbam*, 31) to evoke a feminized figure in the service to Deianeira.

The lover, Hercules, is given his answer by the gatekeeper who substitutes for the hated *lena*. When she speaks the words of rejection, (*limina linque*, 54), the formerly pathetic lover who spoke as a *minus deus* (32) and as a *homo* (41), puts the *blanditia* aside, assaults the house of the *domina* and rushes inside to satisfy his anger and desire.[57] He infuses life into Terence's portrait of a young rapist, sketched in the *Hecyra* and *Eunuchus*. Hercules demolishes the entrance and recovers his figure as the super-male, who had once deflowered fifty virgins in a single night.[58]

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[55] Both Mercury, when entering Herse's private space (*Met*. 2.733), and Sun, entering Leucothoe's apartment (*Met*. 4.226), declare their divinity.

[56] Hercules' self-presentation as a credible woman fails. Clodius' acquittal on charges of sacrilege in 61 B.C. proves his failure to act out a female role successfully. Callimachus in AP 5.23 upbraided Conopium for refusing him admission, and prayed that she suffer similar unhappiness

[57] Cf. Plut. *Amat*. 759b: τὴν δ' ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν τ' ἀνθρώπου καθαψαμένην is the description given for the madness of love in the context of a *paraclausithyron*.

[58] Paus. 9.27.5-7. In Aristophanes (fr. 287 Edm.), Hercules "breaks the front door in, doorposts and all."

Like a comic *adulescens*, Hercules violates norms and, unable to tolerate limits, behaves idiotically by subjecting himself to his passion (*aestus*, 63).[59] This is not his first description of attempting a violent entry. Domestic violence features in Rhinthon's farce *Hercules*, where the hero pounds with his club on the door of Zeus' shrine. As soon as he is inside, he drags off a woman from the altar.[60] His companion, Iolaos, piously pours a libation on the altar while Hercules gobbles up the sacrificial offerings.[61] Menander also alludes to the portrayal of Hercules in the last extant fragments of the *Epitrepontes*, citing the speaker Hercules, who, having raped Auge in Euripides' lost play *Auge*, explains that he "always likes a change from his labours."[62] Menander plays with his allusions to tragedy, implying discrepancies between the genres as well as in tone. Similarly, Propertius' fashioning of Hercules' identity enables the elegist to play with the farcical quality of the hero's theatrical representation.

III. *OPPORTUNA CUNCTIS NATURA FIGURIS*

It seems that the key to reading 4.9 lies in the figure of Hercules fixing his gender, using a collection of masks, properties and adornments reaffirming his weakness. Hercules defies his reading as a unified character: he is the epic hero who does not quite fit into the elegiac framework that he enters; he is the thirsty Hercules who does not quite fit the effeminate role of the *exclusus amator* and the cross-

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[59] The punishment is more in the spirit of the rejected lover than that of the defender of justice: he excludes the eroticized *puellae* of love elegy (see Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 60). In Greek cities, the exclusion of women figures among the special traits of Hercules' cult. Arethusa in 4.3 is as much excluded from the camps of war as the *puellae* Hercules expels from his altar.

[60] Bieber 1961, 134, as attested on the phlyakes in figs. 488a-b.

[61] Bieber 1961, 132, fig. 482. In comedy, Hercules' voraciousness is equivalent to male sexuality. In Euboulos' *Kerkopes* (fr. 54 Kock), the hero tells of his journey to the land of pleasure, where he "ate" Okimon-Basil (a prostitute-an aphrodisiac plant).

[62] Anderson 1982, 165-77.

dressed figure in female clothing.[63] Even though the image of the cross-dressed hero appears for just a few lines in Hercules' speech, it is still an important moment in elegy 4.9, since the question of gender identity is central to the poem and to the whole book in which it appears.

Hercules' episode is the most famous incident of transvestism in ancient literature. This section will examine the method of Propertius, who, by sartorial means, fashions Hercules either as a masculine hero or as a female slave. A closer look at comic travestitism will help shed light on the way in which Propertius constructs characters and assigns gender identity by combining wardrobe and behaviour.[64] Hercules' episode is intertextually connected with another virile hero, Achilles, who has a myth with a major cross-dressing scene. In Statius' *Achilleid* (1.260-265), Thetis invokes the example of Hercules to soften Achilles' reluctance to wear female dress and to demonstrate that transvestism can be a noble option.[65] Statius takes the contrast of the soft weaving and the hard hands of Hercules from Propertius, and he adds the thyrsus, which is considered as a "soft spear" (*molles hastas*, 1.261). In association with Thetis' admonition to the hero (*animos submitte viriles*, 1.259), the reference to the "soft spear" reveals a clear phallic joke.[66]

Hercules in 4.9 uses as an argument for admission to the shrine of the Bona Dea his proven ability in the past to cross-dress. He is sketched delivering a eunuch's song, calling attention to his "unphallic" persona (*apta puella*). This dramatic device of transvestism works

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[63] Lindheim 1998a, 48; DeBrohun 1994. Euripides had already portrayed him as desolate, seated like a woman to escape every glance (*HF* 1214-1215, 1159, 1198, 1205). Ovid in *Ars. am.* 1.691-696, entreats Achilles to drop the wool, the basket and the spindle in favour of the spear and shield.

[64] The crossdressing of Propertius' characters can be associated as an idea with the gods swapping their accoutrements in Ov. *Am.* 1.1.

[65] In Thetis' next example, Bacchus' gender-indeterminate dress is his golden gown; Jupiter disguised as Diana pursues Callisto. Caeneus having once been female did not interfere with the male Caeneus' strength as a hero.

[66] See *brevior hasta* in *Achil.* 1.879. Cf. Heslin 2005, 240. See also Ar. *Nub.* 537ff.: σκύτινον καθείμενον.

intertextually, recalling vested interests that are prominent in Plautus' comedy. *Casina*, for example, is a comedy that questions gender and reveals that the ways in which comedy defines the construction of masculine/feminine are similar to those of Roman elegy. The action of crossdressing parodies the notion of gender and reveals it as a mode of presentation. The figure of Chalinus/Casina attracts all the attention: the male actor playing the male slave Chalinus dresses up as a bride named Casina, and interacts throughout with males and females, creating gender slippage between him and the other characters.[67] Three genders are represented in *Casina*: male, female, and a continually third gender (like the one that enables Hercules to transgress female space).[68] At the end of Plautus' performance, female characters drop their cross-dressed roles so that the audience comes to know them as the men they really are.

Hercules' episode features verbal reference to emasculated men or "eunuchs" of comedy. Terence's *Eunuchus*, for instance, corresponds to boundary-crossings within the action of elegy 4.9;[69] in fact, in the comedy *Eunuchus* there are explicit references to Hercules' episode of transvestism at Omphale's (1026-1027), but also to the comparison with Zeus' rape of Danae. Hercules in Propertius 4.9 is not unlike a eunuch or Zeus, who many a time disguised himself as a woman.[70]

A short overview of transvestism connected to the threshold scene could make clear that it is a characteristically dramatic motif running

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[67] Gold 1998, 19, 26.

[68] The transvestite ceremony was possibly taken form Diphilus' *Kleroumenoi*.

[69] Even though verbal reference hardly licenses intertextuality with Terence's *Eunuchus*, it should be noted that Chaerea, disguised as a eunuch (a semi-*vir* or semi-*femina*), breaks into the house of Thais. He finds his mistress in her chamber sleeping and rapes her and so he exercises violence like Hercules. Chaerea, having donned the costume of the eunuch, must learn the nature of his act from a *meretrix*, Thais, and wearing his disguise, is exposed to the ridicule of the public. The deed of entering the private chamber of Thais' female household attendant is itself called a *flagitium* (383).

[70] Nor does Hercules differ from Aktaeon, who accidentally witnessed a nude Artemis and her company of nymphs in their own sacred space.

through literature and picked up by modern playwrights. Images of doorways that define women's space pervade in Shakespearean plays along with transvestism, parallel elements with Hercules in elegy 4.9. The serenade of the *paraclausithyron* features in *The Merchant of Venice* (2.5.28ff.). Both *Othello* and *Hamlet* are associated with uncovering and opening the women's "secret place," spying on their secrets. The doorkeeper is repeatedly stationed on a threshold, ushering the characters in and out (Iago in *Oth*. 4.2.27-29).[71] Propertius' Hercules has something of the flexible power inherent in the structure of Shakespeare's theatre. *Twelfth Night* for instance, is much concerned with gender and its masquerade centers on two cross-dressers: Gender cross-casting is much developed and, on the Renaissance stage, the transvestite becomes a fixture; it acquires dramatic power producing humour.[72]

Propertius presupposes the reader's collective knowledge of the contradictions inherent in the Hercules' figure, as well as his comic qualities presented in a torrent of satyr plays, farces and comedies.[73] Thus, Propertius's very first word, the traditional patronymic *Amphytrionides*, not only establishes Hercules as an epic hero, but also introduces the character as master of disguise possibly echoing Plautus' *Amphitruo*, the comedy of the disguised Zeus (8.202). That comedy was Hercules' own story of birth, in which the controlling theme was the violation of entrance through disguise: Zeus entered Alcmena's house

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[71] Reynolds also perceives the power of the transvestism and the fundamental way dramatic representation works. He warns against "beautiful boys transformed into women by putting on their feature, lookes and facions ... because a woman's garment being put on a man doeth vehemently touch and move him with the imagination of a woman [since] it stirs up desire." See Goodman 1998, 177.

[72] In *As You Like it*, Rosalind develops Celia's plan by proposing to disguise herself as a man (1.3.104-106). Sexual disguise is considered the major development that the Italians made on classical plots. See Newman 1978, 62-63.

[73] The title of Sophocles' satyr play *Hercules at Taenarus* has survived, as well as of Nicochares' *Hercules as the Bride*. Hercules appears in five comedies of Epicharmus and speaks the prologue in Diphilus' *Hercules* (fr. 15 Edm.).

as *amator* by taking Amphitruo's form, came into her bed, and exited as omnipotent god. Meanwhile, Mercury, as the feigned Sosias, violated Alcmena's space.

The mythical Hercules is a figure which assembles a set of cross-dressing incidents in Greek mythology, especially the tale of the hero and Omphale that underscore his "femininity."[74] There is also evident and necessary connection between Hercules' episode and the κῶμος whose traits have survived in the comic *paraclausithyron* in *Curculio*: the procession of the *ornatus* protagonist in garlands and ornaments (*Curc*. 2: *ornatus Phaedromus*). Hercules remains decked out as a heroic performer of epic deeds, albeit the elegy sketches three different portraits of him which stand side by side.[75] The elegy begins by fitting Hercules out in the garb of a masculine hero, describing a hero willing to battle and cloaking him in epic *ira* and *furor* (14).[76] The next two self-portrayals of Hercules present the manliest hero next to a feminine servant of Omphale. Hercules appears as a self-styled female servant. He recounts the tale of his time spent in servitude to the Lydian Queen, when he dressed in a woman's clothes and engaged in women's work

[74] Propertius in 3.11 has already explored the possibilities that Omphale's story offers for fashioning a "feminine" identity for his "male" *amator* (Catull. 55.23; Prop. 3.23.8). Hercules was thought the hero of πόνος, that is, of pain as glory, and the hero of pleasure (Ath. 12.512e, cited by Licht 1949, 9-10). For Hercules' polyvalence, see Ov. *Fast*. 6.812. According to Loraux 1990, 122, "myths offer the disruption of the distribution of the characteristics of man and woman, by expressing the experience of the feminine lived out by man or the terrifying conquest of the masculine by woman."

[75] Unlike Ovid's Mercury, who carefully spruces up before approaching Herse's room like a regular dandy (*Met*. 2.782: *cura*). Likewise, Evander, before beginning his tale of Hercules and Cacus, seats Aeneas on a lion-skin, which is the emblem of Hercules (*Aen*. 8.177).

[76] See Hor. *Carm*. 1.38; Juv. 3.58-125; Plin. *HN* 29.13.

[76] See Cyrino 1998.

[76] Diod. Sic. 4.14.3.

(4.9.47-50). For his transvestism, gender is conceived as a performance, while prop exchanges get the hero's theatre under way.[77]

In mythical tradition, Hercules is connected to transvestism and shift of power, but also to the feminine πέπλος which often competes with the lion's skin as Hercules' official garment.[78] Each of the gods equipped the hero with an attribute: Hephaistos gave him a club and a cuirass, Poseidon gave horses, Hermes a sword, Apollo bows and arrows; but the gift of Athena was a πέπλος.[79] Euripides emphasizes the femininity of this garment in the scene of Pentheus' transvestism in the *Bacchae* (821, 833).[80] The episode of Hercules in the palace of Omphale and their exchange of clothing resemble the story told by Plutarch: Hercules hides in the home of a Thracian woman, having disguised himself as a woman. After defeating his enemies, the Meropes, he puts on a flowery robe to marry the princess Chalciope.[81]

Propertius' readers "see" the exchange of properties that Hercules holds in 4.9, as if on the Plautine stage or in mime.[82] When Hercules has arrived at the shrine and the door does not swing open, Hercules uses the third person and the indefinite pronoun *aliquem*, to construct an image, a mirror of himself as the very man who supported the world on his back (*ille ego sum*, 38). He emphasizes the effectiveness of his weapons to enable his performance of heroic deeds (*fortia facta*, *tela*, *Herculea clava*, 39). Since his heroic approach fails, he recognizes that his face and lion-skin garment and hair parched by the Libyan sun

[77] See Hor. *Carm*. 1.38; Juv. 3.58-125; Plin. *HN* 29.13.

[78] See Cyrino 1998.

[79] Diod. Sic. 4.14.3.

[80] According to Loraux (1990, 37), the *peplos* and the *krokotos* of the hero paradoxically emphasize his virility which remains untouched by wearing what is the most feminine disguise.

[81] *Quaest*. *Graec*. 58. Hercules is presented clad in a long woman's dress and been served by transvestite priests in Lydus, *Mens*. 4.46. Also the cult of Magna Mater is performed by eunuch priests who pay much attention to ornaments and are called *semiviri* (*Aen*. 4.125, 12.97-100: *semivir* Aeneas).

[82] In mimes, the actions of low characters mirror those of mythological figures (cf. Cynthia in Odysseus role in 4.8).

might appear frightening. Thus, the performer of epic deeds adopts an unheroic *persona*, dressed like a female slave (*servilia officia*, *pensa diurna*), wearing the saffron tunic (47) − with which Propertius formerly dressed Cynthia (2.29.15) − and a soft breast band (49), performing a comedy of feminine masquerade.[83] The priestess of the Bona Dea, presented in her costume is a counterpart to the transvestite Hercules: Carthaginian crimson links with Sidonian purple, hair-band with breast-band (51-52).[84] Ovid will take up a similar comic scene in the *Fasti* (2.303-358), recounting what he refers to as an *antiqui fabula plena ioci*, "a tale full of old jokes" (3.304). Faunus, attempting to climb into bed with Omphale, does not realize that Hercules has swapped clothes with the queen, and pays the price for lifting the "woman's" tunic (2.347-358).

The semiology of dressing as a female to play a female role is drawn from Roman comedy. On the Roman stage, cross-dressing is the norm, since women do not perform in most dramatic roles. This does not mean there is no threat in cross-dressing to masculine identity since actors (unlike their Athenian counterparts) suffer diminished citizen rights at Rome.[85] Male actors could absorb and appropriate the powers ascribed to women. Hercules wearing a brassiere is a humorous image but also is a feature of ancient κῶμοι for komasts to wear female dress.[86] Each significant visual detail of the hero is attended to: face, hair, chest, hands. Dressed and behaving as a *puella*, he becomes a *puella*, although he possesses a hairy chest (*hirsutum pectus*, 49) and spins wool with rough hands (*duris manibus*, 50). He comments on how badly-fitting feminine clothing is; he complains about that like a

[83] Cf. Euripides' *Syleus* (fr. 687 N.2) in which Hercules pretends to be a slave with appropriate clothing, so that Hermes can pass him on to Syleus.

[84] Hutchinson 2006, 215. Artemidorus (2.3) listed priests, musicians, actors and devotees of Dionysus as men who were eligible to wear the elaborate dress (*krokotos*) that Hercules appears to have.

[85] Edwards 1993, 98-136.

[86] Philostr. *Imag*. 1.2, 1.3.5.

comic character.[87] The hero is connected with Dionysus in myth, in cult and art. In the *Ranae* of Aristophanes (550-563), Dionysus goes to the underworld and makes himself look like Hercules; he reversely takes on the attire of Hercules, when he receives Persephone's invitation to a dinner with dancing virgins. He puts on a lion's skin over his *krokotos*. Dressed up like this, he meets the real Hercules who bursts into laughter (45-47, 108-109).[88]

The hero drops the club with which he fatally struck Cacus (*ramo*, 15).[89] The replacement of the *clava* with the *Lydus colus* of line 48 is a nice detail, since each will be carried over Hercules' shoulder.[90] Hercules' description is given last position in his speech, which makes it a prominent image, present in the reader's eye, though distant as a narrative in perfect tense. Hercules serving Omphale because he has fallen in love with her is an altered version of the story in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* (357). Hercules expects to convince the priestess and the reader that he is suitable to join the girls within the shrine, and the elegiac discourse they represent.

The specific plot of cross-dressing is the original plot of Euripides' *Bacchae*. Propertius' Hercules resembles Euripides' Pentheus who desires to spy upon the female space, the women of Thebes and thus, must trade his military tactics for an undercover operation that involves adopting a disguise. Dionysus dresses Pentheus as a woman in flowing wig, headdress, a long pleated robe and belt, along with the

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[87] Cf. Pleusicles in Plaut. *Mil*. (1286): *verear magis* / *me amoris causa hoc ornatu incedere*.

[88] Dionysus wears his *krokotos* in the *Bacchae* where he is called θηλύμορφος (351). Also, Pentheus' costume is described as imitating a woman's (γυναικόμιμοι, 981). When Dionysus is afraid to knock on the door of Pluto's hall, Xanthias eggs him on to remember the lion hide and pride of Hercules (*Ran*. 463). Aeacus, the doorkeeper, bursts into a tirade of threats against him.

[89] See Menander's *Sham Hercules*, fr. 517A-525 Edm., where (according to Plut. *Mor*. 59c) the braggart soldier comes on stage with a hollow club.

[90] DeBrohun 1992, 64. In Hor. *Carm*. 2.12.6, one of the poet's hard topics is the victory of the "Herculean hand" during the Gigantomachy. *Herculea manu* echoes the Propertian *Herculea clava*.

typical *insignia* of the maenads. Following Dionysus' advice, he abandons his desire for violence and accepts the tactics of deception in order to face women on their own terms. His figure is a parallel for Dionysus who in Aeschylus is called γύννης and ψευδάνωρ (that is, a counterfeit man).[91]

Hercules' description offers a glance back to Vertumnus in 4.2, who is the first new character of Book 4 and places great emphasis on his appearance: "Clothe me in Coan silks, and I shall become a compliant girl (23)." Vertumnus indicates his protean capacity to assume a diversity of identities, using a list of clothing, fabrics and accoutrements (*opportuna mea cunctis natura figuris*, 21). In the characteristic dress of Cynthia, the god could pass for a *non dura puella*;[92] a *toga* turns him into a man (24). He claims he can steal the guise of Bacchus and Apollo (31-32). Carrying a sickle transforms him into a reaper, bearing arms turns him into a soldier (25-27). Vertumnus is programmatic and symbolic of the transformation of identities that has taken place under Augustus; Propertius' Book 4 is overall set to underline the re-contextualizing of old ideas. Noticeable too is the fact that both Vertumnus and Hercules were very old Roman deities, although the former was a native god, while the other was an imported one.

Poem 4.9 focuses on the division of gender categories through the exploration of two different religious experiences which limit participation to persons of one gender. Both the priestess of Bona Dea and Hercules advocate the exclusion of the opposite sex from their rites, playing upon the notions of inclusion and exclusion. Propertius' episode reactivates the scenario of the Thesmophoria and the situation of the male intruder into women's ritual space. Thesmophorion (like the Bona Dea shrine) is analogous to the domestic space of women, and so

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[91] Frag. 61 N.2; see Aelius Aristides (*Or*. 34: Κατὰ τῶν ἐξορχουμένων), who refers to the cross-dressed Sardanapallus who vainly sang battle hymns while weaving and doing women's work.

[92] See in section V the discussion about phallic humour. In 4.9, the gatekeeper threatens Hercules with Tiresias whose significance rests on his portrayal as transsexual. The myth of Tiresias glimpsing Athena's bath marks the goddess out as gender transgressive: strong limbs, absence of the Gorgon (58).

the intrusion into their ritual enclosure replicates the intrusion of theatre into another forbidden female domain. Its trespass by men recalls the founding plot of the theatre itself, best known from the *Bacchae*. The tragic side of the Dionysiac is seen in the consequences of violating ritual limits, when the male, who comes to spy on women's secrets, arouses their bacchant madness. The comic side is the delight in violating ritual solemnity that can deflect a potential Dionysiac tragedy into comic farce.

The enabling power of fashion is revealed throughout Propertius' Book 4 and through the effort to fit novel characters and themes into poetic settings. This last book is indeed the world for a cast of characters who, once established in elegiac reality, attempt to adjust to their background by accessorizing themselves with recognisable properties.

The cases of three feminine personae (4.3, 4.4, 4.6) offer to the elegist a fertile field to experiment with the signifying power of costume. In elegy 4.3, Propertius "dresses" his own persona in the female voice of Arethusa. This *inclusa matrona*, in an attempt to infiltrate her husband's martial world, is willing to switch her sewing equipment with *arma* (29-33), and to join her lover, who also equipped his delicate shoulder with unfit weapons. She pictures herself acting as an Amazon, with breasts bared and a helmet hiding her soft feminine features (43-44). Thus, she usurps the part of a "cross-dresser" in the world of *militia amoris*. In her elegy, the on-going shifting of boundaries wherein Arethusa positions herself should be noticed. This is indicative of a broader uncertainty, and confusion of identity that also troubles Hercules.

The Vestal Tarpeia of elegy 4.4 handles a series of disguises: she is the *virgo* and the *inclusa puella* who evolves into a would-be *matrona* (62). Her costume enables the "false exchange" of her status as a Vestal with that of a bride, while her torn garment renders her an Amazon (72). In elegy 4.6, Cleopatra, a "real" character who enslaves the emasculated Antony, takes up *arma* and leads the army of a man.[93] The *pila*

[93] In 4.8 the warrior Cynthia wages battle and in line 27 is described as taking over the reins of her chariot, leading her own "triumphal procession."

do not fit in the feminine hand of Cleopatra (*turpiter apta manu*, 22), who in 3.11.48 had been called *regina meretrix* in her shameful adultery with Antony (2.16). Meanwhile, Apollo exchanges his identity as god of poetry for that of god of war and back again as he enters and exits the Battle of Actium.[94] He changes his attributes and is transformed from a Castalian Apollo who learned unwarlike song on his lyre and ordered Propertius to stay away from epic (3.3, 4.1) to an Apollo armed with his bow and arrows in Augustus' service. Thus, the elegist's cast of characters consists of women who wield weapons and masculine figures who take on female traits as if they were theatrical properties.

Propertius must have in mind the Roman Mime, the only dramatic genre which features women on stage and plays with the concept of transvestism. This genre probably influences the profile of Hercules and the female "cross-dressers" of Book 4. Omphale as a dominatrix who wears Hercules' lion skin and club is also an implied image. In Roman mime the *archimimus* and *archimima* either dress lavishly or perform naked. They are actors who do not play just their own sex, since there are references to mimes donned a *ricinium* (shawl) and impersonating women in mourning.[95] Appropriate μίμησις of the other sex requires costume: the representation of men is accomplished with padded bodysuits and an oversized φαλλός, while naked women are represented by "genital tights." As Mime becomes obscener, female mimes, catering to the audience's demands, take their costume off displaying their identity on stage.

Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousae* centers on the issue of transvestism as a device to further the plot. It is worth mentioning that both the Aristophanic play and the Propertian poem are composed under crucial political circumstances; Athenian anti-militarism and Augustan discourse about ongoing *pax*. *Thesmophoriazousae* features a carnival located at the intersection of the relation between male and female, between comedy and ritual. Dressed as a woman, with a costume borrowed from Agathon's wardrobe, Mnesilochus makes his way up the

[94] DeBrohun 1992, 99.
[95] Marshall 2006.

sacred hill to mingle with other women on the Pnyx. Androgynous in appearance, he wears an incongruous assortment of male and female accessories.[96] When women are in a position to rule men, men must become women.[97] Likewise, Propertius turns the table on Hercules and puts him precisely in the place of Aristophanic characters. The temple of the Bona Dea conveniently serves as the "theatrical space" within the play on which to stage a parody of the Herculean myth.

In festivals outside Athens, men and women changed their costumes for a day, each imitating the behaviour and appearance of the other.[98] Bacchic rites allowed women in controlled circumstances and for a sustained period to "play the other."[99] The quest for Hercules' connection to dramatic cross-dressing can go much further, but the conclusion will always be that more than one purpose is accomplished in Hercules' enactment of cross-dressing in the controlled comic and mime setting of the Bona Dea's threshold.[100]

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[96] Ar. *Thesm*. 134-140: "A lute and saffron gown, an animal skin and hair net, an athlete's oil flask and a brassiere, a sword and a mirror."

[97] The women in the *parabasis* (Ar. *Thesm*. 821-829) joke by transferring the names for women's articles to their masculine counterparts: "we women have kept safe at home our weaving rod (*kanōn*) and sunshade (*skiadeion*), while you men have lost your spearhead (*kanōn*) along with your shield (*skiadeion*)."

[98] Zeitlin 1996, 344 (e.g., the Cretan Ekdysia and the Argive Hybristika). In addition, in initiation rites at puberty, young men temporarily adopt women's dress and behaviour.

[99] Male-to-female cross-dressing rituals occurred in the Oschophoria, where noble youths dressed in women's dress, carried grape clusters to the priestess of Athena Skiras in Phaleron. Ant. Lib. *Met*. 17.6. Cf. Simon 1983, 90-92. During the Ekdysia festival in Phaistos, boys wearing feminine clothes took them off and donned those of their own sex. The cult had to do with Dionysus' transvestism − since the god was among the recipients of cult − and was connected with the myth of Theseus' returning from Crete and having to disguise two young men and to teach them to act like girls; *Vit*. *Thes*. 23.2-3. Also, the priests of Hercules at Anthimachia in Cos wore a woman's robe and headdress (μίτρα) commemorating Hercules hiding in female disguise.

[100] Also, καλλίνικος was a dance in honour of Hercules performed by a chorus in women's dress who were either initiates or a thiasus attached to the

IV. PROPERTIUS ON STAGE

More comic episodes can be detected throughout Propertius' work in specific elegies that reveal direct comic influence and in which the poet assumes the role of the character. Elegy 1.3 for instance, appears as an amusing episode in which the drunken poet returns from a night out to find Cynthia nagging him for staying out late with another woman. Propertius, as *auctor*, provides a comic view of the poet as actor. He is described as having *ebria ... multo vestigia Baccho* (9), and plays himself the Bacchus role, finding his Ariadne alone and asleep.[101] The *puella*'s suspicions of infidelity recall comedy as well as adultery mimes.[102]

According to the poet's drunken fantasy, Cynthia resembles the Maenad in her potential for violence when awakened; this sleeping devotee of Bacchus is gazed upon by the Bacchic drunk poet. Sleeping Maenads are often depicted next to voyeuristic satyrs who are sexually aroused, in vase-painting related to ancient drama. It is worth noting that a lot of vases depict Hercules and satyrs in performances; satyrs are dressed as Hercules and the hero himself is pictured next to Dionysus, the god of wine, clutching an oversized drinking cup.[103] The poet's reactions to Cynthia's moans in sleep are amusing for the reader (27-30), as well as Cynthia's rebuke of the poet on waking, that suggests her own possible infidelity (35-40). Cynthia's self-portrait is dubious; she resembles not only a *matrona*, but also a *puella* and *meretrix* of comedy. She claims a list of occupations with which she spent her hours: spinning wool makes her a virtuous *matrona*, whereas her luxurious purple garment suggests the extravagance of an elegiac *puella*.[104] Cynthia's skill on the lyre is an aspect which marks her as a disputable

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shrine. In the parabasis of the *Vespae*, there is reference to this dance (1029-1050) at the point where Aristophanes himself is compared to Hercules. Cf. Ar. *Ach*. 1227-1234; Eur. *HF*, 687; Sen. *HF*, 827-894.

[101] Harrison 1994.

[102] See, in particular, Apul. *Met*. 9.26, where a baker's wife declaims against adultery to her husband while her lover is hidden in the house.

[103] Brommer 1960, 144-145; Galinsky 1972 (Plate 3).

[104] Tib. 2.3.58, 2.4.28.

professional party-entertainer similar to a *meretrix*, who often signals the festival end of Plautine comedies (for instance, in *Stich*.).

It is possible that Propertius adopts a comic situation when writing poem 1.8, the *propempticon* to Cynthia. The triangular relationship involving the lover, the unfaithful courtesan and the soldier is revealed within this episode, where Cynthia refuses to run off with Propertius' soldier rival.[105] Moreover, the same soldier features in elegy 2.16; he is called *barbarus* and comes from the Illyrian campaign to town to rival the poet for Cynthia's affections. He is given the description of a typical comic *miles gloriosus* (*dives*, 19, *stolidus*, 8, which occurs only once elsewhere in elegy, whereas it is a well-established word in comedy). As in Plautus' *Epidicus* and *Curculio*, the rich, stupid braggart comes to town from overseas to buy the lover's girl. The poor lover urges his mistress to exploit the enemy (2.16.7-12) the same way that Phaedria does so with Thais against the *miles* Thraso in the comedy *Eunuchus*.[106] Similar love triangles (subject-object of desire-rival) can be found in comedies such as the *Miles Gloriosus* (*adulescens* Pleusicles, *meretrix* Philocomasium, *miles* Pyrgopolinices) and *Curculio* (*adulescens* Phaedromus, *meretrix* Planesium, *miles* Therapontigonus).

Elegy 3.6 recalls a characteristic episode of Terence's *Heauton Timorumenos* (285-310). Like Lygdamus in Propertius's poem, Syrus finds Antiphila faithful to Clinia and working at the loom in her house. Cynthia cries and gives strong indications of her love and fidelity. The *adulescens amans* of comedy promises the clever slave his freedom in order to obtain his services (*Poen*. 428; *Merc*. 152; *Mil*. 1192). Similarly, Propertius offers this stock bribe to Lygdamus if his quarrel with Cynthia is patched up. In addition, elegy 3.8 adapts a situation provided by comic poets, the *dulcis ira*. Cynthia assaults the poet with furniture and cups and the basic themes revealed in the poem are jealousy, fide-

[105] The same triangular relationship occurs in Ov. *Am*. 3.8, where the poet's rival is described as *dives eques*.

[106] *Pauper amans* is a phrase that occurs frequently in Prop. 1.8, 1.14, 2.13b, 2.24c, 2.34, 3.2.

lity and rivals.[107] The ἐρωτοδίδαξις of line 17ff. in elegy 3.8 is reminiscent of scenes in Roman comedy with language that occurs repeatedly in theatre (and only once in Propertius).

Book 4 explores a variety of female figures, ranging from the loyal *matronae* of 4.3 and 4.11 to the prostitutes of 4.5 and 4.8. In elegy 4.5, the physical attack on one's sexual partner occurs in the mouth of the *lena* (31), in an erotodidactic context.[108] The procuress Acanthis is the speaking character in her inserted speech, giving advice to the elegiac *puella*, the way the vile *lenae* do so in Plautus (Syra in *Cistellaria*, Clearetа in *Asinaria*). The procuress enters Book 4 as if already a familiar literary figure, to prepare the ground for elegy 4.9. Her didactic posture is an essential feature of her characterization in comedy.[109] The poet's curses upon her involve thirst, hunger, poverty and death (2-4, 75-78).[110] Like the Leaena in *Curculio* (*multibiba*, *merobiba*, 77) and Syra in *Cistellaria* (*multiloqua et multibiba*, 149), Acanthis is described as bibulous, mercenary, and having magical powers over nature (4.4.9-18). To these powers Propertius will turn, seeking an explanation for his lack of erotic success.

The dramatic situation in 4.5 resembles more that of Scapha in the comedy *Mostellaria*, who advises Philematium not to devote herself exclusively to Philolaches.[111] The young man overhears the conversation and reacts with curses against the *lena*. The dramatic objectivity, with which one sees the poet in Propertius 4.5, resembles the objective perspective the audience had on the lover in the *Mostellaria*.[112] Propertius' Acanthis refers to Thais (*comic moecha*, 44) and promotes adultery

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[107] The situation goes back to Ar. *Plut*. 1013. Polemon in Menander's *Perikeiromene* is a violently jealous lover. The heroine of the *Rapizomene* suffered violence at the hands of her lover.

[108] Propertius curses the dead *lena* and his verbal abuse echoes her scorn in Ar. *Eccl*. 877-1111. The old procuress was a stock character of the mime, known as μαγωδία (Ath. 621c-d). Cf. Ovid's Dipsas in *Am*. 1.8, and Tib. 1.5, 2.6.

[109] Myers 1996, 3.

[110] See Plaut. *Mostell*. 192ff.

[111] *Mostell*. 168-169, 173.

[112] Gutzwiller 1985, 107.

(15). She has been herself a courtesan in her younger days.[113] Her list of luxuries imported from the east takes up parallels in New Comedy, as well as her advice that the mistress should accept a soldier or even a former slave if he has money (4.5.49-52).[114] It is worth noting that due to elegy 4.5, the topic of money becomes more pervasive in Propertius' poetry, for it is the cause of the *dolor* that besets Propertius' affair with Cynthia. Acanthis' list of luxuries tallies with the expensive jewels Cynthia demands from Propertius but receives form the *praetor* in 2.16 (17, 43, 55).[115] That the lover prefers his mistress unadorned is a motif developed in Propertius 1.2, motivated by fear of rivals who furnish Cynthia with expensive presents (23-26).

Poem 4.8 is a brilliantly executed comedy with Cynthia performing, even though she was dismissed in elegies 3.24 and 3.25 and reported dead in 4.7. The poem, with all its door images, could be read as some kind of reverse *paraclausithyron* (48, 49, 51, 84). Cynthia is situated outside the house's *limen* where she cannot be controlled, and the *exclusus* Propertius utters a cry as he waits for her at the gates of Lanuvium. The poet gets revenge on the woman who has left with another lover, and encloses himself inside. He plans *noctem lenire* and *furta novare* with a pair of *viles puellae* (33-34). The revelry's description is humorous enough to recall comic banquets (a flickering lamp, the table collapsing, Propertius' continual throwing of *damnosi canes* in a dice game, flute players, a castanet player and a dancing dwarf).[116] The *exclusa* Cynthia bursts into the house. Hercules' action in 4.9.14 is thus countered (*cum subito rauci sonuerunt cardine postes*, 48). Cynthia can aptly be compared with Artemona in Plautus' *Asinaria* (880ff.), who bursts into the house of Cleareta to catch her husband Demanaetus with the *meretrix* Philaenium, engaged in an after-dinner game of dice.

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[113] See *Cist*. 564.

[114] Plaut. *Truc*. 51-56, 530-540.

[115] *Aurum et ornamenta* are the properties emphasized as identifications of the *meretrix* Philocomasium in Plaut. *Mil*. 981, 1127, 1148.

[116] The poet's figure recalls Plato Comicus' Hercules, who combined wenching with eating while playing a dice game with a few prostitutes (*Zeus Afflicted*); cf. Galinsky 1972. See Ov. *Tr*. 2.497-500, 505-506.

Lygdamus appears as an analogue of the stock cunning slave, serving his master, while appearing quite innocent to the furious Cynthia. Cynthia reacts violently and beats her rivals (the comic Phyllis and Teia, 57-62), a moment reminiscent of the violent scenes in *Aulularia* (53ff.) and *Rudens* (759ff.). The poet's purpose is to amuse through the depiction of Cynthia's dramatic entry (*totas resupinat valvas*, 51). The story includes expansive asides on the setting and principal actors. In the final scene, furnished with comic hyperbole, the *puella* establishes her terms of reconciliation (*supplicibus palmis*, 71) and her instructions are intended, like Hercules' at 4.9.67-70, to determine future behaviour. She cleans the threshold, reestablishes herself inside, prepares the setting for Hercules' story and seals the comedy of 4.8 which ends Cynthia's poetry of Book 4. Thus as culmination of comedy in Book 4 comes the incident of Hercules breaking into the sacred enclosed female space, blending gender and tropes, and crossing typical elegiac boundaries.

CONCLUSION

Like certain cross-dressers in other times and cultures who take on another identity for the duration of a performance, Hercules in Propertius 4.9 dons a persona and is veiled with the appearance of a comic lover. Propertius chooses to stage a male victory and aetiology of two different festivals within a book in which feminine "heroines" prevail (4.2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11).[117] Exactly because the feminine element predominates, Hercules' effeminacy is necessary for the hero's entry into a "women's space." It is undeniable that elegy 4.9 grants a widened perspective on the relationship of Propertius with theatre. The *paraclausithyron* motif is animated within new contexts and has more to do with its traditional dramatic version. Elegy interacts with comedy and the hero goes out of focus in that second doorway which renders him the protagonist of a comic *paraclausithyron*.

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[117] Even if the rites of the Bona Dea are enclosed into Hercules' story and nothing is said about the goddess and her cult, the feminine element is elaborately treated and predominates in the poem. On the contrary, Hutchinson (2006, 205) argues that the elegy as a whole subordinates females to males.

The poet takes liberties with the episode and with the cults of Hercules and the Bona Dea. Hercules arrives "loaded" with previous literary treatments (*fessus*), with elements from satyr and mime, to be transformed on the threshold of comedy. His revised myth becomes a comedy of gender fluidity, crossdressing and transgression. Rhinthon's farces and other lost plays could have contributed elements to this transgressive hero of Propertius. Prop exchange becomes an enabling device throughout Book 4, which reflects the elegiac lover's refusal to conform to prescribed gender roles in his love poetry. Thus, Propertius manages to link the exclusion episode, which caused much merriment in Roman comedy, with transvestism. Propertius' awareness of and allusions to comedy throughout his corpus, is intensified in this last book, in which comic figures feed into thematic concerns. The elements tracked in this paper, reveal Propertius imagining his elegiac settings within the frame of a theatrical scene.[118]

In the process of the hero becoming a "woman," the elegy plays with the extreme limit of its own premises and identifies intersexuality with intertextuality. Why is Propertius using a comic Hercules? The hero's image is carefully selected from a wide range of options in the tradition. Only an *exclusus* Hercules could evoke resonances taking the reader back to Clodius' masquerade episode, to *Thesmophoriazusae*'s political drama and carnivals within ritual settings. With an *exclusus amator* as his actor, Propertius ruptures the boundaries of epic and elegy and establishes a heroic/masculine world, being himself camouflaged as a rejected *adulescens*.[119]

The use of comic elements allows the poet to enrich Book 4 with entertaining topics which form a climax and a resolution. This is an advance on modern scholarship, whose key point has so far been the generic fusion of fitting the un-elegiac Hercules to the framework of

[118] According to D. Spencer (2001), Propertius' Hercules is an important stage in the hero's ongoing redefinition.

[119] Propertius as Arethusa, Tarpeia, Acanthis, Cynthia (4.7, 4.8) and the Bona Dea priestess, invades amorous spaces within his new "political/aetiological" poetry.

Book 4. Accepting that the masculine and heroic prevails in 4.9, then it becomes clear that Book 4 gradually transcends elegy by means of comedy: the poet takes leave of a dead *lena* (4.5), a dead *meretrix* (4.6) and an episode of exclusion. These elements converge on revealing a "transvestite poet" who once having entered Cynthia's enclosed realm, now attempts to disengage from amorous topics. Elegy 4.9 initiates a sequence of three closure-poems closely relevant to Augustan political and social interests. Just as the *vigilatio ad clausas fores* marks the beginning of Propertius' love for Cynthia, its triumph (2.14.31-32) and its end (3.7.71-72), a mistress' threshold in 4.9 signals a comic climax, an end, and the beginning of the "more" political remainder of Book 4.

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DAS ERLÖSCHEN DES GLAUBENS: THE FATE OF BELIEF IN THE STUDY OF ROMAN RELIGION

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Abstract. This essay traces the development of a consensus against belief as a category relevant to the study of ancient religion, taking Roman religion as a case in point. The anti-belief position began with Christian disparagement of traditional worship and continued with late-20th-century cultural relativism. After dismantling arguments that belief is unique to western cultures, I introduce the cognitive theory of intentionality. On this theory, all mental states *represent* or *are about* objects and circumstances in the world. I distinguish two broad mental state types: the *practical*, such as desire, which represents circumstances as we would have them be, and the *doxastic*, such as belief, which represents circumstances as we take them to be. Insofar as the Romans represented circumstances as obtaining, they had beliefs. Three payoffs follow from this approach. First, beliefs often underlie *emotions*, because emotions amount to our *evaluations* of circumstances we take to obtain. So, when Romans record emotions in connection with religious events, researchers are licensed to ask about the beliefs at the root of those emotions. Second, beliefs (along with practical states) underlie *action*, because in order to act, agents require a cognitive map of the space of possibilities for action. This is provided in part by belief. So, when Romans record religious action, researchers are licensed to inquire into the beliefs that demarcated the parameters of the action. Finally, in

representing objects and circumstances, beliefs represent them in a *certain way*. This puts beliefs at the foundations of *social reality*, for it is only by virtue of being represented as a *pontifex* that any Roman ever counted as a *pontifex*, and it is only by virtue of being represented as a *sacrificium* that any act of animal slaughter ever counted as a *sacrificium*. Thus, far from being an irrelevant category for researchers, belief turns out to be central to Roman religious cognition, religious action, and religious reality.

This essay is both critical and constructive. Critical, because we must finish dismantling a longstanding edifice erected against belief in scholarship on Roman religion before we can construct anew.[1] Thus, in the essay's first section, I sketch a history of "the dying out of belief" in the scholarship. I show how a dichotomy between belief and action, accompanied by denial of belief, had sprung up by the early 20th century and had come to prevail by century's end. In the second section, I anatomize the premises and arguments of the anti-belief consensus in order to expose their flaws.

In the essay's third section, I propose that belief is not so fraught as has often been assumed. Indeed, our traditional scholarly ways of understanding belief have made it hard for us to appreciate the true nature of belief and its place in Roman religion. Rather than being synonymous with Christian faith, as belief's critics often assume, "belief" is just the English word for a basic sort of cognitive state, which represents how states of affairs stand in the world. On this definition, believing that the eagle is the shield-bearer of Jupiter amounts to representing the eagle as the shield-bearer of Jupiter. The cognitive capacity to represent states of affairs in this way is presumably shared by all human beings.

In defining belief, I present at some length a theory that is widely subscribed in the cognitive sciences but that will be new to researchers

[1] I do not treat of the related but quite distinct *faith* here. For *fides* in the Roman world see Morgan 2015. For a philosophical account of faith, see Audi 2011, 52-88.

of ancient religion, the theory of "intentionality."[2] On this theory, the distinguishing feature of all mental states is that they are about something or represent something other than themselves, such as the eagle in our example. Our "doxastic" states, such as belief, represent the world as we take it to be, while our "practical" states, such as desire, represent the world as we would have it be. Once we grasp this distinction between doxastic and practical states, we are in a position to see the theoretical work that talk of belief, within a holistic conception of intentionality, can do for us. For it will turn out that belief plays a central role in our cognitive and practical lives, underlying emotion, action, and even socio-religious reality.

In the fourth, final section of this essay, I briefly sketch an application of the theory of intentionality to a passage from Livy on religious action. This section is meant to be merely suggestive. But its suggestions can only stand if the ground has first been cleared of the edifice of old prejudice against belief.

Before proceeding, I should offer an explanation of my use of the term "religion." Many scholars now question whether the Romans had anything we could legitimately call religion.[3] Such doubts seem to me to spring, on the etic side, from a kind of post-modern positivism. The reasoning seems to go like this: the concept named by our term "religion" is inflexibly and immutably defined by certain (historically contingent) criteria. Since no Roman phenomenon precisely and without exception meets all the criteria that supposedly define our concept, the Romans did not have religion.[4] Surely this is too unsupple a stance. Romans engaged in all sorts of activities, such as prayer and sacrifice, that they themselves described as related to gods. These activities fit quite effortlessly within the extension of our (really rather loose and capacious) term "religion."

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[2] It is important to note that my goal here is not to synthesize all the latest developments in the cognitive science of belief.

[3] E.g., most recently, Nongbri 2008 and Barton and Boyarin 2016.

[4] I owe this observation *mutatis mutandis* to John R. Searle's 1983 and 1994 articles about literary theory.

On the emic side, scholars fret that the Romans had no discrete concept of "religion" that was rigorously defined by exactly the same criteria that supposedly define our concept. Therefore, the Romans had no such thing as religion. However, on these grounds we may also doubt whether they had an economy and even tuberculosis.[5] Such worries are ill-conceived. A community need have no explicit concept of "economy" in order to have an economy, i.e., the systematic and discoverable fallout of trading, buying, and selling. Nor need a community have any explicitly worked-out concept of "religion" to have religion, i.e., practices that involve (and that thus may be noticed by community members to involve) doing things to, for, or with gods, spirits, and other non-natural entities. I assume this latter definition of "religion" in this article.

1. A HISTORY OF BELIEF DENIAL AND THE BELIEF-ACTION DICHOTOMY

An important survey of Roman religion by John North closes by recapitulating its aim "to summarize and report on some fundamental changes in our way of looking at the religious life of Roman pagans." North notes that "the understanding of" Roman religion had been "blocked in the past by expectations inappropriate to the Romans' time and place." One of these inappropriate expectations consisted in attributing too much importance to "any question of the participants' belief or disbelief in the efficacy of ritual actions." In contrast, scholars had concluded in recent decades that they had "good reason to suspect that the whole problem (sc. of belief) derives from later not pagan preoccupations." Belief was now to be seen as largely anachronistic to Roman religion and reference to it usually a solecism. Evaluation of the new approach was welcomed "by the progress that may be made, or not made, in the future" under its auspices.[6]

Now, there can be no doubt that the past several decades, and especially the years since the publication of North's survey, have wit-

[5] For doubts about the ancient economy, see Morley 2004, 33-50. For doubts about tuberculosis in ancient Egypt, see Latour 1998 and cf. his recent *retractatio*, Latour 2004.

[6] North 2000, 84-85.

nessed unprecedented growth in novel, productive, theoretically sophisticated, and self-reflective approaches to Roman religion. And yet I would plead that a tendency often in evidence throughout this period, the tendency to assert that belief is not a category of much relevance to the study of Roman religion, has hindered the progress that North anticipated. Despite some notable recent attempts to challenge it, a consensus against belief persists. In certain respects this consensus is quite old, rooted in, among other factors, Protestant disparagement of Catholicism's supposedly paganistic ritualism. In other respects, the consensus is rather new, stemming from the often relativistic anthropological theorizing of the 1960s and after. So let us begin by reviewing briefly the fate of belief in scholarship on Roman religion. For we must see whence we have come in order to grasp where we are and to decide where we wish to go.

Once upon a time, researching Roman religion meant, in part, reconstructing its "original" state from the evidence of necessarily later sources. This pursuit occupied scholars such as Johann Adam Hartung, who helped found the field with his *Die Religion der Römer* in 1836. In the striking image of his "Vorrede," Hartung describes authentic Roman religion as "ein alter Tempel" upon which a later structure ("Überbau"), assembled of Greek and other alien materials, had been imposed. Both of these structures collapsed, leaving to the scholar the task of excavating the remains ("die Trümmer") of the first structure from under the rubble of the later one.[7] Hartung's image of architectural supersession and collapse proved canonical: Preller, Aust, and Wissowa, among others, cited it approvingly.[8] Guided by Hartung's conceit, with its tragic motif of "das Erlöschen des alten

[7] Hartung 1836, I: ix. The sketch offered here makes no claim to being exhaustive. On Hartung, Mommsen, Wissowa, Cumont and the history of the study of Roman religion, see Scheid 1987; Bendlin 2000; Stroumsa 2002; Bendlin 2006; Phillips 2007; Ando 2008, ix-xvii; Rives 2010, 244-251, esp. 247ff.; and Scheid 2015, 5-11.

[8] Preller 1858, 41-42 n. 2; Aust 1899, 1; Wissowa 1902, 1 and 1912, 1. See further Bendlin 2006, 235-236.

Glaubens,"[9] scholars could not but disparage the religion of the historical republic as contaminated or degenerate.[10]

This thesis sat well with Theodor Mommsen, for whom "the old national religion was visibly on the decline ('auf Neige')" in the age of Cato and Ennius, undermined by Hellenism and other eastern influences.[11] But of course for Mommsen Roman religion *qua* religion had always fallen short.[12] At its best, it had served as a system of ritual marked by a practical legalism,[13] but by the late republic it was merely a tool with which the élite cynically exploited "the principles of the popular belief, which were recognized as irrational ('als irrationell erkannten Sätze des Volksglaubens'), for reasons of outward convenience."[14] Mommsen's view of republican religion as a means of manipulation has ancient authority, for example, that of Polybius (6.56), whom he cites.[15] More importantly, it is surely no coincidence that this scholar, with his particular interests and expertise, should have identified a legalistic paradigm at the heart of Roman religion.

Mommsen's legalistic paradigm proved influential; Georg Wissowa absorbed its lessons. He dedicated the first edition of his still fundamental *Religion und Kultus der Römer* to the elder scholar, asserting that

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[9] Hartung 1836, 244.

[10] See, e.g., Fowler 1911, 428-429, admiring by contrast the "revival of the State religion by Augustus."

[11] Mommsen 1862-1866, II: 402; 1856, 844: "So ging es mit der alten Landesreligion zusehends auf Neige."

[12] Mommsen 1856, 152: "den geheimnisvollen Schauer, nach dem das Menschenherz doch auch sich sehnt, vermag sie (sc. römische Religion) nicht zu erregen." Mommsen may have been "agnostic" but we can see his "education in the Lutheran tradition" (Scheid 2015, 10) reflected in this quotation. See below, text accompanying n. 29.

[13] See the discussion at Mommsen 1862-1866, I: 222-227, which concludes (227): "Thus the whole criminal law rested as to its ultimate basis on the religious idea of expiation. But religion performed no higher service in Latium than the furtherance of civil order and morality by means such as these."

[14] Mommsen 1862-1866, II: 433, cited in Fowler 1911, 2; Mommsen 1857, 417.

[15] The manipulation thesis reaches an apex in Taylor 1949, 1-24.

without Mommsen's Lebenswerk — especially *Römisches Staatsrecht* (1871-1888) and his contributions on the *Fasti* to *CIL* I, *pars prior* (1893) — his own work would not exist.[16] In the "Vorwort" to his book's second edition, Wissowa responded to the charge that his account lacked "Religiosität."[17] Defending his "juristische" perspective, that is, his "Gesichtspunkt des *ius pontificium*," he explicitly aligned himself with Mommsen and his paradigm.[18] It was for another scholar, Franz Cumont, to discover a source of the "religiosity" that Wissowa had neglected: the "Oriental religions."[19] Cumont adduced dry Roman legalism to explain the appeal of these foreign cults. He derogated Roman religion as "froide" and "prosaïque," compared its priests to jurists,[20] and likened its observances to legal practice.[21]

Cumont's cold legalism stopped one step short of empty formalism. Arthur Darby Nock, otherwise an extraordinarily sensitive scholar of Greco-Roman religion, took that step. In his essay for the tenth volume of *The Cambridge Ancient History* (1934), Nock asserted that Roman

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[16] Wissowa 1902, x: "kein Kapitel dieses Buches hätte geschrieben werden können." See Scheid 1987, 309 and Bendlin 2006, 236ff. On the epistolary relationship between these men, see Scheid and Wirbelauer 2008.

[17] The charge reflects a Protestant notion of true religion as, in Schleiermacher's famous words, "Frömmigkeit," "piety," that is, a "feeling of absolute dependence on God" ("das Gefühl schlechthiniger Abhängikeit von Gott"), Schleiermacher 2003, 32, 38, 44, 67, 265, 283, etc. See Bendlin 2000, 120 and 2006, 229.

[18] Wissowa 1912, viii. On this moment in Wissowa's intellectual career and its import, contrast Bendlin 2006 and Scheid 2015, 7-21.

[19] Cumont 1906, 37: "Les religions Orientales, qui ne s'imposent pas avec l'autorité reconnue d'une religion officielle, doivent pour s'attirer des prosélytes, émouvoir les sentiments de l'individu."

[20] Cumont 1906, 36: "Ses pontifes, qui sont aussi des magistrats, ont réglé les manifestations du culte avec une précision exacte de juristes." This is cited in Fowler 1911, 2-3, in the course of the author's acknowledgment of and departure from Mommsen and Wissowa's legalistic paradigm.

[21] Cumont 1906, 37, cited in Fowler 1911, 2-3: "Sa liturgie rappelle par la minutie de ses prescriptions l'ancien droit civil." None of this is to say, of course, that the Romans' was not a religion of law: in addition to Wissowa 1912, see Watson 1992 and 1993; Meyer 2004; Ando and Rüpke 2006; Tellegen-Couperus 2012.

religion was "in its essence a matter of cult acts" (465). It was a "religion made up of traditional practice;" "it was not a matter of belief" (469); it was, in a word, "jejune" (467). In Nock's appraisal, we see clearly the dichotomy between belief and practice that came to inform even the most rigorous scholarship: Roman religion was strictly "a matter of cult acts," "it was not a matter of belief." Where Hartung had traced a "dying out" of belief, and where Mommsen had derided "irrational" belief, Nock saw no belief at all, only empty cult. Thus, a dichotomy between belief and practice, as well as a denial of belief, became *de rigueur* for the interpretation of Roman religion.[22]

On the dominant view whose development we have sketched thus far, Roman religion had always been preoccupied with ritual action. But regarding belief we may discern a bifurcation into two schools of thought. If we back up a bit, we see that Bernard de Fontenelle, in his *Histoire des Oracles* of 1687, had been led by his survey of Cicero's remarks on religion to opine that "among the pagans religion was only a practice, for which speculation was unimportant. Do as the others do, and believe whatever you like."[23] Fontenelle's assertion, though not intended as a compliment, has the merit of according the Romans a certain respect. For example, "believe whatever you like" credits polytheism with a cognitive autonomy that Christian traditions typically seek to curtail.[24] To his credit, Fontenelle had declined to declare the beliefs of the Romans inadequate, as one school of thought was soon

[22] Kindt 2012, 30-32 and Harrison 2015a diagnose an analogous dichotomy in the study of Greek religion.

[23] Fontenelle 1687, 64: "Il y a lieu de croire que chez les Payens la Religion n'estoit qu'une pratique, dont la speculation estoit indifferente. Faites commes les autres, et croyez ce qu'il vous plaira." On this passage and recent "neo-Fontenellian" approaches, see Parker 2011, 31-39.

[24] Indeed, the Jesuit Jean-François Baltus attacked as impious Fontenelle's treatise and the work of Antonie van Dale (1683) upon which it was based (Baltus 1707). Following Dale, Fontenelle argued that the pagan oracles had been merely human frauds, not the work of demons. This thesis clashed with the received theory that Christ's incarnation had silenced antiquity's demonic pagan oracles. See Ossa-Richardson 2013.

to do, nor had he denied beliefs to the Romans, as a second school was later to do.[25]

According to the first of these schools of thought, into which, as we have seen, Mommsen fell, Roman cult had beliefs associated with it, but they were nugatory. This view may be found expressed again and again in this period as, for example, with considerable violence, by Stephen Gaselee in the *Edinburgh Review*:[26]

> The indigenous Roman religion seems indeed to have been one of the least satisfying forms of belief ever possessed by any nation. It consisted of a large number of ritual observances, closely bound up with the routine of the household and of the State, in combination with a host of gods that can only be described as the palest and most bloodless personifications of ordinary and extraordinary actions.

The second school of thought, that of Nock, held that Roman religion simply lacked beliefs, nugatory or otherwise. We should note that this thesis was not original to Nock; he merely gave it particularly stark expression. Already in 1885, for example, Nettleship could remind his readers, without the air of a man imparting an especially novel insight, that "Roman religion was far more an observance than a creed" (143).

The two schools of thought represented by Mommsen and Gaselee, Nettleship and Nock, articulate in their respective ways what had become by the late 19th century a ubiquitous dichotomy between belief and ritual. But this dichotomy hardly had its origins in the disinterested findings of secular scholarship.[27] Instead, it drew both upon a new privileging of Greece over Rome that marked the transition from 18th- to

[25] Cf. Parker 2011, 32-33.

[26] Gaselee 1913, 89.

[27] Consider the framework, motivated by a teleological view of Christian religiosity, posited by W. R. Smith for ancient Semitic religions: "ritual and practical usage were, strictly speaking, the sum total of ancient religions;" such religion "was not a system of belief with practical applications; it was a body of fixed traditional practices" (Smith 1889, 21). On Smith, see Harrison 2015a.

19th-century Humanism,[28] as well as upon Protestant anti-Catholic (and, indeed, anti-Semitic) sentiment. If the religious beliefs of the Romans fared badly in this fraught scholarship, their religious practices hardly fared better. Here is Mommsen again (1862-1866, I: 222-223):

> ... the Latin religion sank into an incredible insipidity and dullness, and early became shrivelled into an anxious and dreary round of ceremonies.

Lest the reader fail to draw the parallel between ancient Romans and modern Catholics, Mommsen obligingly draws it himself: these unfortunate traits of Roman religion were "no less distinctly apparent in the saint worship of the modern inhabitants of Italy."[29]

The approach to Roman religion common to these scholars of the 19th and early 20th centuries, with its opposition of belief to ritual action, was not new, as the example of Fontenelle shows. Indeed, it was older than Fontenelle. It was situated within and structured by a polemic that dated back to the Reformation, when Martin Luther had elevated *fides* and "der Glaube des Herzens" of "der innere Mensch" over a supposed Catholic formalism that relied on "gute Werke" performed by what Luther termed "der äußere Mensch."[30] And if "faith" (*fides*, Glaube) was a Protestant byword from Luther on, it is perhaps telling that the first attested use of "ritual" appears in the *Acts and Monuments* of the English anti-Catholic polemicist John Foxe, who faults an epistle of Pope Zephyrinus to the bishops of Egypt for "contayning no maner of doctrine ... but onely certayn ritual decrees to no purpose."[31] Here in

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[28] See, for example, the unfavorable comparison of Rome (Book XIV) against Greece (Book XIII) in J. G. Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791).

[29] See above, n. 12. It is hard to know whether Jew or Roman fares worse in Mommsen's comparisons, as at 1862-1866, II: 400: "The catalogue of the duties and privileges of the priest of Jupiter ... might well have a place in the Talmud."

[30] Luther 1520, *passim*. On the inner man/outer man distinction, see Rieger 2007, 80ff., 234ff.

[31] Foxe 1570, I: 83, cited in *OED* s.v., which is cited in turn by J. Z. Smith (1987, 102), whose chapter (96-103) on Protestant construal of the emptiness of Catholic ritual is especially instructive. Smith 1990 studies the context of Protestant

the 16th century we can already discern the opposition that will come to determine the assumptions of so much scholarship on Roman religion, the opposition of unsatisfactory or absent beliefs ("no maner of doctrine") to meaningless practices ("ritual decrees to no purpose").[32]

Indeed, this Reformation rhetoric, which cast a Catholic "paganism"[33] against the authentic Christianity of Protestantism, drew from ancient wellsprings, such as the writings of Lactantius, who in a characteristically polemical passage proposed a dichotomy between body and soul, action and cognition, which tracks his distinction between pagan and Christian (Lactant. *Div. inst*. 4.3.1):

> *nec habet* (sc. *deorum cultus*) *inquisitionem aliquam veritatis, sed tantummodo ritum colendi, qui non officio mentis, sed ministerio corporis constat*.
>
> Nor does the cult of the gods amount to any search for truth but merely a ritual of worshipping, which consists not in a function of the mind, but in employment of the body.

Here we already see, *in ovo*, not only Luther's doctrine of "inner" versus "outer" and his castigation of Catholic work-righteousness, but also Foxe's polemical contrast between doctrine and ritual. As the case of Wissowa, who was Catholic, shows, later scholars needed not have a dog in the denominational fight, nor a stake in religious polemic, in order to subscribe to this Lactantian dichotomy.

Now, scholars in recent years have shown themselves sensitive to the influence that ideological and confessional elements, even when attenuated and no long matters of urgency, exert on the putatively objective narratives and judgments of historiography. They have not hesitated to expose and reject tendentious categories implicit in the paradigms of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Notions of an early, authentic Roman religiosity beset by contaminating external influences

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anti-Catholic polemic in which modern religious studies — especially comparative studies of early Christianity and late antique religions — are situated. See Wiebe 1999 for more on the 19th-century Protestant context of the origins of the academic study of religion.

[32] For a host of examples of the "empty ritual" thesis in classical scholarship, see the citations in Phillips 1986, 2697 n. 56.

[33] See Middleton 1729 for one of the most florid examples.

or degenerating internally from neglect, for example, have been rightly discarded, the manipulation thesis no longer exerts quite the explanatory allure it once did, and the legalistic aspects of Roman religion are no longer seen as failings of authentic sentiment. Progress, often dramatic progress, has been made.[34]

As part and parcel of that progress, we have already seen scholars such as North seeking to root out of our assessment of Roman cult even unconsciously Christianizing presuppositions. This has involved questioning whether non-Christian religions should be evaluated in terms of belief. Surely both schools — the one that found the beliefs of the Romans wanting and the one that found the Romans wanting beliefs — were wrong to measure the ancients against this modern, Christian yardstick? Perhaps belief is not a necessary or even intelligible category of analysis in the study of non-Christian religions? Voicing such doubts was intended to expose the judgments of a Mommsen for what they were, to wit, condescending in their censuring of Roman religion's inadequate or "irrational" beliefs. In addition, this relativism about belief was intended to disarm the evaluations of a Hartung or a Nock. For how can we speak of "das Erlöschen des alten Glaubens" or chide the Romans for lacking belief, if belief was simply never a part of their religion? This stance, which was meant to be charitable, derived in part from developments in 20th-century anthropology, where the hazards of assessing non-western cultural traditions in light of western concepts and values had come vividly into view.

The signal anthropological study that encouraged scholars of Roman religion to cast off outmoded ideas about belief was Rodney Needham's *Belief, Language, and Experience*, which appeared in 1972. Needham concluded, on the basis of his attempt to locate belief among the Penan of Borneo and the Nuer of the Sudan, that it was a mistake for the western researcher to attribute beliefs to individuals of other cul-

[34] For overviews of this progress with rather different emphases, see Phillips 2007; Rives 2010; and the *Translator's Foreword* by Clifford Ando in Scheid 2015, xi-xvii. An exhaustive history of scholarship on Roman religion, attentive to the various intellectual contexts that have shaped its study, is a desideratum.

tures. As we shall see, Needham is often misinterpreted as asserting that belief is an inherently western, Christian mental state not shared by non-western, non-Christian peoples. However, his true thesis is much stronger and much more radical, to wit, that *no one* has ever believed.[35] He writes, for example, as follows (1972, 188):

> [T]he notion of belief is not appropriate to an empirical philosophy of mind or to an exact account of human motives and conduct. Belief is not a discriminable experience, it does not constitute a natural resemblance among men, and it does not belong to "the common behaviour of mankind."

On this view, reference to belief in the anthropological study of religion should be eschewed as misguided and misguiding. But this is not because belief is properly western or Christian. Rather, it is because belief is an incoherent category even within western, Christian culture. "Belief" refers to no psychological state of which we can speak meaningfully at all. Needham's views have done immense harm to the study of ancient religion. I shall attempt to demolish definitively some of his most pernicious arguments later in this essay.[36] For now I would note that if we should accept Needham's conclusions, we might well throw up our hands with him: "I am not saying that human life is senseless, but that we cannot make sense of it."[37]

Scholars of ancient religion did not delay long in drawing inspiration from Needham's skepticism about belief,[38] although as I mentioned they have usually mistaken his most radical thesis. Simon Price, in his *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (1984), stands at the vanguard of and typifies this misprision of Needham, from whom he draws a relativist rather than a universalist lesson about be-

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[35] I thank Joseph Streeter for helping me see, *per litteras*, the full implications of Needham's arguments.

[36] See, too, Streeter (forthcoming), which neatly defeats Needham's arguments using resources internal to them.

[37] Needham 1972, 244.

[38] In turn, Needham could comment on the work of ancient historians, as in a 1990 review faulting Veyne 1988 for lack of rigor in its discussion of the beliefs of the Greeks and Romans.

lief. Price helped to establish, and asserted perhaps the most vehemently, the new approach to belief that we have seen heralded by North, according to which belief is a Christian, not pagan phenomenon. It is worth quoting Price at modest length (1984, 10-11):

> Indeed the centrality of "religious belief" in our culture has sometimes led to the feeling that belief is a distinct and natural capacity which is shared by all human beings. This of course is nonsense. [Here Price footnotes, without comment, Needham 1972]. "Belief" as a religious term is profoundly Christian in its implications; it was forged out of the experience which the Apostles and Saint Paul had of the Risen Lord. The emphasis which "belief" gives to spiritual commitment has no necessary place in the analysis of other cultures. That is, the question about the "real beliefs" of the Greeks is again implicitly Christianizing.

For the ancients, he continues, "Ritual is what there was." Price's animadversions have proved influential,[39] as has his appeal to Needham's study. I note here in passing a virtue of Price's book that is overlooked as often as its vice concerning belief is propagated. The disproportionate influence of Price's denial of belief has obscured his valuable conception of "ritual as a public cognitive system."[40] But if Roman ritual was a public cognitive system, then presumably it will have drawn upon and appealed to publicly manifest Roman *beliefs*, among many other cognitive states, events, and processes.

As many virtues as Price's study may possess, we must focus here on the canonical status it helped Needham's book attain among classicists. Two years after the appearance of *Rituals and Power*, for example, C. R. Phillips III cited Needham in an article on "The Sociology of Religious Knowledge in the Roman Empire." He rightly took exception to the view expressed by Nock, recognizing that "Roman religion ... by its very postulation of superhuman beings and rituals for dealing with them cannot be mere actions." But he nonetheless declined to allow that the "postulation of superhuman beings" might constitute any-

[39] From Bowersock 1989, 206 to Collar 2013, 63-64, Price's belief denial continues to exert influence.

[40] Price 1984, 9; cf. 8.

thing resembling belief: "The very word 'belief' represents far too slippery a category to help investigators, while considerable doubt may be cast on contemporary models for mental life."[41] Although Phillips expressed ambivalence about Needham's work,[42] we can still see the latter's influence reflected in the former's skepticism as to whether the ancients entertained anything like what we call "beliefs." Needham's book continues to be cited by classicists when they wish to argue along the lines that "'Belief' is ... deeply problematic: it may be that this paradoxical concept is one peculiar to the Christianized West."[43]

These latter quotations are addressed to *Roman* religion, but Price, it will be noted, was writing not about Romans *per se* but about Greeks under Roman rule. The dichotomy of belief and ritual with which he operated may accordingly be found echoed in scholarship on Greek religion. In 1985 for example Paul Cartledge wrote that "Classical Greek religion was at bottom a question of doing not of believing, of behaviour rather than faith."[44] Much more recently we have been told, "Ancient Greek religion had little to do with belief, and a great deal to do with practice and observance of common ancestral customs."[45] Andreas Bendlin, analyzing trends in the study of Roman religion, and Thomas Harrison, performing the same office for Greek religion, di-

[41] Phillips 1986, 2710 and 2702.

[42] Phillips 1986, 2689: Needham "offers a thorough and thought-provoking study of the problem" of belief, and his "enterprise has utility," but "the logic of Needham's analytic position produces paralysis." More recently, Phillips has argued for the relevance of belief, e.g., 2007, 13 (and cf. 26): "most specialists nowadays reject the idea that Roman religion constituted 'cult acts without belief.'" See n. 73, below, for a few such recent works of scholarship.

[43] Davies 2004, citing Needham 1972 at 5 n. 15; cf. Davies 2011, citing Needham at 398 *et passim*. On the Greek side, see, e.g., Giordano-Zecharya 2005, citing Needham at 330 n. 19 and 343; and Gagné 2013, citing Needham at 7 n. 17.

[44] Cartledge 1985, 98. Cf., much earlier, Burnet [1924] 1970, 5: "Athenian religion was a matter of practice, not of belief."

[45] Evans 2010, 7. Many more such remarks about Greek religion cited in Harrison 2000, 18-23; 2007, 382-384; Versnel 2011, 539-559, esp. 544-545; Harrison 2015a; Petrovic and Petrovic 2016, 1-37.

agnosed in this resurrected dichotomy between belief and action what both called a new "orthodoxy."[46] This new orthodoxy is part and parcel of what we have seen North, writing in the same year as Bendlin and Harrison, herald as a new approach.

Statements of this orthodoxy dating from the two decades that straddle the millennium are not far to find. Here is a relatively unobjectionable example: "In the case of polytheistic religions, action, not belief, is primary."[47] More tendentiously: "One of the hardest features of ancient religion for the modern student is the sheer unimportance of belief;" what was important was "correct observance of rituals."[48] Similarly but boiled down: "For the Romans, religion was not a belief...: it was purely utilitarian practice."[49] Now expanded: "For the Romans, *religio* was not a matter of faith or belief, of doctrine or creed, but rather of worship — of divination, prayer, and sacrifice."[50] More expansively still: "For the Romans, *religio* especially denoted ritual precision. Being religious, 'having religion,' did not mean believing correctly, but performing acts such as sacrifice or oracles (*sacra et auspicia*) at the right point in time and in the right series of parts."[51] Most authoritatively and, as we shall see, least tenably: in Roman religious life, "experiences, beliefs and disbeliefs had no particularly privileged role in defining an individual's actions, behaviour or sense of identity."[52] And most recently and quite briefly: Roman cult "was a religion of doing, not believing."[53] In all of these dicta, which derive for the most part

[46] Bendlin 2000, 115 (cf. 2001); Harrison 2000, 18. Petrovic and Petrovic 2016, 2 speak of "a long tradition which peaked in the latter part of the twentieth century" of denial regarding belief in Greek religion.
[47] Rüpke 2007, 86.
[48] Dowden 1992, 8.
[49] Turcan 2000, 2.
[50] Warrior 2006, xv.
[51] Auffarth and Mohr 2006, 1608-1609.
[52] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 42.
[53] Beard 2015, 103.

from introductory texts,[54] we find both the dichotomy that opposes belief to action and the denial of belief's relevance to Roman cult.

So, in this new orthodoxy an updated dichotomy between belief and action returned, along with denial about belief. Now, however, both the dichotomy and the denial manifested as theoretical sophistication and sympathetic appreciation of Roman alterity rather than as denominational rancor and Christian sanctimony. Nor have the dichotomy or the denial been limited to classics; both continue to inform the study of religion in a variety of disciplines.[55] Of course, it would be wrong to say that this has been the only theory of Roman belief ever proposed. Some have discerned "une foi dans la religion romaine." This Roman faith "donnait pour acquise l'existence des dieux et posait la nécessité et l'efficacité du commerce rituelle avec eux."[56] Others have observed that the Romans did not just *have* religious beliefs, they also *talked about* them.[57] Despite such interventions, the dominant trend has been to see Roman cult as a paradigmatic case of religious *doing* rather than religious *believing*.

But here we must pause. After all, is there not *something* to these views that we have just rehearsed? I observed that Fontenelle's formulation — *faites commes les autres, et croyez ce qu'il vous plaira* — has its merits. Indeed, if the millennial consensus had favored expression in terms of Fontenellian cognitive autonomy rather than of non-cognitivism, it would have hit closer to the mark. The study of Roman religion is always at least implicitly a comparative endeavor, so it is

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[54] From more specialized literature, see, e.g., Gargola 1995, 5; Gradel 2002, 4-5; Rasmussen 2002, 169.

[55] Recognition of the dichotomy: Bell 1992, 19-20. A plea to rethink it: Smith 2002. Review and assessment of belief denial: Bell 2002 and 2008. A recent reassertion of belief denial: Lindquist and Coleman 2008.

[56] Linder and Scheid 1993, 55 (cf. Scheid 2005, ch. 5). Cf. Mueller 2002, 19: "the emotions (as well as terms like 'belief') should not be neglected;" Rives 2007, 48: "... we must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater."

[57] Feeney 1998, 11: "This is not to say that language of belief is never an issue when we are discussing the 'ancient' religions. It certainly is, as we shall see in detail."

always worth attending to points of contact and departure between ancient ways of religious life and ways perhaps more familiar in the modern west. Let us consider three examples.

First, many Christianities and other "religions of the Book" have been or are organized around a definitive and obligatory set of explicit doctrines while Roman religion was not. Even so, it is important to recall the "foi dans la religion romaine," just mentioned: all of Roman religious activity proceeded on the basis of an at least implicit theology, a set of beliefs as to the gods' existence and susceptibility to cult.

Second, no traditional Roman would have supposed that *believing* in and of itself was effective for, say, the soul's salvation. Such considerations, which are surely part of the point of the consensus against belief, inform the contrast scholars have rightly drawn between Roman cult and religions in which "believing as such" is "a central element in the system."[58] Still, of course, there is no denying that some ancient people did have beliefs about the soul's salvation. The gold leaves found in Italian and Sicilian graves witness a belief that one may find favorable or unfavorable reception in the afterlife, depending on one's possession of privileged knowledge of what to do and say upon arrival in the underworld.[59] Of course, in such cases it was the *content* of the relevant beliefs, not the business of believing *per se*, that conduced to the soul's salvation.

Finally, and no doubt owing to these latter two facts, traditional Romans neither put overt profession of approved beliefs in the foreground nor fretted over such highly self-conscious epistemological attitudes as have gone under the rubrics of πίστις, *fides*, or faith. Obviously, the ways in which belief may enter a people's explicit conversation, and differing "cultures of belief," are eminently susceptible to historical analysis and comparison.[60] But for this very reason we must take care not to rule out the possibility that Romans could engage in

[58] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 43.

[59] Tablets nos. 1-9, the latter from Rome, in the edition of Graf and Iles Johnston 2007.

[60] Mair 2013.

religious metacognition, that is, that they could think about their own religious thinking, and could even "believe in belief."[61]

Seneca, for example, held that believing the gods to exist was the primary *deorum cultus*.[62] And Cicero's Cotta affirms, against Balbus' insinuations, his endorsement of "the beliefs (*opiniones*) that we have received from our ancestors concerning the immortal gods."[63] Again, speaking *propria voce*, Marcus could assert the utility of such *opiniones* for communal life and the keeping of faith among human beings.[64] Then there is Livy, who expected his readers to believe that belief in the divinity of Romulus soothed the grief of his followers after his mysterious disappearance.[65] Recall, too, that in his *De republica*, Cicero has Scipio worry over this supposedly historical datum: how could the *maiores*, living in a cultured age, have *believed* myths such as the apotheosis of Romulus? Their proclivity to believe is a problem to be explained.[66] Similarly, Livy and Cicero both attest a tradition that the liturgical reforms of Numa had a salutary effect on the minds, *animi*, of the warlike Romans and that he made his reforms acceptable by leading people to believe that the nymph Egeria had guided him.[67] And Cicero could divide even his own contemporaries into those who believed such myths and those who did not.[68] So even though, or perhaps because, cognitive autonomy was the rule, Romans could and did

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[61] In the happy expression of Dennett 2006, 200ff. For "belief in belief" in Ptolemaic Egypt, see Roubekas 2015.

[62] Sen. *Ep*. 95.50: *primus est deorum cultus deos credere*. Cf. Cic. *Dom*. 107: *nec est ulla erga deos pietas nisi honesta de numine eorum ac mente opinio*.

[63] Cic. *Nat. D*. 3.5: *opiniones quas a maioribus accepimus de dis immortalibus*.

[64] Cic. *Leg*. 2.16: *utilis esse autem has opiniones quis neget*...?

[65] Liv. 1.16.8: *mirum, quantum illi viro nuntianti haec fidei fuerit quamque desiderium Romuli apud plebem exercitumque facta fide inmortalitatis lenitum sit*.

[66] Cic. *Rep*. 2.17-20. The language of belief and disbelief runs throughout this passage. In order: *putaretur*, *opinionem*, *ad credendum*, *recepit*, *respuit*, *creditum*, *crederetur*, *credidissent*.

[67] Cic. *Rep*. 2.26: *animos ... religionum caerimoniis mitigavit*; cf. Liv. 1.19.4-5.

[68] Cic. *Leg*. 1.4: *nec dubito quin idem et cum Egeria conlocutum Numam et ab aquila Tarquinio apicem impositum putent*.

freely discuss beliefs, entertain beliefs about belief, and even believe or disbelieve in the value of various religious belief(s).

Now, I would be happy to tender the foregoing considerations, with the qualifications I have appended, as charitable if non-literal interpretations of the quotations affirming the belief-action dichotomy and belief denial that we have reviewed. To recapitulate: I acknowledge, first, that Roman religion was not distinguished by a set of core tenets, even if it did presuppose certain beliefs about the gods; second, Romans typically did not accord salvific efficacy to believing *per se*, though this does not mean that Romans could not have beliefs of one sort or another about the soul's salvation; therefore, third, Roman religion did not accord a central place to creedal confession, even if this obvious fact does not entail that Romans could not be reflective about and even "believe in" the value of religious belief.

I have found, especially in the "oral tradition" of the classroom, the conference, and the lecture series, that many hold views no more exceptionable than those I have just outlined. Nonetheless, a great many published statements of the consensus militate against the charitable interpretations I have tendered above and seem to demand a literal reading. Indeed I have found, also in the oral tradition, that many scholars insist on just such a literal reading and refuse to countenance any reference to belief. We have been told that belief is not a "natural capacity which is shared by all human beings,"[69] that "beliefs ... had no particularly privileged role in defining an individual's actions,"[70] and that the Romans had no beliefs one way or the other about "the efficacy" of the "ritual actions"[71] that they performed at the cost of so much time, trouble, and material expense. The consequence of such authoritative pronouncements has been, as Andreas Bendlin notes, a focus on

[69] Price 1984, 10.
[70] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 42.
[71] North 2000, 84.

"the ritual dimension of the Roman religious experience rather than a possible cognitive dimension."[72]

So a rethinking of the dichotomy between belief and action and of the denial of belief was clearly due. Just such a rethinking commenced at the turn of the millennium. Scholars of classical antiquity have reopened the question of belief and have been looking afresh at it and at cognition more generally as necessary components in any holistic picture of ancient religious life.[73] This essay joins and seeks to contribute to these efforts. I argue that on both theoretical and evidentiary grounds the consensus about belief and its relationship to action that was in place at the beginning of this century, however valuable much of the work carried out under its auspices, has impeded the progress North envisioned and therefore stands in need of reconsideration.[74] I concur, *mutatis mutandis*, with Thomas Harrison when he writes of Greek religion, "Rather than dismissing 'belief'..., we need to reclaim it."[75] This essay represents an attempt at reclamation. Now, it will not suffice to affirm of the Romans that, yes, they had beliefs. We must understand belief as one among many intentional states (section 3.1), see how it underpins emotions and its role in the etiology of cult action

[72] Bendlin 2001, 193. Cf. Phillips 2007, 26: "Perhaps it is time for specialists in Roman religion to renew contact with their erstwhile colleagues in religious studies and anthropology — those fields are rife with promising approaches such as the cognitive."

[73] For the emerging approach to belief in Greek and Roman religion, see Bendlin 2000; Harrison 2000; King 2003; Harrison 2007; Phillips 2007; Parker 2011; Versnel 2011; Kindt 2012; Harrison 2015a; and Petrovic and Petrovic 2016. Cognitive theory, broadly construed, now informs many studies of the Greco-Roman world. For a fully committed, rather than piecemeal, cognitive approach to Greek religion, see now Larson 2016. Other cognitive theorizations of ancient religion may be found in Whitehouse and Martin 2004; Beck 2006; Bowden 2010. For cognitive theory in Greco-Roman literary, cultural, and historical studies, see, e.g., Fagan 2011; Meineck 2011.

[74] Cf. Kindt 2012, 31, on scholarship on Greek religion: "The neglect of religious beliefs came at a high price..."

[75] Harrison 2000, 22.

(3.2), and consider how, in being shared among individuals collectively, it contributes to creating religious reality and the social powers attendant upon it (3.3). So, we must go well beyond debating whether the Romans did or did not entertain beliefs in the domain of religion.

So, how to proceed? As we have seen, an understanding of what belief actually amounts to has proved elusive. The word "belief" is often used idiosyncratically in the study of religion, especially ancient religions. The term is often used in ways that do not correspond to the way belief is typically understood in the cognitive sciences, philosophy, social sciences, or even daily life. The effect of this idiosyncrasy is to preclude interdisciplinary conversation. Even more basically: not all understandings of belief are equally adequate to the phenomenon itself, so why retain inaccurate ones? I propose, in the following section, to offer a brief anatomy of some oft-encountered misleading propositions about belief. I do not pretend to answer nor do I have the space to address every last objection raised against the propriety of belief to the study of Roman religion. But I hope to destabilize the most venerable arguments against belief enough to suggest that a reassessment is in order. My positive theory of belief follows, in section 3.

2. AN ANATOMY OF BELIEF DENIAL AND THE BELIEF-ACTION DICHOTOMY

2.1. BELIEF IS CHRISTIAN

The first misleading proposition to address is that both the phenomenon and the term "belief" are uniquely Christian. More than misleading, this is simply false.[76] We saw this view expressed by Price, whose gambit was to historicize the phenomenon and lexeme and thereby assert their contingency. He condemns the word in his admonition that "'Belief' as a religious term is profoundly Christian in its implications."[77] And he posits that the phenomenon of believing is the result of a unique religious experience undergone by particular individuals (the Apostles) at parti-

[76] Cf. King 2003, 279: "Far from being 'implicitly Christianizing,' belief is not even intrinsically connected with religion or religious concepts."

[77] Price 1984, 10. More recently Gagné imagines that "belief" cannot escape its "fundamental ties to conviction and devotion and so many other heirs of the Christian *credo*" (2013, 7).

cular moments in time (post-resurrection meetings with Jesus) and is thus inextricably tangled up with Christian origins.

The historical claim that not beliefs with certain contents but rather belief *itself*, as a type of cognitive state, "was forged out of the experience which the Apostles and Saint Paul had of the Risen Lord" is *prima facie* hard to accept.[78] Indeed, it is a claim that participates in the very Christianizing that Price expressly wishes to avoid. Jonathan Z. Smith has laid bare the implications that allegations of Christian uniqueness such as this have for the comparative study of religion:[79]

> The centre, the fabled Pauline seizure by the "Christ-event" or some other construction of an originary moment, has been declared, *a priori*, to be unique, to be *sui generis*, and hence by definition, incomparable.

Thus, as for scholars of previous centuries, so for Price, a latent commitment to Christian exceptionalism underpins his verdict on the applicability of belief to ancient religions.[80]

In attempting to extirpate Christianizing categories of analysis, Price and scholars of like persuasion have allowed those very categories to inform their first principles. They imagine that the word "belief" of necessity baldly refers to or covertly connotes "the Christian virtue of faith."[81] Just as bachelors are unmarried, so belief, on this misprision, is analytically, by definition Christian.[82] I should hope it would be ob-

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[78] Cf. Johnson 1987, contending, in what is best read as a prank, "that no one believed anything, strictly speaking, until Greek thinkers of the sixth century B.C. showed people how to do this."

[79] Smith 1990, 143. Cf. esp. 36-53.

[80] Cf. Harrison 2000, 20: "Ironically," Price's "position falls into exactly the trap that it seeks to avoid" and King 2003, 276: "… the product of a Christianizing bias in favor of Christian uniqueness."

[81] A definition marked as *arch*. or *Obs*. in *OED* (1989) s.v. 1.b, but curiously elevated in *OED* (2011) to I.1.a.

[82] Further examples: Davies 2004, 5 (quoted above and just below) and *mutatis mutandis* Davies 2011, 411: "if we were to say that 'group X believed in Y/believed Y' then we would be concluding that a group in antiquity took up a position comparable to a modern religious group." This only holds on the troubled assumption that belief is inherently a "modern religious" cognitive state.

vious to any fluent speaker of English that the word gets used in non-Christian ways with non-Christian connotations all the time, even when it is used "as a religious term."

We shall return to this question below, but for now please note that Price's position exhibits the genetic fallacy, that is, the mistake of supposing that some moment in a thing's history discredits, authenticates, or mechanically determines the current significance of the thing.[83] Since Christians once used or even still use the English word "belief" to refer to Christian faith, the word is hopelessly linked to Christianity. Should we generalize this genetic method, we would have to stop speaking of *atoms*, on the grounds that the word's etymology links it to theories of Leucippus and his successors that are incommensurable with modern physics. We would have to quit referring to the *cosmos*, given the term's redolence of pre-Copernican astronomy. Finally, we would have to wonder how early Christians managed to cleanse words like *fides* and *credo* of their pagan overtones. Were they not profoundly *polytheistic* in their implications? After all, *Fides* had a temple on the Capitol.[84] Obviously, we can use all these terms in their current or secular senses and still talk about *Christian* (or *Roman*) belief, *Epicurean* atoms, and the *Ptolemaic* cosmos. We shall see that Price's Christianizing assumptions do not hold and that belief is not an anachronism.

2. 2. BELIEF IS A CONCEPT

Our second misleading proposition holds that belief is first and foremost a *concept*, and therefore may or may not be found in cultures other than our own. This misprision is closely related to or perhaps a more ecumenical version of the idea that belief is inherently Christian. We have already seen the belief-as-concept line expressed thus: "'Belief' is ... deeply problematic: it may be that this *paradoxical concept* is one peculiar to the Christianized West."[85] A similar perplexity infor-

[83] Cf. Versnel 2011, 548, with original emphasis: "The argument ... that 'believing' *originally* meant 'having faith' or even 'to pledge allegiance to' (and that our word 'belief' still betrays traces of those connotations) is *in this respect* irrelevant."
[84] Ziółkowski 1992, 28-31.
[85] Davies 2004, 5, my emphasis.

med Needham's study and an oft-cited article by Pouillon.[86] It is true that one may or may not have an explicit, theoretical concept of "belief," just as one may or may not possess the concept of "tubercle bacillus." But to be bereft of a well-articulated concept of belief is no more to be free of beliefs than to lack the concept of tubercle bacillus is to be insusceptible, as Latour allowed himself to be interpreted,[87] to tuberculosis.

Conceptual relativity, in this domain at least, does not entail ontological relativity.[88] Belief, unlike *auspicatio* or the *tribunatus plebis*, does not depend for its existence on how it is implicitly or explicitly conceptualized. Believing, that is, at a first approximation, representing states of affairs to obtain, is simply what minds do. Indeed, it is in part the mind's capacity to believe that allows us to form and entertain concepts, such as the mistaken concepts of belief promulgated by Needham, Price, Davies, and others. If they did not believe a lot of misguided things about belief, they would not have the concepts of belief that they have. So while their *concepts* of belief only exist in virtue of their *beliefs* about belief, belief *as such* does not exist in virtue of any concept of belief or any belief about belief. I would hazard that confusion to the contrary has arisen because there *are* some entities that really *do* depend on our beliefs and concepts, and therefore exist only relative to certain beliefs and conceptual schemes, such as *auspicatio* or the *tribunatus plebis*. There can be no *auspicatio* absent a reasonably determinate concept of *auspicatio* and likewise for the office of *tribunus plebis*.[89]

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[86] Needham 1972, with my emphases: "The *concept* of belief is an historical product…" (41); "The English *concept* of belief has been formed by a Christian tradition" (44). Cf. Pouillon 1982, 8, my emphasis: "… this *notion* [sc. religious belief] does not have universal value." Appeal to Pouillon 1982 in classical scholarship: e.g., Giordano-Zecharya 2005 *passim*; Davies 2004, 5 n. 15; Gagné 2013, 7 n. 17; in anthropology: e.g., Lindquist and Coleman 2008, 5-6 and Dein 2013.

[87] Doubts about tuberculosis in ancient Egypt: Latour 1998. Cf. his recent *retractatio*: Latour 2004.

[88] See further, Searle 1995, 160-167.

[89] See Searle 1995 and 2010.

2.3. BELIEF IS A LINGUISTIC PRACTICE

There is a linguistic version of the epistemological thesis that we must find a concept of belief in a given society in order to attribute beliefs to its people. It holds that in order to attribute beliefs to non-western or pre-modern people, we must at a minimum find a word in their language that translates as "belief" or "believe" and then ideally observe them making first-person affirmations of belief using that word. These premises underwrite the projects of Needham and Pouillon and, as might be expected in a philological discipline, may be found among classicists.[90] Needham puts it thus (1972, 108):

> Where, then, do we get the notion of belief from? From the verb "believe," and its inflected forms, in everyday English usage. Statements of belief are the only evidence for the phenomenon; but the phenomenon itself appears to be no more than the custom of making such statements.

Not only do we get our "notion of belief" from the verb "believe" but, what is more, "[s]tatements of belief are the only evidence" for belief. Finally, believing is nothing more than using the verb "believe."

On his first page, Needham describes the epistemological crisis, occasioned by a concern about language, that inspired his book. Although "[i]t was certain that the Penan spoke of the existence of a spiritual personage named Peselong" and although "his attributes were well agreed," nonetheless, the western anthropologist "had no linguistic evidence at all" about the beliefs of the Penan. This is because the Penan have "no formal creed, and ... no other conventional means for expressing belief in their god."[91] Needham spends many pages studying the etymology of the English belief/believe lexeme and surveying words in the tongues of the Penan, Nuer, and others that might trans-

[90] See, e.g., Davies 2011, 401-402 (worrying about the word *credo*); cf. 404 n. 32 and 406-407. An example from the oral tradition: I was once scolded by a very senior Latinist for attributing religious beliefs to the Romans. He could not imagine any Roman pagan saying *credo in deum/deos*. This consideration, which he regarded as decisive, is perfectly irrelevant, as we shall see.

[91] Needham 1972, 1.

late as "belief" or "believe."[92] These are worthy endeavors in their own right. Yet one cannot help but wonder if the fact that "the Penan spoke of the existence of" their god might not have counted as the "linguistic evidence" of belief that Needham was seeking.

Before exposing the full extent of Needham's error, let us turn to Jean Pouillon to see structuralism's contribution to the confusion. Pouillon's ethnographic problem is the Dangaléat people. He wonders, "how can one tell whether they believe [*croire*] and in what way? What question can one ask them, using what word of their language, in what context?"[93] His linguistic question is this: "is a translation of the verb (sc. *croire*) in all its senses possible in other languages, using a single term?"[94] Pouillon's structuralism leads him, after he has spent some pages identifying the semantic range of *croire* in its various constructions, to determine that all possible "meanings" of the verb *croire*, "even the contradictory ones, are intrinsically linked."[95] He finds that although "we can translate all aspects of the verb 'to believe'," we cannot translate "the verb itself" into Dangaléat.[96] The assumption that *croire* expresses all of its possible meanings whenever it is used, and the finding that the Dangaléat have no comparable verb, motivate Pouillon's conclusion that a vast gulf separates Christian and Dangaléat modes of religiosity.[97]

We shall take these claims apart in the order of presentation, but let us start with a fact about cultural cognition. There is no question that

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[92] Needham 1972, 32-50.

[93] Pouillon 1982, 4.

[94] Pouillon 1982, 1.

[95] Pouillon 1982, 5 (for "linked" the text reads "liked"). Cf. 8: "All the meanings of the verb 'to believe' should then come together." Pouillon's mistake continues to damage the study of ancient religion, e.g., Giordano-Zecharya 2005, 331: "... the Christian and modern use of the word ... subsumes three senses, inextricably." Similarly, for Gagné 2013 the "vast semantic range of the word 'belief'" (7) and "the force of its connotations" (8) prove intellectually insurmountable and thus apotropaic.

[96] Pouillon 1982, 5.

[97] Pouillon 1982, 5-8.

the lexicon of mental-state words in any given language plays an important role in language-users' reasoning about the mental-states of self and other, that is, their metacognitive abilities.[98] But it is mistaken to suppose that *believing itself* depends on any specific lexicon or linguistic practice, or that "[s]tatements of belief are the only evidence" we have for belief. Far from it. Needham could have saved himself the trouble of writing his book based solely on the evidence that he presents on page one. For all he required in order to attribute belief to the Penan was the fact that, as he admits, they speak of and agree about their god and his attributes. No linguistic construction for "expressing belief" is needed beyond simple assertion.[99]

The same answer may be given to Pouillon's series of questions about the Dangaléat: "How can one tell whether they believe...? What question can one ask them, using what word of their language...?" Again, Dangaléat assertions would typically count as evidence of Dangaléat beliefs, regardless of whether there is any "word of their language" for "croire." Pouillon would no doubt have rejected this, because he assumed that belief was a Christian mental state whose unique quality could be captured and expressed only by *croire*, as understood in all of its conceivable meanings taken at once. As he says, "it seems impossible to overcome the polysemy of the word."[100] However, this assumption that all the semantic potential of a term is gratuitously deployed with every use is groundless.[101] As every dictionary editor knows, a term's meaning differs from use to use and from context to context: this is why dictionaries offer multiple definitions of single words. So Pouillon's quest for a single Dangaléat word whose

[98] See, e.g., Wellman 2014, 25-26, 160-167; Zufferey 2010, 27-51. Needham has a useful discussion of this point: 1972, 25-28.

[99] As forcefully argued against Needham from Needham's own Wittgensteinian perspective in Streeter (forthcoming). For assertion and belief, see Searle 1979, 12-13; Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 18-19, 54-55, and 59-60; Jary 2010, 32-51; MacFarlane 2011; Goldberg 2015, 144-203.

[100] Pouillon 1982, 4.

[101] Barr (1961, 219) identified this tendency in Biblical scholarship as "illegitimate totality transfer."

semantic range maps precisely onto that of *croire* is a red herring, for *croire* does not express its entire semantic potential each time and in every context that it is used.[102]

In sum, we can often safely attribute beliefs to agents on the basis of their assertive speech acts. An assertive need not be embedded as a sentential clause dependent on a verb of believing ("I believe that...") because assertives alone, independently of a verb of believing, characteristically express a speaker's beliefs regarding a state of affairs.[103] Indeed, the most telling result of our discussion, and the greatest indictment of the methods of Needham and Pouillon, is the realization that we could attribute beliefs to people who speak a language with no mental-state lexicon at all, no so-called "intensional transitive" verbs like "believe," simply because in order to attribute beliefs we do not require confessions of belief employing first-person mentalizing verbs of believing. Unlike this hypothetical language that does not lexicalize mental states, Latin has a rich thesaurus of psychological terms, including numerous words for doxastic states of differing intensities, for example, *opinio* and *opinor*, *scientia* and *scio*, *cognitio* and *cognosco*, *fides*, *coniectura*, *sententia*, *credo*, *arbitror*, and *puto*, among many others. Any language with resources for denoting mental states, episodes, and processes grants its users certain capacities for metacognition, that is, the ability to think about thinking and to talk about thinking about thinking. But even if Latin had not a single term for any mental episode whatsoever, nonetheless, when Camillus asserts *urbem auspicato inauguratoque conditam habemus; nullus locus in ea non religionum deorumque est plenus*, we, like his imagined audience, are entitled to credit

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[102] Roughly this thesis is vividly argued using the example of αἰδώς/αἰδέομαι, in Cairns and Fulkerson 2015, section II.

[103] Assertive speech acts can, of course, be used in writing fiction, playing a role in a drama, lying, or with the perlocutionary intention of getting another to believe something regarding which one has no settled belief oneself. In these cases, the aesthetic, dramatic, deceptive, or persuasive effects of assertives *depend upon* the fact that their illocutionary point is to tell how the world is and, as such, express a psychological state of belief regardless of whether one *really has* the expressed belief.

him with certain beliefs about Rome, her divine charter, and her sacred relationship with the gods.[104]

2.4. BELIEFS ARE UNKNOWABLE

There is a diffidence in some recent literature concerning our ability to divine anything about the Romans' cognitive and affective states and indeed, most broadly speaking, their experience.[105] So this subsection extends to the study of ancient experience as well as of ancient belief. Regarding belief, we are warned that "it is a mistake to overemphasize any question of participants' belief or disbelief in the efficacy of ritual actions, *when we have no access to their private thoughts*."[106] As to experience, we are admonished:[107]

> We can never know what any Roman 'felt', at any period, when he decided to use his wealth to build a temple to a particular god; still less how Romans might have felt when entering, walking past or simply gazing at the religious monuments of their city.

Note the scare quotes around *felt*. If these passages advise us that we can never know what the Romans might have thought or experienced in the privacy of their hearts, other passages go further, suggesting that we cannot know whether the Romans even had psychological states that we could recognize, for "considerable doubt may be cast on contemporary models for mental life."[108] Indeed, preemptory surrender has been enjoined as a methodological principle:[109]

> même si nous pouvions déduire de telles croyances religieuses et les interpreter correctement, nous aurions bien tort de croire que nous

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[104] Liv. 5.50.2. See Ando 2015, 17-24. The occasion finds Camillus urging his fellow Romans not to move to Veii after the Gallic sack of Rome of 390. Even if this *diligentissimus religionum cultor* (Liv. 5.50.1) is in reality a thorough Polybian, cynically manipulating a credulous audience, his project still requires the activation, appeal to, and elicitation of *beliefs*.

[105] Experience as such has been gaining attention in scholarship on ancient religion: see Rüpke 2013, 20-22 for references and reflections.

[106] North 2000, 84, my emphasis.

[107] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 125.

[108] Phillips 1986, 2702.

[109] North 2003, 344.

> pourrions alors comprendre ces 'croyances' de la meme manière que nous comprenons les 'croyances' des religions modernes.

Ex hypothesi, even if we could work out and interpret Roman religious beliefs, and do so correctly, we *still* could not understand them.

The premise informing these self-defeating proposals is that ancient texts, artifacts, and behaviors that have survived to us or for which we have evidence do not necessarily constitute any "index" of any "experience,"[110] thoughts, or feelings the Romans may have had. What is more, even when ancient materials may licitly be taken, albeit with all due caution, as indices of Roman experiences, feelings, or beliefs, we still cannot understand these Roman mental episodes due to the irreducible alterity, the "sheer difference"[111] of these ancients. Now, of course, we hardly want to come to our encounter with the Romans assuming that we already know them, that they do not differ from us, that their relics are self-interpreting. But whence this extreme of epistemological reserve?

We may look again to Needham for an answer. Skepticism about the psychological states of his ethnographic informants, and thus about the entire *Verstehen* project, was a motivating mystification of his book. In the first chapter, titled "Problem," he had found fault with the practice of his colleagues (1972, 2):

> If ... an ethnographer said that people believed something when he did not actually know what was going on inside them, ... then surely his account of them must ... be very defective in quite fundamental regards.

Even when informed by a Nuer man that several Nuer verbs readily translate as "to believe" in religious contexts,[112] Needham serenely persisted in maintaining that "we remain completely ignorant of what is the interior state of the Nuer toward their god."[113]

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[110] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 125.

[111] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: x. Cf. Versnel 2011, 10-18, criticizing this thesis *vis-à-vis* the Greeks.

[112] Needham 1972, 30 n. 13 and accompanying text.

[113] Needham 1972, 31.

In one very specific sense, Needham and the classicists who follow his lead are quite right that we are "completely ignorant" about the inner lives of cultural others. We do "not actually know what was going on inside" of the Romans. For consider: sensory perceptions, bodily feelings, emotions, and beliefs are first-person episodes. This entails that one has no *immediate* access to any sensory, cognitive, or affective experience but one's own, whatever the cultural similarities or differences between self and other. Yet this hardly justifies solipsism. Others *obviously* have inner states, even if our only evidence for these states is their outward behavior.

Consider the following ancient instance of bodily pain, emotion, and belief. Augustine tells of Innocentius, a prominent Carthaginian, who had undergone surgery for fistulas *in posteriore atque ima corporis parte*.[114] In surgery, he had suffered horrific pains (*dolores*).[115] But his surgeons had missed a fistula, so deeply was it hidden *inter multos sinus*. The wretched man anticipated a second surgery with great fear (*tantus ... metus*), because he believed (*non dubitare*) that he would not survive it.[116] His entire *domus*, in sympathy with its *dominus*, wept "like the lamentation at a funeral."[117] Yet in the end, after much pitiable prayer, Innocentius was miraculously cured by a *misericors et omnipotens Deus*, to the great joy (*laetitia*) of the man and his family, who immediately offered prayers of thanks amid tears of rejoicing (*lacrimantia gaudia*).[118]

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[114] August. *De civ. D.* 22.8.3: *curabatur a medicis fistulas, quas numerosas atque perplexas habuit in posteriore atque ima corporis parte. iam secuerant eum et artis suae cetera medicamentis agebant.*

[115] August. *De civ. D.* 22.8.3: *passus autem fuerat in sectione illa et diuturnos et acerbos dolores.*

[116] August. *De civ. D.* 22.8.3: *tantus enim eum metus ex prioribus invaserat poenis, ut se inter medicorum manus non dubitaret esse moriturum.*

[117] August. *De civ. D.* 22.8.3: *ex maerore nimio domini tantus est in domo illa exortus dolor ut tamquam funeris planctus.*

[118] This miracle is not incidental to Augustine's motivations: *De civ. D.* 22.8.1: *nam etiam nunc fiunt miracula in eius nomine.*

Now, none of us in Innocentius, and no one, not his *domus*, not Augustine, has experienced precisely his fistulas, his pains in surgery, his beliefs and fears anticipating a second surgery, or his joy at his miraculous cure. Innocentius' bodily pains, his belief that he could die, and his successive emotions of fear and joy had a first-person, private, subjective existence rather than a third-person, public, objective existence. No matter how empathetic, tuned-in, and close to him were his *domus* and his friends such as Augustine, Innocentius alone was *directly* acquainted with these things. It is worth remarking that all of this holds as much for us and our own closest kin as for the Romans or the Nuer.

But these facts about the subjectivity of the psychological episodes occasioned by Innocentius' fistulas hardly sponsor Needhamian solipsism, i.e., doubt as to whether minds enculturated differently than one's own possess underlying features anything like one's own,[119] such as the sorts of cognitive episodes that Innocentius experienced: bodily pain, belief, emotion.[120] The *content* of those episodes as well as the *individual episodes themselves* were unique to Innocentius and were of course determined by his life history, including his cultural situatedness. But the *types* of episode — bodily pain, belief, and emotion — are universal to the minded being that is *Homo sapiens*.

Moreover, the fact that Innocentius' psychological episodes and experiences were personal, or *ontologically subjective*, does not entail that we can make no claims or have no knowledge about them that is factual, or *epistemologically objective*.[121] What we or Augustine think or say about Innocentius' pain is either accurate or inaccurate. In principle, if not always in practice, we can *really know* that Innocentius felt pain *in posteriore corporis parte* and thus be far from ignorant about "what was going on inside" of him. This holds for any Roman about whom we

[119] Versions of cultural solipsism continue to be regarded as paradigm-subverting methodological interventions among some anthropologists, e.g., Robbins and Rumsey 2008.

[120] For the intentionality of beliefs, see Searle 1983; for the intentionality of emotions and feelings, see Goldie 2002.

[121] More on this distinction: see Searle 1995, 7-13 and 2010, 17-18.

have any data. True, we must never forget that any ancient experience that we can study "is always something which is already told, spoken about, and thus constructed."[122] Indeed, the surviving tellings and constructions are the only indices available to us of the experience. And we reconstruct from these constructions, as I have reconstructed Innocentius' experience from Augustine's construction of it, retold it from his telling, and turned it to my own use, as Augustine turned it to his. We cannot capture or recapture the intrinsic first-personal subjectivity of ancient experience but we can surely glean some genuine *understanding* of it.[123]

Now, how can I possibly justify such a claim about the "knowability" of other minds, the epistemological objectivity of the ontologically subjective? Rather than attempt such a whimsical project, I shall limit myself to a point about the condition of the very possibility of disciplines such as classics. When we treat Roman behavior as behavior we implicitly treat it differently than we treat electrons, dimethyl sulfoxide, the circulation of blood, or the seasonal abscission of deciduous trees. We treat it as the intentional activity of *agents* who *act* for reasons explicable in terms of what we really have no choice but to see as their perceptions, perspectives, fears, desires, intentions, bodily feelings, and yes, beliefs. For example, when we treat Roman linguistic artifacts *as linguistic artifacts* — as purposeful, meaningful uses of language, as questions, commands, assertions, *vota*, *carmina*, *orationes*, or epitaphs — we thereby *necessarily* ascribe to the ancients intentional states appropriate to these speech acts. If we did not take this "intentional stance,"[124] we would fail to see these linguistic artifacts as *artifacts* at all, but merely register them, if at all, as mindless marks, like patterns in the sand.[125]

So we are simply *in the business* of taking Roman behaviors as indices of Roman psychological states. We must not be naive about this pro-

[122] Vuolanto 2016, 16.
[123] Cf. Rüpke 2016, 62-63.
[124] The term comes from Dennett 1987.
[125] In the famous image of Knapp and Michaels 1982, 727-728.

ject but equally we must not reckon a facile solipsism the *ne plus ultra* of methodological circumspection. It is easy to fail to recognize the foregoing considerations, to overlook them because they are the half-buried foundations upon which not only historical research but also textual criticism, literary study, anthropology, cultural psychology, and indeed any *social* endeavor at all stands, the unconscious background and unstated condition of the possibility of approaching others, of any time or place, *as others*, that is, as fellow human creatures, but not *as other*, that is, as utterly incommensurable beings. Indeed, even those scholars who pointedly eschew the belief/believe lexeme nonetheless covertly ascribe beliefs to the subjects of their study,[126] though they fail to recognize their own practice for what it is and the beliefs of their Roman subjects for what they actually are.

3. WHAT IS BELIEF?

3.1. THE INTENTIONALITY OF BELIEF

So, what is belief?[127] I have said that belief is not inherently Christian, and that believing does not depend upon possessing a concept of belief or upon engaging in some special linguistic practice. Instead, believing is simply one of the things that human minds do. This view of belief is captured in a functionalist definition offered by cognitive scientists of religion Justin Barrett and Jonathan Lanman. According to them, belief is "the state of a cognitive system holding information (not necessarily in propositional or explicit form) as true in the generation of further thought and behavior."[128] This deflationary definition, informed by decades of research in philosophy of mind, has much to recommend it.

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[126] Some low-hanging fruit: Davies 2011: "The Romans would have vigorously contested the claim that they had no evidence for religious deductions" (403); "it was almost universally axiomatic that one could influence gods through ritual" (422). The troublesome lexeme is avoided even as the psychological state is attributed. See Versnel 2011, 548 for a similar observation regarding scholarship on Greek religion.

[127] The topics touched upon here are covered more systematically in my forthcoming book, tentatively titled *Belief and Cult*: *From Intuitions to Institutions in Roman Religion*.

[128] Barrett and Lanman 2008, 110; so too Lanman 2008, 54.

Most importantly, for a "cognitive system," a mind, to "hold information as true" just means that it treats some information as an accurate representation of states of affairs. If you allow that human minds are constituted to represent states of affairs as obtaining, that is, to hold information as true, then you allow that belief is a human universal. When people hold as true information about gods, ancestors, spirits, extramundane forces, ritual efficacy, and so on, then they are entertaining religious beliefs. Religious believing is just one sort of religious cognition among many others, but given the universality of belief posited here, it is presumably a very widespread sort.

Barrett and Lanman's definition also captures succinctly the connections between belief and other cognitions and between belief and action. Beliefs may, for example, serve as premises for inference or reflection or as the bases of emotions. And beliefs play a central role in the etiology of action. Finally, moving to the parenthesis, the definition allows that beliefs need not be held in "creedal" form, as explicitly spelled-out propositions. This removes any temptation to suppose that only creedal religions foster believing.

Now allow me to return to the definition's notion of "information." Information is representational. It has content. Information is *about* this or that state of affairs. This quality of *representationality*, or *contentfulness*, or *aboutness* is called by cognitive scientists and philosophers "intentionality." Here, intentionality denotes the quality not of *purposiveness*, as when we say that an action was "intentional," but of *aboutness* or *directedness toward* an object.[129] It is worth noting that intentionality in this sense was of theoretical interest to ancient philosophers, upon whose work the modern study of intentionality is founded.[130] Franz Brentano is usually given credit for initiating the modern study of intentionality. Inspired by Aristotle and the Scholastics, he posited that intentionality was the "mark of the mental." That is, unlike trees, grav-

[129] Crane 2001, 4-8. See Searle 1983, 1-4.

[130] See Sorabji 1991 and Caston 2008. Brentano 1874, influenced by Aristotle and the Scholastics, launched the modern study of intentionality. See Crane 2001, 8-13 for a brief history of research on intentionality; see further Sorabji 1991.

ity, or helium, mental states are unique in being *about* or *directed upon* objects (1995, 68):

> Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

We have already seen that the term "intentionality" is ambiguous. In a narrow sense, we speak of *intentions* to act (plans) or actions done *intentionally* (on purpose). But most broadly, "intentionality" denotes the fact that mental states, including intentions to act, are directed upon or are about *objects*.

Like information, beliefs exhibit intentionality. They represent the objects toward which they are directed, they have content, they are *about* this or that quality, thing, situation, or circumstance. Belief is but one of many sorts of intentional mental state, which may be divided into two broad classes: the doxastic and the practical. Doxastic states are directed upon and represent how the world *is* or how we take it *to be*. Such states may be positive, such as *belief*, *knowledge*, *memory*, *assumption*, *presupposition*, *conjecture*, *recognition*, and *acceptance*, and negative, such as *denial*, *rejection*, and *disbelief*, or indeed neutral, such as *uncertainty*. Doxastic states are also sometimes called "representational," "theoretical," or "cognitive." All these intentional states are distinguished as doxastic by the fact that they seek to fit, match, or be adequate to the way things stand in the world. It is important to note that doxastic states are mutually implicating. If you suppose that Romans could *deny* or *reject* propositions then you have accepted that Romans could *affirm*, *accept*, and *believe* propositions. So, doxastic states are not modular. We cannot accept the existence of the ones we like and reject the ones that we do not like.

In contrast to doxastic states, practical states are directed upon and represent states of affairs as we wish they *were* or intend to make them *be*. Such states include desire and *intention* and are often classed under the rubrics "motivational," "volitive," or "conative." Our practical attitudes have as their content or are *about* things that we wish were the case or plan to make the case. They represent our interventions in the world or

the world as we wish it were. Conversely, our beliefs are about things that we take to be the case. They represent the world as we take it to be, irrespective of our wishes.

Allow me to elaborate upon these points by introducing six interrelated features of all intentional states, including belief: subject, object, content, psychological mode, direction of fit, and conditions of satisfaction.[131] When belief is understood in light of these six features, its central place in cognition as well as its systematic relationship to other sorts of mental states becomes clear.

3.1.1. INTENTIONAL STATES REQUIRE A *SUBJECT* IN ORDER TO EXIST

Every mental state's existence depends upon a subject with a mind to own or have or bear it. Mental states are thus ontologically subjective. Mental states differ from ontologically objective entities, such as carbon, trees, and galaxies, which exist independently of subjects or minds. It is worth noting now, in passing, that social reality is ontologically subjective as well. That is, it depends for its very existence upon subjects and their intentionality. We shall return to this below.

3.1.2. INTENTIONAL STATES ARE ABOUT *OBJECTS*

Intentional states are about or directed at *stuff*, where *stuff* amounts to states of affairs, entities, events, situations, processes, properties, relations, and so on.[132] The stuff an intentional state is about is its *object*.[133] *Intentionality* is the quality of directedness toward an object exhibited by intentional states. Beliefs are about states of affairs that one takes to exist, desires are about states of affairs one wishes did exist, while intentions are about states of affairs one plans to cause to exist. More on these distinctions below.

3.1.3. INTENTIONAL STATES HAVE *CONTENT*

Intentional states are *contentful*. A belief's content is the perspective from which, the aspect under which, or the way in which it represents

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[131] I rely primarily on Searle 1983, 1-36; Crane 2001, 1-33; 2013, 89-117. For phenomenological takes on intentionality, see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 107-128; and Drummond 2012.

[132] Searle 1983, 16-19; Crane 2001, 13-18; 2013, 90-96, esp. 92.

[133] Crane 2001, 15-16; 2013, 4.

its object. Just as one cannot gaze upon the Capitoline Hill from no particular vantage point, so intentional states cannot neutrally represent their objects in a view from nowhere. All intentional states present or represent their objects under some aspect, from some perspective, from one point of view and not others.[134]

This aspectual or perspectival feature of intentional states determines the *content* that each one has. The perspectival nature of content entails that two beliefs (for example) can be about the same *object* but have different *contents*, that is, represent the same object under different aspects.[135] For example, one person can believe that *the eagle is never killed by lightning* while another believes that *the eagle is the shield-bearer of Jupiter*.[136] Both beliefs share an object, the eagle, but they differ in content, that is, in the way they represent this shared object. Content, that is, the *way* objects are represented, is consequential. Oedipus wanted to marry *the woman* he believed *was the queen of Thebes* but not *the woman* he believed *was his mother*. The content of Oedipus' belief about Iocasta — the way he represented this object of his thought — contributed to his undoing.

Another aspect of cognition that comes to light when we characterize it in terms of intentionality is neatly brought out in Robert Brandom's elaboration of an insight of Brentano. Brentano saw that extra-mental stuff "can only stand in physical or causal relations to actually existing facts, events, and objects." But "intentional states can 'refer to contents' that are not true (do not express actual facts) and be 'directed upon objects' that do not exist." So the content of my belief about you can be wrong, even though you (the object of my belief) do exist. Or I may entertain beliefs that are directed upon an object, such as a god, that does not exist. Cognition is unique in this way: "I can only kick the can if it exists, but I can think about unicorns even if they do not."[137]

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[134] Searle 1983, 4-22 *passim*; Crane 2001, 18-21, 28-30; 2013, 96-102.

[135] See Crane 2001, 345, 348; 2013, 97.

[136] Examples derived from Plin. *HN* 10.6.15.

[137] Brandom 2014, 348. For non-existent objects of intentional states and episodes, see Crane 2013.

3.1.4. INTENTIONAL STATES OCCUR IN A DISTINCTIVE *PSYCHOLOGICAL MODE*

All intentional states represent their objects from a perspective and this perspective constitutes their content. But what makes a given intentional state a *belief*, a *desire*, an *intention*, and so forth? The determinant here lies neither in object nor in content, but in the subject's *attitude* toward the content. Attitude is sometimes referred to, more technically, as *psychological mode*.[138] "Belief" names a basic psychological mode, as do "desire," "intention," "fear," "hope," and so on.

Attitude (or psychological mode) and content are independent features of mental states. Thus, one may *desire*, *intend*, *fear*, *hope*, and of course *believe* or *doubt* that (for example) the eagle is never killed by lightning. The content (how the eagle is represented) remains the same in each case (*never killed by lightning*). What changes here is the subject's attitude toward that content. One *believes* when one's attitude toward an intentional content is that it *is the case*. In contrast, one *desires* when one's attitude toward that content is that of wishing *it were the case*. And so on.

3.1.5. INTENTIONAL STATES HAVE A *DIRECTION OF FIT*

For all intentional states, direction of fit follows directly from psychological mode.[139] We may distinguish between mind-to-world and world-to-mind directions of fit. Perception, belief, and memory[140] have mind-to-world direction of fit, while desire and intention have world-to-mind direction of fit. When one *believes* that a state of affairs obtains, one's representation "aims," in the traditional metaphor,[141] to fit or be adequate to the world. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit often go under a heading we have already encountered, "doxastic."

Conversely, some intentional states have the opposite direction of fit: world-to-mind. In these cases, the mind does not conform to the way

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[138] Searle 1983, 15-16; Crane 2001, 31-32.

[139] Searle 1983, 7-9, 15-16.

[140] Memory's mutability is one of its *psychological* rather than *logical* features. Memory, however changing and "constructive" (e.g., Schacter 2012), remains an intentional state with mind-to-world direction of fit, like belief.

[141] See Chan 2013, 1.

the world is but rather, ideally, the way the world is conforms to the way the mind represents it. So, if the *pontifex maximus* desires that the *res publica* be preserved for five more years,[142] he wants something about the world to conform to the content of his intentional state. These world-to-mind mental states are the practical states we discussed briefly above, desire and intention chief among them. We must not let all of this terminological variety cause us to miss the fact that both mind-to-world and world-to-mind states are representational. It is merely that the former seeks to represent the way the world *is* while the latter represents the world and our interventions in it as we would have them *be*.

3.1.6. INTENTIONAL STATES REPRESENT THEIR OWN *CONDITIONS OF SATISFACTION*[143]

An intentional state's "conditions of satisfaction" are represented in its *content*. For example, one's *desire* that this or that occur is *satisfied* on the *condition* that this or that actually occurs. The desire's content represents exactly what it would take to satisfy that very desire. So, the desire represents the conditions of its own satisfaction. Analogously for belief. The *belief* that the altar of Jupiter Soter is on the Capitoline is *satisfied* (i.e., true, accurate, correct) on the *condition* that the altar of Jupiter Soter really is on the Capitoline.[144] Like desire, belief represents the conditions of its own satisfaction.[145] Where desires may be *fulfilled*, beliefs may be *true*, and intentions may be *acted upon*. *Satisfaction* is the broad term, encompassing *fulfillment*, *truth*, and so on.

The critical difference between a practical state with world-to-mind

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[142] Example from Liv. 22.10.2.

[143] Searle 1983, 10-13, 19-21; 1992, 175-177.

[144] *Serv. ad Aen.* 8.652: *ara in Capitolio est Iovis Soteris*.

[145] It is well known (a) that we often believe things because we *want* to believe them (confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, etc.) and (b) that many of our beliefs are not mutually consistent. These are psychological rather than logical features of belief. As to (a), see Kunda 1990; Harmon-Jones 2000; Oswald and Grosjean 2004. As to (b), see Feeney 1998, 14-21 on the "brain-balkanisation" thesis of Veyne 1988 and see Versnel 1990 on cognitive dissonance in Greco-Roman religion. For some relevant cognitive theory, see, e.g., Cherniak 1981; Egan 2008; Davies and Egan 2013, esp. 705ff.

direction of fit, such as desire, and a doxastic state with mind-to-world direction of fit, such as belief, is this: If the practical state is not satisfied, something in the world has not been made to conform to the mind. But if the doxastic state is not satisfied, something in the mind has failed to conform to the world.[146]

Let us now summarize how these six features fit together. Intentionality requires a minded *subject*. The subject's *intentional* states, such as belief, are about or directed toward *objects*, that is, features of the world. An intentional state's *content* is the way the state represents the object that it is about, its perspective on the object. There are various *psychological modes* or *attitudes* through which subjects may relate to such contents. In *belief*, a subject relates to a content by taking it to be the case (rather than hoping, wishing, or fearing it to be the case, for example). Belief has a mind-to-world direction of fit: its content ideally conforms to or matches up with states of affairs. Desires and intentions exhibit world-to-mind direction of fit: the world ideally comes to match their content. The content of an intentional state describes its *conditions of satisfaction*. So, if states of affairs *come to be* as represented in the content of a desire, the desire is satisfied, i.e., *fulfilled*, and if states of affairs really *are* as represented in the content of a belief, then the belief is satisfied, i.e., accurate.

3.2. BELIEF, EMOTION, AND ACTION

Seen this way, several reasons why it is valuable to talk about belief present themselves. First, far from being a Christianizing term, "belief" is just the broadest, most neutral term for a positive doxastic state currently in wide use. Unlike, say, "knowledge," it does not imply that a given representation is epistemically justified. Unlike "conjecture" it need not imply ambivalence or uncertainty. A belief may be indifferently true or false, strongly or weakly held, more or less reflective. Because believing is simply one of the basic things minds do, we should expect both ancients and moderns to incorporate it into, and

[146] Anscombe (1957, 56) first presented this idea by contrasting two lists, one used by a shopper to buy groceries (cf. desire) and the other made by a detective recording the shopper's actions (cf. belief).

participate in, their own distinctive discourses of belief. It is not that early Christians believed while traditional Romans did not; rather, early Christians and traditional Romans made belief a part of differing discourses and subjected belief to differing evaluations. We need first to be attentive to the nature of belief if we hope to be alive to differing "cultures of belief."[147]

A second reason that it is valuable to talk about belief is that belief is constitutive of emotion.[148] If we acknowledge that the Romans could experience emotions in their religious lives, then we must admit that they had beliefs. Here is why: emotions have intentionality, but they inherit their intentionality from beliefs and other doxastic states, as well as from immediate perceptions. That is, one can only be *angry* about, *frightened* about, *sad* about, or *happy* about a state of affairs *about which* one has beliefs (or *of which* one has perceptual information).[149] Innocentius could only feel *fear* about his upcoming surgery because he *believed* certain things about surgery for deep fistulas, such as that it might kill him. His later *joy*, in contrast, was predicated upon his *recognition* of the sudden reversal in his fortunes and, what is more, its specific quality depended upon his *belief* that God had intervened to effect that reversal.[150] And this cuts both ways: for emotions contribute to the formation and fixation of beliefs by disposing us to attend to some information, which our emotions render more salient, in preference to other information. So beliefs may have affective origins and supports: "emotions can awaken, intrude into, and shape beliefs, by creating them, by amplifying or altering them, and by making them resistant to change."[151]

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[147] See Mair 2013.

[148] I draw upon the so-called "appraisal theory" of emotion. See Frijda 1986 and, concisely, from psychological and philosophical perspectives, Mulligan and Scherer 2012.

[149] This is a "cognitivist" theory of the emotions: see, e.g., Nussbaum 2001.

[150] For the role of culture-specific beliefs in generating culture-specific emotions, see Mesquita and Ellsworth 2001 and cf. De Leersnyder, Boiger, and Mesquita 2015.

[151] Frijda, Manstead and Bem 2000, 5.

A third reason why we should recover belief for scholarship on Roman religion is this: belief is essential to action. This fact, well-understood in theoretical terms since at least Aristotle,[152] contrasts as strongly as possible with the venerable belief-action dichotomy, according to which ancient cult was a matter of ritual action alone, not belief. Why accept this alternative view? Don't people sometimes "just do stuff" without believing anything one way or another? Consider this: Agents require a sense of their world and its affordances for action, even when they are "just doing stuff." Sometimes this sense of a world comes through perception, the direct sensory coupling of agent to environment, whereby the agent perceives directly its immediate possibilities for action and tracks the changes effected by its actions upon itself and the environment. But "planning agents,"[153] and especially other-regarding planning agents like ourselves, engaged with other such agents in cooperative social activities extending over indefinite periods of time, require in addition to direct perceptual coupling a cognitive model of the world. This cognitive model is composed of doxastic states such as belief that serve to define the space not only of possible but also of permissible, impermissible, and obligatory action.[154] Finally, we need practical attitudes, such as desire and intention, as well as affective episodes, such as emotion, to get us moving within the space of possibilities for action pictured for us by our doxastic states and our perceptions. So, if you accept that humans act, for example, by engaging in complex cult behavior with all of its obligations, dos, and don'ts, then there really is no avoiding belief.

3.3 BELIEF AND SOCIAL REALITY

A final reason that we should care about belief, a reason that deserves its own heading, is that belief is indispensible to the ontology of the social world. To put it very simply, much of social reality is how it is

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[152] Arist. *De motu an*. 701a-702a; *De an*. 433a-b; *Eth. Nic*. 1147a-b; see Nussbaum 1978 and Reeve 2012, 130-194. Anscombe 1957 and Davidson 1963 are seminal texts in modern action theory with Aristotelian roots.

[153] Bratman 1987; 2014.

[154] See Miller 2006; cf. Searle 2005, 66-73; 2010, 9, 123-132.

because of the beliefs and other representational cognitions, doxastic and practical, shared by people in a community. Consider: In a world without human subjects, there would be no institutions, no practices, no social statuses, no obligations, rights, or responsibilities. But this means that institutions and other features of the social world are subject-dependent entities: they depend on subjects for their existence.

How can this be, precisely? On what property, faculty, or activity of subjects depended an institution such as the pontificate, a status such as *pontifex*, a practice such as sacrifice, or a cult obligation such as that exerted by the calendrical recurrence of a festival? These and countless other social realities depended on Roman subjects *representing* them as existing in their practical and doxastic cognitions, such as intention and belief, as well as in their speech acts, and consequently *treating* them as existing in their practical lives. More precisely, in intentionalist terms (section 3.1), social reality is created and maintained when subjects collectively represent some *object*, some feature of the world, under a certain aspect, or in a certain way, in the *contents* of their *attitudes* and speech acts, and treat these objects accordingly in their actions and interactions. Thus, a certain person is represented *as* a *pontifex*, certain gestures *as* sacrifice, a certain day on the calendar *as* a festival, and so on, with all the social empowerments, disempowerments, and obligations to action concomitant with such statuses.

There is far more to say on this topic but these brief remarks and the few additional comments I offer in the following section will have to suffice here to indicate belief's centrality to the ontology of the social.[155]

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[155] I take up social ontology at much greater length in my forthcoming book, tentatively titled *Belief and Cult*: *From Intuitions to Institutions in Roman Religion*. My discussion here and in my forthcoming book reflects primarily the theory developed in Searle 1995 and 2010, with refinements from Tuomela 2007, 182-214; Elder-Vass 2010; Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2011; List and Pettit 2011; Elder-Vass 2012; Lawson 2012; Tuomela 2013, 214-241; Gilbert 2013; Schmitz, Kobow, and Schmid 2013; Gallotti and Michael 2014; Tollefsen 2015; Ziv and Schmid 2014; Guala 2016; Lawson 2016. While perhaps appearing similar on the surface, social ontology is not to be confused with radical versions of social constructionism. See Elder-Vass 2012 for discussion.

4. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY

We can appreciate the interplay of belief, emotion, intention, and action, as well as the role of belief in the creation and maintenance of social reality, by looking at religious action in Livy. He repeatedly tells us that outlandish occurrences and adverse events could induce beliefs and fears in the Roman people, and that these beliefs and fears could cause religious action. For example, in Book 21 we learn that in 218 B.C. Hannibal has begun to harass Tiberius Sempronius Longus in Italy and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus has clashed with Hasdrubal in Spain. The Romans are spooked. Livy describes the situation at Rome as follows (21.62.1-11):

> Romae aut circa urbem multa ea hieme prodigia facta aut, quod evenire solet motis semel in religionem animis, multa nuntiata et temere credita sunt, (2) in quis ingenuum infantem semenstrem in foro holitorio triumphum clamasse, (3) et in foro boario bovem in tertiam contignationem sua sponte escendisse atque inde tumultu habitatorum territum sese deiecisse, (4) et navium speciem de caelo adfulsisse, et aedem Spei, quae est in foro holitorio, fulmine ictam, et Lanuvi hastam se commouisse et coruum in aedem Iunonis devolasse atque in ipso pulvinari consedisse, (5) et in agro Amiternino multis locis hominum specie procul candida veste visos nec cum ullo congressos, et in Piceno lapidibus pluvisse, et Caere sortes extenuatas, et in Gallia lupum vigili gladium ex vagina raptum abstulisse. (6) ob cetera prodigia libros adire decemviri iussi; quod autem lapidibus pluvisset in Piceno, novendiale sacrum edictum; et subinde aliis procurandis prope tota civitas operata fuit. (7) iam primum omnium urbs lustrata est hostiaeque maiores quibus editum est dis caesae, (8) et donum ex auri pondo quadraginta Lanuvium Iunoni portatum est et signum aeneum matronae Iunoni in Auentino dedicaverunt, et lectisternium Caere, ubi sortes attenuatae erant, imperatum, et supplicatio Fortunae in Algido; (9) Romae quoque et lectisternium Iuventati et supplicatio ad aedem Herculis nominatim, deinde universo populo circa omnia pulvinaria indicta, et Genio maiores hostiae caesae quinque, (10) et C. Atilius Serranus praetor vota suscipere iussus, si in decem annos res publica eodem stetisset statu. (11) haec procurata votaque ex libris Sibyllinis magna ex parte levaverant religione animos.

> During this winter, at Rome or in the vicinity many *prodigia* occurred or, what typically happens once minds have been stirred with religious concern, many *prodigia* were announced and rashly believed. (2) Among them: a six-month-old freeborn infant shouted "Triumphe!" in the Forum Holitorium; (3) in the Forum Boarium, a cow climbed of its own accord to a third floor and then, terrified by the uproar of the occupants, threw itself down; (4) an image of ships appeared in the heavens; the Temple of Hope, which is in the Forum Holitorium, was struck by a thunderbolt; at Lanuvium, Juno's spear shook itself and a crow flew into the Temple of Juno and settled on her couch; (5) at many places in the territory of Amiternum, beings were seen at a distance, looking like human beings dressed in white, but they did not engage with anyone; in Picenum, there was a rain of stones; at Caere, the records of oracles shrank; in Gaul, a wolf snatched a sword from a watchman's sheath and ran off. (6) On account of the other *prodigia*, the *decemviri* were ordered to consult the Sibylline books. But with respect to the rain of stones at Picenum, a nine-day sacrifice was declared. After that practically the whole city was busied with taking care of the other *prodigia*. (7) First of all, the city was lustrated and full-grown victims were sacrificed to the gods that were specified. (8) A gift of fifty pounds of gold was brought to Lanuvium for Juno. The matrons dedicated a bronze statue to Juno on the Aventine. At Caere, where the records of oracles had shrunk, a *lectisternium* was ordered and a supplication to Fortuna on Algidus. (9) At Rome, also, a *lectisternium* was enjoined for Iuventas and a supplication at the Temple of Hercules, then, for the whole people, one around all the couches of the gods. Five full-grown victims were sacrificed to the Genius (10) and the praetor Gaius Atilius Serranus was ordered to undertake vows if for ten years the *res publica* should stay in the same condition. (11) These ministrations and vows from the Sibylline books for the most part relieved minds of religious concern.

Livy alludes here to most of the steps for determining and expiating prodigies.[156] Unusual events might be reported to a magistrate as a potential *prodigium*. This is the *nuntiatio*, marked by Livy with the words *multa nuntiata* (21.62.1). The magistrate then refers the report to the

[156] Linderski 1993, 58 lays out the procedure. See Satterfield 2012 for an important reassessment of the timing and relative chronology of the stages of the process.

senate for evaluation: this is the *relatio*. The senate may accept or reject, *suscipere* or *non suscipere*, the report as a genuine *prodigium*. Livy does not use the verb *suscipere* but rather writes of "what typically happens once minds have been stirred with religious concern," i.e., the reported prodigies "were rashly believed" (*credita sunt*, 21.62.1). *Credere* here is either a synonym for *suscipere* or, more likely, it refers not to senatorial acceptance but to the credulousness of the people, as parallel passages featuring *credere* in relation to prodigies appear to suggest.[157]

Once a *prodigium* was accepted, the senate deliberated or ordered priests to deliberate about what actions to take. In Livy's account, ten *prodigia* were accepted by the senate. Nine of these the senate ordered the *decemviri sacris faciundis* to interpret and expiate in light of the Sibylline Books: *libros adire decemviri iussi* (21.62.6). The senate itself determined that the rain of stones at Picenum should be expiated by nine days of sacrifice (21.62.6). Following this, we must infer, the *decemviri* delivered their proposal regarding the remaining nine *prodigia*. Everyone, *prope tota civitas*, was to participate in making a variety of gifts for the gods, in sacrifices, lustrations, *supplicationes*, and *lectisternia*, while the praetor made vows (21.62.7-10). We return to our credulous Roman people after all this cult activity. The result is that their "minds have been relieved of religious concern" (21.62.11). Livy's formula here is *animos* (or *mentes*) *religione levare* (or *liberare*).[158]

Belief permeates this Livian episode. The Roman people come to believe that certain events count as *prodigia*, a religious category that the Romans antecedently believed to signal a need to secure the *pax deum*.[159] The role of the people's beliefs about the current *prodigia* in elic-

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[157] See, e.g., Liv. 24.10.6: *Prodigia eo anno multa nuntiata sunt, quae quo magis credebant simplices ac religiosi homines* (hardly a description of the senate), *eo plura nuntiabantur*; 43.13.1-2: *non sum nescius ab eadem neglegentia qua nihil deos portendere volgo* (again, obviously not senators) *nunc credant neque nuntiari admodum ulla prodigia in publicum neque in annales referri*; 29.14.2: *impleverat ea res superstitionum animos, pronique et ad nuntianda et ad credenda prodigia erant*; *eo plura volgabantur*.

[158] See, e.g., Liv. 7.3.1, 21.62.11, 25.1.11, 27.37.5.

[159] Prodigies did not signal "breaches" in the *pax deum*: see Satterfield 2015.

iting emotion and, indeed, emotion's role in promoting belief are both on display here. For the people's belief that *prodigia* have occurred and their appraisal of this situation appear to heighten the cognitive-affective episode that in Livy goes under the term *religio* (21.62.1, 11). Yet it was because their minds were already disposed by *religio* to form such beliefs (their minds were already "moved *in religionem*") that they "rashly" (*temere*) came to form beliefs about prodigies in the first place (21.62.1). Note the emotion-belief/belief-emotion feedback loop implied here. The emotion of *religio* produces a disposition to form certain sorts of beliefs, here, beliefs about *prodigia*; these beliefs about *prodigia* then play a part in eliciting more *religio*.

Let us pause for a moment over *religio* in order to trace the etiological contributions of belief and emotion to action. The young Cicero offers the following definition (*Inv. rhet.* 2.161):[160]

> *Religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert.*
>
> *Religio* is that which occasions concern for (*cura*) and worship of (*caerimonia*) a certain higher nature, which men call "divine."

Following Cicero, we may gloss *religio* in Livy as a religious emotion, that is, an affective state of concern (*cura*), which carries with it a motivation to cult action (*caerimonia*).[161] The affective state that Cicero and Livy call *religio* inherits its intentional content from a belief or set of beliefs to the effect, at the very least, that there exists some higher "divine" nature, *superior quaedam natura* (see section 3.2 above). So, in Livy's narrative, the Romans' beliefs about *prodigia* and *prodigia*'s relation to the divine elicit heightened religious concern, and this concern moves them to cult action. Not that emotion leads straightaway to spontaneous action here. Rather, space is allowed for the formulation of practical attitudes under the guidance of the authorities — deliberation and its resulting intentions to act — as well as for the promulga-

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[160] Cf. Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 2.66, where we find *metus* instead of *cura*.

[161] For the "action readiness" or "action tendencies" of emotion, see Frijda 1986, 69-93. Cf. Nussbaum 2001, 129-137. For a neuroscientific view of emotion's role in behavior more holistically, see Damasio 1994.

tion of directive speech acts, i.e., orders (21.62.6, 9-10). In all of this, we see the roles of belief, emotion, and intention in the etiology of cult action. For without determinate beliefs — certain representations of states of affairs — and without the emotion that promoted but was also exacerbated by those beliefs, and finally without intentions to act, the Romans would not have engaged in the cult acts that Livy describes: gifts for the gods, sacrifices, lustrations, *supplicationes*, *lectisternia*, and vows. So, belief, emotions that derive their intentionality from belief, and practical intentions: all are causally implicated in Roman cult action.

On Livy's account, it is through these deliberate acts of cult that the Romans achieve relief from *religio* (21.62.11). This relief depends, like *religio* itself, upon pre-existing beliefs about the efficacy of cult as well as upon the Romans' real-time appraisal of the relevance to their current religious concerns of the cult that they actually perform. In other words, what the Romans believe about the cult that they perform is constitutive of that cult's psychological effects, i.e., its relief-producing effect. Livy's formula for cult's success here is *animos religione levare*, "relieve minds of religious care." What we see in this passage of Livy, then, is a "script"[162] for the unfolding of an entire collective cognitive-affective-behavioral episode: belief, emotion, intention, and action.

We have discussed the role of belief in emotion and in action. Let us now consider the role of belief in Roman socio-religious reality. Recall that all intentional states have an object, i.e., some feature of the world that they are about. Recall, too, that all intentional states have content, that is, a way that they are about what they are about. Every intentional state represents its object from a perspective, under an aspect, in this way rather than that way. Now, note that the *objects* of Livy's prodigy list and hence the *objects* of the Romans' doxastic, practical, and affective states include, in order, an infant, a cow, an image of ships, the Temple of Hope, Juno's spear, a crow, beings dressed in white, a rain of stones, the records of oracles, and a wolf (21.62.2-5). But none of these objects is or even can be represented "neutrally" or under some perspective-free

[162] In the sense of Kaster 2005, 7-9 *et passim* with references at 151 n. 17.

aspect. Rather, Livy represents the baby as *ingenuus infans semenstris*, "a six-month-old freeborn infant," who shouted "Triumphe." Moreover, insofar as the senate accepts this representation, Livy, and indeed the Roman people, may represent him as a *prodigium*.

Presumably, at various other times, in various other contexts, the child might have been represented as, for example, *filius*, "son," *nepos*, "grandson," *frater*, "brother," or as standing in some other kinship relation. In a few years, for legal purposes, he may be represented as *minor*, "a minor," or as *impubes*, "pre-adolescent," and even more specifically as *impubes infantiae proximus*, "pre-adolescent just beyond infancy," and later as *impubes pubertati proximus*, "pre-adolescent bordering on puberty." He might also be represented as *heres*, "heir," as *filius familias*, "son subject to *patria potestas*," as *pupillus*, "boy under guardianship," and so forth, on and on.[163]

In each of these cases a single, entity — the child — is the *object* of cognitive and linguistic representations. However, the content of these representations, the ways in which one and the same object is represented in each case, differs in ways that have tremendous cognitive, cultural, and practical import. For the content of these representations helps determine the familial, legal, and as we saw even religious status of the child, and along with any given status, the practices, rights, and obligations that pertain to it. So, the content of Roman beliefs about the child play a role in determining his social ontology, i.e., what he is socially and how he should be treated.

One could perform this same analysis on each of the objects in Livy's catalog of prodigies and indeed, I emphasize, on the very category of *prodigium* itself. For a *prodigium* was a *prodigium* not due to some feature intrinsic to the object or event in question. It was not the physics, chemistry, or biology of the child, the cow, the wolf or of any of the other entities that made them prodigious. Rather, it was the ways in which Romans represented these things in their beliefs, practical intentions, and speech acts, and the way they therefore treated them in practice, that made them *prodigia*. One assumes that Romans were usually blind to

[163] Berger 1953.

this fact about their social reality. Presumably, they saw the senate's role in accepting prodigies as a matter of recognizing objective facts for what they were rather than as a matter of constructing facts, which would then depend for their continued existence on recognition, acceptance, and belief. Indeed, Livy's emphasis on "rash belief" (21.62.1) may be read to support this. He finds fault with the people's credulousness not because he is skeptical of the category of *prodigium* as such but rather because he is concerned to distinguish genuine from spurious prodigies.[164] So, Romans accept that prodigies are part of the furniture of the world. The live question is a question of belief: to which reports of prodigies do we have good reason to lend credence?[165]

Now to sum up. We have seen that Livy attends carefully to the psychological effects of prodigies. We need not attribute to Livy any explicit theory interrelating belief, emotion, and action to interpret the patterns we find in his text. In the episode we examined, we saw that events generate beliefs, often as a result of beliefs already held. For example, such-and-such an event-type counts as prodigious; this event is of the relevant type; the resulting belief is that this event is a prodigy. Next, appraisal of the content of the new belief might elicit emotion. Equally, emotions to which one is already subject might promote religious beliefs. Finally, we saw that Livy focuses on the behavioral consequences of beliefs and emotions. Together with intentions to act, they guide, motivate, and cause behavior.[166] Finally, cult behavior, if deemed successful by participants, might generate new beliefs, for example, to the effect that all prodigies have been expiated. The content of such beliefs, in turn, might result in the emotion of relief.

On the theory offered here, the distinction between Augustine's good Christian Innocentius and Livy's Roman *populus* is not that the

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[164] Linderski 1993, 66 n. 2.

[165] Cf. similar concerns about what to believe about prodigies at Cic. *Har. resp.* 62-63.

[166] Note that I have not offered here a creation narrative that would seek to explain how beliefs and emotions generated, *ex nihilo*, cult action and the particular forms it takes. I am merely asserting that an individual's beliefs, emotions, and intentions contribute causally to her participation in already established forms of cult.

one had beliefs and the other did not. Rather, the distinction lies in the *content* of their respective beliefs, in what they take to be the case. And what they take to be the case — their beliefs — has important downstream effects on their emotions, their practical attitudes such as intentions to act, their actions, and indeed on their social reality. We can appreciate Livy's remarks about the beliefs of the people, as indeed we can appreciate any evidence for Roman religion, only if we appreciate the causal relations in which belief stands to emotions like *religio* and to actions like cult. What is more, we can only hope to account for the ontology of the Roman social world, with its institutions, practices, statuses, obligations, permissions, and disabilities to action, if we have recognized belief for what it is and located it among other doxastic and practical mental phenomena.

In this view of Roman religion, belief takes center stage. It is neither a "penumbra to ritual action" nor "secondary," "somehow less substantial than ritual action."[167] On my account, any story about ancient religious behavior that does not take into account the beliefs as well as desires, intentions, and emotions that motivate that behavior is not truly explanatory but at best descriptive, at worst partial and misleading. If my arguments have any force, they have rendered the thesis that ancient religion was "a question of doing not of believing"[168] and the insistence that "beliefs … had no particularly privileged role in defining an individual's actions"[169] much less attractive. It remains to nurture a new conversation about the nature of belief and how we as historians of religion should treat it in our necessarily etic discourse.[170] I hope to have contributed to that conversation here.

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[167] Harrison 2015b, 173, pointing to shortcomings even in recent reassertions of the relevance of belief.

[168] Cartledge 1985, 98.

[169] Beard, North, and Price 1998, I: 42.

[170] Versnel 2011, 548: "Scholarly discourse is always etic and should therefore be conducted in etic terms."

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ZWISCHEN TRADITIONELLER RHETORIK UND SOKRATISCHER (ANTI-)RHETORIK. EINIGE NEUE BEMERKUNGEN ÜBER DAS PROÖMIUM VON PLATONS *APOLOGIE DES SOKRATES* (17A1-18A6)*

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Abstract. In this paper my aim is to show how Socrates' critique of contemporary rhetoric in the preamble of the *Apology* is indirectly but clearly addressed to the Homeric value system. Socrates' contemporary litigants, heirs to the competitive ethics embodied in the Homeric epics, are observed to devote themselves to employing devious tricks and cunning in order to win court cases. Socrates, however, sets out to plead the cause of truth and justice, and will defend himself against his accusers by means of these conceptual "tools." It is clear, therefore, that Socrates' principal aim is to redefine traditional rhetoric by formulating new goals and expected outcomes: rhetoric must not distort the truth but reveal it so that it can be readily grasped by the audience.

* Ich möchte mich an dieser Stelle bei Frau Sophia Regopoulos, die mir geholfen hat, mein Deutsch zu polieren, herzlich bedanken.

EINLEITUNG

Dass Homer als der Ursprung der griechischen Kultur angesehen war, ist in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur mittlerweile mehr oder weniger akzeptiert. Inwieweit man jedoch von einer universalen Wirkung sprechen kann, ob und wann man dann überhaupt von ideologischer Innovation sprechen darf, sind knifflige Fragen, und doch bleiben sie immer verlockend für Wissenschaftler klassischer Texten. In diesem Artikel ist es mein Ziel, zu zeigen, dass und wie Sokrates' Kritik an der zeitgenössischen Rhetorik in der Präambel der *Apologie* an das moralische System der Epen Homers indirekt aber eindeutig gerichtet ist, ein Wertesystem, das insgesamt als die allgemein akzeptierte Grundlage moralischer Erziehung erscheint. Nichts scheint besser geeignet zu sein, einen fruchtbaren Boden für die Zwecke einer derartigen Forschung zu bilden, wie die Präambel einer forensischen Rede. Solchen Reden werden traditionell drei verschiedene Funktionen zugeschrieben: (a) den Fall für die Zuhörer zu verdeutlichen, (b) deren Aufmerksamkeit zu gewinnen, und (c) deren Gunst zu erwerben.[1] Ich werde versuchen zu beweisen, dass diese drei Funktionen in der Präambel der *Apologie*, einer fiktiven Gerichtsrede, zu finden sind, aber auf zwei verschiedene Arten realisiert werden: Die ersten beiden Funktionen durch den Fokus auf die Tatsache, dass Sokrates' Ankläger, d.h. Vertreter einer Rhetorik, die ihre Wurzeln in der Homerischen Moral hat, ihn mit einer unfairen und völlig falschen Anschuldigung vor Gericht brachten; die dritte als eine notwendige Folge der Offenbarung einer neuen Art von Rhetorik, die ihre Beziehung zur Tradition abgebrochen zu haben scheint, und die sich ausdrücklich auf die Prinzipien bezieht, auf denen sie gegründet wurde, nämlich Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit.

[1] Arist. *Rh*. 3.14.1415a34-b1; [*Rh*. *Al*.] 29.1; *Rhet*. *Her*. 1.7; Cic. *Inv*. *rhet*. 1.20; *De or*. 2.82; *Top*. 97; Dion. Hal. *Lys*. 17.9; Quint. *Inst*. 4.1.5; *Anon*. *Seg*. 8, siehe Pernot 2000, 288. Vgl. Heitsch 2002, 41.

LÜGE vs. WAHRHEIT

Es scheint ein allgemeiner Konsens unter Wissenschaftlern zu herrschen, dass sich das Proömium von Platons *Apologie* von den typischen Merkmalen der echten rhetorischen Reden unterscheidet.[2] Schon zu Beginn von Sokrates' Verteidigungsrede wird dreierlei klar: das Eingeständnis der Ignoranz (οὐκ οἶδα), der kritische Stil und die Betonung des Wahrheitsbegriffes: τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα (17a2-17b5). Besondere Aufmerksamkeit sollte den sokratischen Schambegriffen (αἰσχυνθῆναι, ἐξελεγχθήσονται, ἀναισχυντότατον) geschenkt werden, durch welche das Lügen wegen der Schande, die sie über Menschen bringt, kritisiert und verworfen wird. Es ist beschämend, jemandem Eigenschaften, die nicht zu ihm passen, zuzuschreiben. Sokrates' Unterscheidung kann folgendermassen formuliert werden:

A. Die Wahrheit zu verheimlichen bringt Schande über sich.

B. Der sokratische *Elenchus* ist eine sichere Methode, nach der Wahrheit zu suchen.

Diese Unterscheidung zeigt einen hohen Kontrast zwischen Lüge und Wahrheit.[3] Die Erwähnung des Elenchus bezieht sich zugleich auf die sokratische Dialektik. Das Elenchusverfahren offenbart die Lüge (ἔργῳ), während es zugleich die Wahrheit des Gesagten (λόγῳ), die ganze Wahrheit (πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν), wiederherstellt. Eine nähere Betrachtung der Zeilen bringt nicht nur die entgegengesetzten Begriffe

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[2] Dazu siehe Riddell [1877] 1973, xxi; Burnet [1924] 1970, 66; Meyer 1962, 45-46, 124; Stokes 1997, 97. Vgl. Stock [1887] 1961, 22; Bonner 1908, 169-177; Brickhouse und Smith 1986, 289-298; 1989, 49; Strycker und Slings 1994, 31ff.

[3] Sokrates unterscheidet Überzeugungskraft von Wahrheit (οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον). Eine Rede kann überzeugend sein, ohne dabei wahr sein zu müssen. Dieselbe Idee findet sich im *Tht*. 172d-173a und *Menex*. 234c-5c wieder, und stellt wahrscheinlich eine sokratische Art von Kritik an den rhetorischen Reden seiner Zeit dar, die nur nach Überzeugung strebt, völlig ungeachtet dessen, was wahr ist. Vgl. *Grg*. 456c4-459b5, 479c, 486a; vgl. auch Meyer 1962, 66, 115ff., 118, 139; Strycker und Slings 1994, 27-31, 241; Heitsch 2002, 44-45.

Wahrheit-Lüge, sondern auch das Wortpaar Rede/Werk (λόγῳ-ἔργῳ)[4] und, gleichermassen, *einai* (sein) / *phainesthai* (erscheinen) zum Vorschein. Die Ankläger beschuldigen Sokrates zu Unrecht mit einer Anklage, die nur auf der theoretischen und oberflächlichen Ebene gültig ist. Auf der anderen Seite, wird Sokrates mit Hilfe des Elenchus die Verlogenheit der Anklage nachweisen und ihre Grundlosigkeit beweisen.

ΚΕΚΑΛΛΙΕΠΗΜΕΝΟΙ vs. ΟΥΔΕ ΚΕΚΟΣΜΗΜΕΝΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ

Sokrates äußert sich eindeutig und entschlossen über den Wahrheitsgehalt dessen, was er später behaupten wird (ὑμεῖς δέ μου … ἄλλως, 17b8-17c4). Bei der Wahrheit seiner Worte handelt es sich nicht um ein Produkt ausgeschmückter und wohlüberlegter Reden.[5] An dieser Stelle wird ein Verweis auf die Vorbereitung und Zusammenstellung von Reden offensichtlich, die durch die Prozessparteien vorgetragen werden. Zuständig für derartige Reden waren dabei Rhetoriker — also professionelle Redenschreiber. Im Gegensatz dazu lässt sich bei ihm die Wahrheit aus den Worten ableiten, was die Ausdrucksart derer, die spontan Reden halten, ohne diese vorher geplant oder vorbereitet zu haben ist. Und in diesem Rahmen findet die Rechtsprechung statt (πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω).[6] Der neue, bedeutungsvolle Begriff, der nun eingeführt wird, um zu beschreiben, wie eine Rede vor einem jeweiligen Publikum zu halten ist, ist der Begriff des *dikaion*, also des Rechts oder der Gerechtigkeit. Das Auftreten dieser Begrifflichkeit ist natürlich nicht vollkommen zusammenhanglos, sondern steht in unmittelbarer Verbindung mit all dem, was Sokrates

[4] Vgl. Heitsch 2002, 46-47.

[5] Der Begriff κεκοσμημένοι λόγοι bezieht sich auf die Verwendung einer Sprache mit Metaphern und Bildern, während der Begriff κύριοι λόγοι mit Wörtern in ihrem wörtlichen Sinn verwendet wird (siehe Williamson [1908] 1963, 51; vgl. Adam [1887] 1891, 43). Burnet jedoch ([1924] 1970, 70) unterstützt die Meinung, dass die κεκοσμημένοι λόγοι sich nicht auf geschmückte Reden beziehen, sondern auf diejenigen, die in Ordnung gebracht worden sind. West 1979, 50 Anm. 4, unterstützt die gleichzeitige Koexistenz der beiden Interpretationen. Vgl. Sesonske 1968, 217-231; Strycker und Slings 1994, 243-244; Heitsch 2002, 49.

[6] Vgl. Leibowitz 2010, 10.

zuvor beschrieben hat. Der Text lässt folgende wichtige Unterscheidungen zu:

- aus der reichlich verzierten Rede (κεκαλλιεπημένος-κεκοσμημένος ῥήμασι καὶ ὀνόμασι λόγος) lassen sich Lüge, ungerechte Unterstellungen, List und Betrug folgern;
- aus der schlichten, spontanen Rede lassen sich Wahrheit, Gerechtigkeit und Vertrauen folgern.

In obiger Unterscheidung zeichnet sich das inhärente Verhältnis zwischen der Lüge und dem Unrecht ab, während die Wahrheit mit dem Recht verbunden ist. In den gleichen Zeilen wird zudem der vehemente Gegensatz zwischen den beiden Redensarten (λέξις) offensichtlich: einerseits die Redensart, bei der der Sprecher ohne vorherige Planung (εἰκῇ λεγόμενα) Wörter und Ausdrücke benutzt, die der Wahrheitsfindung dienen und im Allgemeinen als gerechte Rede bezeichnet werden können, und andererseits die Redensart, bei der der Sprecher eine künstliche, kaum abschweifende Rede vorträgt, die auf eine Verschleierung der Wahrheit abzielt und somit eine ungerechte Redensart darstellt. Dabei müssen zunächst zwei Aspekte festgehalten werden: erstens, dass der Verweis auf ausgeschmückte und wohlüberlegte Reden mit der Unterscheidung zwischen "sich zeigen" (*phainesthai*) und "sein" zusammenhängt, zu der die Entwicklung des obigen Gedankengangs geführt hat. Die besondere Bemühung, einen Text äußerlich mit wohlgeformten und gewählten Sätzen auszustatten, garantiert dessen angeblichen Inhalt, während zugleich sein ursprünglicher Aufbau aufgehoben wird. Das äußere Erscheinungsbild (*phainesthai*) dient somit der Lüge und hängt unmittelbar mit der absichtlichen List, dem Betrug und dem Aufbau ungewisser Beziehungen zusammen. Zweitens unterstreicht Sokrates das Recht seiner Reden. Welche Rolle spielt jedoch der Begriff im einleitenden Vorspiel? Selbstverständlich bemüht sich Sokrates um die Erläuterung seiner wahren Motivation. Die Länge, der Aufbau und der Inhalt seiner Rede zielen nicht darauf ab, den Gerechtigkeitssinn des Publikums zu brechen. Dies bedarf jedoch weiterer Erklärungen. Der traditionelle Begriff der Gerechtigkeit (*dike*) bezieht sich auf

den Satz "was jemandem traditionell und zweifellos gehört".[7] Demnach bezeichnet der Begriff 'Ungerechtigkeit' die ausbleibende Anerkennung der Gerechtigkeit als Regel, die das menschliche Verhalten koordiniert, und somit auch die Überschreitung derer Grundsätze. Die Koexistenz der beiden Begriffe Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit (sowie auch derer Gegenteile) im Text dient im Wesentlichen der sichereren Feststellung der jeweiligen Folgen. Ein entscheidender Aspekt der gerechten Rede ist das Anliegen des Redners, schlicht und einfach die Wahrheit der Ereignisse zu präsentieren, ohne dabei den Zuhörer betrügen zu wollen. Ein mögliches Verletzen des Gerechtigkeitssinnes des Publikums würde somit bedeuten, dass die Ereignisse absichtlich falsch präsentiert werden, um die Zuhörer zu betrügen. Sokrates scheint somit zu versuchen, dem traditionellen Begriff der Gerechtigkeit eine neue Bedeutung anzuheften, indem er ihn unmittelbar mit dem Begriff der Wahrheit verbindet.

Um die Bedeutung dieses zusätzlichen semantischen Anspruchs des Begriffs der Gerechtigkeit nachvollziehen zu können, muss vorher folgende Frage beantwortet werden: Welche Beziehung besteht im Rahmen der traditionellen, ethischen Werte zwischen der Gerechtigkeit und der Wahrheit? In seiner berühmten Aufforderung an Achilles (μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων, *Il.* 9.443)[8] bezieht sich Phoenix

[7] Siehe Palmer 1950, 149ff.; vgl. Rodgers 1971, 293 und 293 Anm. 1; Lloyd-Jones 1971; Gagarin 1973; 1974; Dickie 1978; Havelock 1978; Garner 1987, 1-19.

[8] Donlan (1980, 6), unterstreicht treffend, dass in den homerischen Epen der Schwerpunkt auf die körperliche Stärke und auf die Ehre die Intelligenz und den Einfallsreichtum nicht ausschließt, sondern voraussetzt. Die Fähigkeit zum Kniff und Betrug, sowie die Geschicklichkeit in öffentlichen Reden, waren auch wünschenswerte Eigenschaften. Bei Homer ist die Intelligenz nicht von der körperlichen Stärke getrennt, sondern ist ein integraler Bestandteil davon. Das Ideale ist eine Kombination von physischer Überlegenheit (äußere Erscheinung mit körperlicher Stärke) und geistigen Einfallsreichtum. Einige Helden zeigen den letzteren in einem größeren Ausmaß an (z. B. Odysseus, Nestor), während andere, wie Aias, überwiegend Handlungsmänner sind. Odysseus gibt eine umfassende Beschreibung von sich selbst und fast in einer Art und Weise, dass alle Eigenschaften, die für den kompletten Held von wesentlicher Bedeutung sind,

auf zwei grundlegende Eigenschaften: die des begnadeten Redners und die des fähigen Kämpfers. In der Gesellschaft, in der ein ständiger Konkurrenzkampf herrscht, wie sie sich aus dem Epos Homers rekonstruieren lässt, kann sich ein Wert wie Zusammenarbeit nicht durchsetzen.[9] Im Gegensatz dazu begnügen sich die im Konkurrenzkampf Unterlegenen mit dem einfachen Überleben. Homers Helden sind einzig und allein auf Ehre (*time*) aus, was ihr Verhalten von Grund auf prägt.[10] Begriffe wie Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit spielen nur insofern eine Rolle, als dass sie nicht im Gegensatz zu persönlichen Vorteilen stehen.[11] Sicher ist jedoch, dass unwahre Reden oder ungerechte Taten bevorzugt werden, wenn dies im Interesse des Helden steht. Genau an diesem Punkt offenbart sich die Bedeutung der Werteverschiebung in Zusammenhang mit der traditionellen Ethik, wie sie der Philosoph vorschlägt. Dem Anliegen der Wahrheit nachzuspüren und diese zu enthüllen, si-

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zusammen. Er erwähnt seinen Gefährten, dass er dank seiner Tapferkeit und Festigkeit, dem Plan, den er konstruiert hat, und seiner Einfallsreichtum dem Zyklopen entkommen ist (*Od*. 12.211-212: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔνθεν ἐμῇ ἀρετῇ βουλῇ τε νόῳ τε / ἐκφύγομεν).

[9] Siehe Adkins 1960; 1971; 1972a; für eine entgegengesetzte Ansicht siehe Long 1970.

[10] Siehe z. B. *Il*. 1.158-174, 1.505-510, 3.284-291, 9.601-605, 16.90-100; *Od*. 24.433-437.

[11] Siehe Adkins 1972b, 9, 11: "Homeric society understands the function of evidence in establishing the truth;" 14: "It is *πεπνυμένος* not to utter *ψεῦδος* — at least in some circumstances;" 15: "where *ἀρετή* is, or may be, affected, *ἀγαθοί* are likely to evaluate what is said in terms of its grace, charm, and pleasantness — or at least the absence of offensiveness — rather than its truth;" 16: "When *ἀρετή* is unaffected by speaking the truth, not only it is *κατὰ κόσμον* to speak the truth, but the phrase may characterize the statement as true;" 17: "When, even though the situation is a co-operative one, the *ἀρετή* and/or status of the participants are involved, to behave or speak *κατὰ κόσμον* is to behave with due regard to their relative status and *ἀρετή*, and truth is comparatively unimportant." Siehe auch Gagarin 1973, 87: "*δίκη* is an insignificant word in Homer. No important character is called *δίκαιος*; no one ever appeals to *δίκη* when he has been wronged; no warnings or threats mention *δίκη*; and none of the major actions of the epics […] is ever spoken of in terms of *δίκη*."

chert den Grad an Gerechtigkeit einer Rede, demnach eine gerechte Rede, und verstärkt zudem ihre Glaubwürdigkeit.

Sokrates' erste Worte offenbaren die Problematik der Bedeutungsdifferenz im Gegensatz von Rede (*logos*) und Tat (*ergon*), welcher weiter oben bereits angesprochen wurde. Wie dort erwähnt wurde, bestätigt der Elenchus in der Praxis die Wahrheit der Rede von jemandem. Mit anderen Worten: Die Elenchusmethode zielt darauf ab, die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Begriffen zu korrigieren – eine Dimension, die besonders in den Worten seiner Ankläger offensichtlich ist – und die die Rückkehr zur ursprünglichen Einheit der beiden Begriffe bezweckt. Diese Einheit dient der Wahrheit und bildet somit das Muster für die gerechte Rede. Deren Bruch jedoch setzt die Wahrheit außer Kraft und macht die Rede ungerecht.

Wie nun einfach nachzuvollziehen ist, handelt es sich bei Sokrates' *logos-ergon* um eine Einheit. Somit offenbart und vervollständigt sich die Essenz der gerechten Rede auf zwei Niveaus: auf dem Niveau der Sprache und auf dem Niveau des Handelns. Sokrates äußert sich weder ausdrücklich dazu noch beschäftigt er sich mit dem Thema der Qualität einer Handlung. Sicherlich deutet er jedoch durch den Nachdruck, den er in obiger Einheit der gerechten-wahren Rede und deren Glaubwürdigkeit verleiht, an, dass eine notwendige Konsequenz der gerechten Rede besteht, nämlich die gerechte Handlung, die zur Anwendung seiner Lehrsätze führt und somit die Vertrauensbeziehung und Kooperation zwischen den Bürgern gewährleistet.

Natürlich offenbart die nähere Untersuchung der Einheit, die Sokrates repräsentiert, umso mehr seine Differenz zur Homer`schen Tradition. Wie wir schon festgestellt haben, besteht das Ideal des Homer`schen Helden, wie es in Phoenix Aufforderung an Achilles ersichtlich ist, im rhetorischen Talent und der kriegerischen Gewandtheit dessen, also in Eigenschaften, die eine bestimmte Fassung der Einheit von Worten und Taten bilden. Durch die Auseinandersetzung mit vorliegendem platonischem Abschnitt stellen wir fest, dass Sokrates eine differenzierte Fassung der Einheit repräsentiert, die nun auf einer veränderten Grundlage basiert. Der "Homer`sche" Ausdruck der Einheit von Worten und Taten erlaubt die Lüge, das Unrecht und den Gebrauch der List, Elemente, die die kon-

kurrierende Präsenz des Helden untermalen. Andererseits akzeptiert der "sokratische" Ausdruck dieser Einheit lediglich das Forschen und Entblößen der Wahrheit sowie auch das gerechte Handeln und kultiviert dadurch ein Klima harmonischen Zusammenlebens und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Bürgern. Es ist somit offensichtlich, dass der Philosoph indirekt Kritik an den ethischen Verhaltensvorbildern übt, die das Epos Homers lehrt. Dabei nutzt er als grundlegendes, methodologisches Werkzeug zum Erreichen seines Ziels den Elenchus.

In den platonischen Dialogen tritt als häufiges Phänomen die Verwendung dieses spezifischen Dialektik-Werkzeugs in Verbindung mit der Kritik auf, die sich gegen die Ethik des Epos wendet. Der Elenchus Sokrates` spürt die Lüge und den Betrug auf und zeigt somit unverhüllt die ganze Wahrheit auf. So ruft er bei allen Angesprochenen das Gefühl der Schande (αἰσχύνη) hervor. Andererseits bedeutet im Rahmen der Homer`schen Ethik der Begriff *elencheie* (Schande oder Vorwurf) denjenigen Gemütszustand, in dem es dem Helden nicht gelingt als traditionell *agathos* zu reagieren, weshalb er sich schämt.[12] Die beiden gleichstämmigen Begriffe *elencheie* und *elenchos* erscheinen zwar in verschiedenen literarischen Umfeldern, aber ihre Präsenz wird fast immer von Schamgefühl begleitet. Dies steht keineswegs im Gegensatz zur Logik, zumal das Gefühl der Scham mit der Ethik einer Gesellschaft zusammenhängt, die durch das Versagen bei der Umsetzung der WGrund auf die Kriterien, denen zufolge eine Tat das Schamgefühl hervorruorte in Taten zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Trotzdem überdenkt Sokrates durch seine Kritik am traditionellen Wertesystem von fen kann oder auch nicht. Dies geschieht dadurch, dass hauptsächlich der Kern der Homerischen Ethik angezweifelt wird, nämlich das Ergebnis,[13] sodass die Bedeutung nun auf die Mittel transferiert wird, durch die das Ergebnis erreicht werden kann. Dadurch diesem Wandel wird der *elenchos* zum Werkzeug der Wahrheitsfindung – einem Werkzeug, das alle Praktiken anprangert, die nur auf das erwünschte Ergebnis abzielen, ohne dabei die Mittel zu berücksichtigen.

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[12] Adkins 1960, 33-34.
[13] Adkins 1972b, 8.

ΑΡΕΤΗ ΡΗΤΟΡΟΣ – ΑΡΕΤΗ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΟΥ

Am Ende des Proömiums, geht Sokrates zur Rechtfertigung seines persönlichen Stils und seiner Ausdrucksweise (λέξις) über. Er beruft sich auf seine Ungeschicklichkeit[14] bezüglich des sprachlichen Kodes, der von den gegnerischen Parteien im Rahmen einer Gerichtsverhandlung verwendet wird. Und hofft, dass die eben angesprochene Ungeschicklichkeit den Gerichtshof im Nachgehen seiner Pflichten nicht hindern wird. Es ist ausgesprochen interessant festzustellen, dass Platon dem Gerechtigkeitsfaktor des Antrags des Sokrates (ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον) große Bedeutung zuspricht. Dabei besteht das Ziel darin, die Zuständigkeiten des Richters und Rhetorikers "in Erinnerung zu rufen" beziehungsweise neu zu definieren. Damit übt Platon vehement Kritik an der Art und Weise, wie diese Begrifflichkeiten zu seiner Zeit wahrgenommen wurden, etwas was gerade in seinen zeitgenössischen und rechtlichen Ansprachen offensichtlich wird. Sokrates` Anliegen ist insbesondere deshalb gerecht (*dikaion*), weil die Aufmerksamkeit der Richter von der Form auf den Inhalt seiner Worte transferiert wird (εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή). Es steht also im Einklang mit den Zuständigkeiten, die der Richter erfüllen müsste. Die absolute Art, mit der dies zum Ausdruck gebracht wird, deutet an, dass es nicht als selbstverständlich angesehen wird, obwohl es so sein sollte. Die Hinweise deuten darauf hin, dass die Worte Sokrates' als ein Versuch angesehen werden sollten, um erneut festzulegen, worin die Tugend des Richters und die Tugend des Rhetorikers bestehen. Angenommen also, Sokrates wäre vollkommen unerfahren, was die verbreitete Ausdrucksweise in Gerichtshöfen anbelangt. Ob er ein guter Redner ist oder nicht, ist dabei etwas ganz anderes, es kommt darauf an, ob er mit gerechten Worten die Wahrheit vor dem Gericht sprechen wird. Sie ihrerseits sind gute Richter, wenn sie aufmerksam dem Inhalt der Reden zuhören und diese dann bezüglich ihrer Richtigkeit prüfen.

Aus der Analyse des Abschnitts geht zudem hervor, dass der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit, der, wie schon erwähnt, unmittelbar mit dem Wahrheitsbegriff zusammenhängt, den grundliegenden Gedankengang des

[14] Vgl. Stokes 1997, 103.

Philosophen wiederspiegelt. Es sollte zudem angemerkt werden, dass der Begriff der Tugend scheinbar das Netzwerk der Beziehungen, die sich bereits entwickelt haben, vervollständigt. Genauer gesagt werden im Proömium sinnverwandte Begriffe oft wiederholt [z. B. (a) δίκαιον, δίκαια, δικαστής, (b) ἀρετή, χείρων, βελτίων, (c) ῥήτωρ, λέξις, λέγω], welche sich überkreuzen und erstaunliche semantische Ergebnisse aufweisen. Der Schluss des Proömiums trennt jedoch die Bedeutungen voneinander ab. Kurz gesagt besteht die Tugend eines Richters darin, dass er die Fähigkeit besitzt, einen Redner bezüglich seiner Tugend zu bewerten. Es geht darum, ob er gut ist oder nicht, ob er also eine gerechte und wahre Rede hält oder nicht.[15]

Gehen wir nun jedoch einen Schritt weiter. Welche Bedeutung hat der Begriff der Tugend in diesem spezifischen Kontext? Die Tugend bezieht sich natürlich auf die Gesamtheit der Eigenschaften, über die jemand oder etwas verfügt, und dank derer eine angemessene und effiziente Auseinandersetzung damit stattfinden kann, was ihm aufgetragen wurde.[16] Demnach deckt der Begriff auch den Prozess der Ausführung

[15] Vgl. Strycker und Slings 1994, 27.

[16] West (1979, 51 Anm. 13) vertritt die Meinung, dass mit dem Begriff ἀρετὴ (Tugend) die Überlegenheit einer Sache gemeint ist. Es kann sein, dass es sich bei dieser Überlegenheit um eine moderne Terminologie als "Moral-Ethik" handelt. Sokrates, bezieht sich jedoch auf 20b in der Tugend "der Ochsen und Fohlen". Daraus schließt der Forscher, dass die Bedeutung der sokratischen Tugend immer je nach Kontext bestimmt werden muss, in dem Platon sie verwendet. Reeve 1989, x, erklärt die Bedeutung der 'Tugend' mit einer Analogie: Wenn etwas ein Messer ist, was man als die Tugend des Messers bezeichnet, besteht in der Beschaffenheit oder Eigenschaft, die es zu einem *guten* Messer macht; das gleiche gilt auch für den Fall des guten Menschen. Es kann sein, dass die Tugend eines Messers eine geschärfte Klinge ist. Gleichermassen, kann es sein, dass in der Tugend eines Menschen die Klugheit, der Edelmut, die Gerechtigkeit und der Mut mitenthalten sind. Folglich ist der Begriff ἀρετὴ breiter als die moderne Auffassung der moralischen Tugend. Er wird angewendet und gilt auch für Dinge, die keine Träger oder moralische Vertreter sind und in der Regel ein breiteres Spektrum abdeckt. Strycker und Slings 1994, 251, nehmen schließlich zur Kenntnis, dass aufgrund der Tugend (ἀρετή) jemand oder etwas (in diesem

der spezifischen Handlung und deren erfolgreichen Ausgang ab. Somit (a) führt für Sokrates der Richter sein Werk richtig und tugendhaft aus, wenn im Mittelpunkt seines Trachtens vorrangig eine Überprüfung steht, welche der Feststellung von Recht und Unrecht, Wahrheit und Lüge und vom Charakter der Reden des Rhetorikers dient; und (b) führt der Redner selbst sein Werk tugendhaft aus, wenn er sich bei seiner Rede auf Recht (*dikaion*) und Wahrheit stützt.

Im Anbetracht dessen, dass der gemeinsame Nenner der beschriebenen Zuständigkeiten das Recht (*dikaion*) ist, kann man die Grundbedeutung des Rechts einfach erfassen. Dieses steht in enger Verbindung zur Tugend und Wahrheit und besteht in Wirklichkeit aus drei Faktoren:

a) dem Respekt des Raumes, über den sich die Zuständigkeiten einer Person ausdehnen. Somit ist es gerecht, wenn ein Richter über das Recht und die Wahrheit entscheidet, während es gleichzeitig Recht ist, wenn ein Redner bezüglich der Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit seiner Reden kritisiert wird (siehe auch 18a7: δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι);

b) der Bestimmung der Tugend des Richters und des Redners;

c) dem Erzwingen von Tugenden/Werten im menschlichen Miteinander.

Der Abschluss des Proömiums ist im Grunde mit einer erneut beginnenden Kritik gleichzusetzen, die sich als einzige gegen die konkurrierende Ethik im Epos wendet.

KONKLUSION

Vor Abschluss der Analyse des Proömium lohnt es sich, einen Blick auf den Kommentar von Sokrates bezüglich der Redegewandtheit seiner Beschuldiger im Gegensatz zu seiner eigenen zu werfen (17b4-6: […] εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ). Sokrates akzeptiert zwar seine Funktion als Rhetoriker, unterstreicht jedoch, dass der Abgrund, der ihn von seinen Gegnern trennt, unüberbrückbar scheint.[17] Worin besteht jedoch seine Überlegenheit als Rhetori-

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Fall der gute Richter und ein guter Redner) entsprechend den Bedürfnissen seiner (eigenen) Natur gut ist.

[17] Siehe Burnet [1924] 1970, 69, 73.

ker? Die Antwort auf diese Frage findet sich im abschließenden Satz des Proömium (τἀληθῆ λέγειν), der auch den Kern der Reden von Sokrates im Ganzen darstellt. Es handelt sich im Grunde um die Bestätigung der Idee, dass das wahre Ziel der Rhetorik das Wahre (*alethes*) und nicht das Wahrscheinliche (*pithanon*) darstellt. Sokrates propagiert, dass seine Reden der Wahrheit, der Gerechtigkeit und der logischen Überzeugung dienen. Er kritisiert vehement all diejenigen Praktiken, denen zufolge der Beschuldigte versucht, seinen Freispruch zu erlangen und somit die Gefühle der Richter zu seinen Gunsten zu beeinflussen.[18] Somit scheint der Aufprall der beiden Arten von Rhetorik unumgänglich. Sokrates kritisiert die überzeugende Rhetorik seiner Ankläger, in der nicht nur die gleichgültige Stellung gegenüber der Wahrheit offensichtlich ist, sondern auch deren Fähigkeit, die Zuhörer in jegliche Stimmung zu versetzen.[19] In der Verweigerung der üblichen Praktiken der Rhetorik wendet er sich zugleich auch von der Auffassung ab, dass der Gerichtshof einen Ort darstellt, an dem ein harter Konkurrenzkampf (*agon*) zwischen den gegensätzlichen Gerichtsparteien besteht.[20] Die Verweigerung dieses Konkurrenzkampfes stimmt, wie bereits angesprochen, mit einer indirekten Kritik an den Werten überein, wie sie in Homers Epos propagiert werden. Seine zeitgenössischen Redner, Erben der konkurrierenden Ethik des Epos, kämpfen durch Betrug und hinterhältige Tricks um den Gewinn des Gerichtsprozesses. Sokrates jedoch plädiert für die Wahrheit und die Gerechtigkeit und wird sich selbst mittels dieses Werkzeugs gegen seine Beschuldiger verteidigen. Es ist also offensichtlich, dass seine Haltung die Rhetorik verändert und deren Ziele neu definiert: Die Rhetorik darf die Wahrheit nicht verdrehen, sondern soll diese offenbaren, so dass sie durch die Zuhörer sofort und einfach aufgenommen werden kann. Sokrates' Verteidigungslinie zeigt zunehmend, dass die Methode der Dialektik den einzig sicheren Weg zur Enthüllung der Wahrheit im Ganzen darstellt. Somit wird er dazu angeleitet eine neue Rhetorik einzuweihen, eine Rhetorik, die die traditionelle rhetorische Praxis vollkommen ersetzen

[18] Vgl. Reeve 1989, 6.
[19] Siehe auch *Menex*. 234c1-235c5; *Symp*. 198c1-e2.
[20] Strycker und Slings 1994, 33.

wird. Angesichts der obigen Schlussfolgerung scheint das Proömium einen herausragenden Platz im Dialog als Ganzes einzunehmen. Der Grund dafür ist, daß es einige der wichtigsten Hinweise zur Entschlüsselung aller anderen Passagen von Platons *Apologie*, in der Konfrontationen mit der homerischen Ethik auftreten, liefert. Um die Beziehung zwischen dem Proömium und diesen Passagen herauszuarbeiten, bedarf es natürlich einer separaten Studie, deren Grundlagen dieser Artikel zu legen versucht.

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GREEK IDIOMS AND SAYINGS IN GEORGIAN

MEDEA ABULASHVILI, EKA TCHKOIDZE

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The book discusses Greek idioms and sayings and their corresponding translations into Georgian. It is divided into ten thematic chapters: *Human Body*, *Nature, Emotions*, *Historical Personae* and *Events*, *Mythology*, *Religion*, *Food/Drinks*, *Appreciations* (*of People and Situations*), *Animals/Birds and Miscellaneous*. Each Greek idiom is followed by a literal Georgian translation, an explication and the closest Georgian phraseological equivalent with a similar stylistic and semantic value. All idioms are illustrated by examples from Modern Greek discourse, retrieved from periodicals and literary corpora. The authors offer conventional signs that provide information about the relationship between Greek idioms and their Georgian equivalents in terms of their meaning and linguistic expression.

THE CODE OF ETHICS OF AN EPIC HERO *(in Georgian)*

IAMZE GAGUA

2017: 140x200: 131 p.
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The book is a collection of articles dealing with the code of conduct of epic heroes and the peculiarities of their personalities based on the *Iliad* by Homer, the *Aeneid* by Virgil, the *Knight in the Panther's Skin* by Shota Rustaveli, and the *Argonautica* by Apollonius of Rhodes. "Moral Make-up of an Epic Hero" outlines the code of conduct of the heroes of the *Iliad*, the *Aeneid*, the *Knight in the Panther's Skin,* and the *Argonautica*, i.e., the characteristic features uniting the protagonists of the above poems. "Achilles' Readiness to Reconcile and the Unsuccessful Embassy according to the *Iliad*, Book IX" focuses on the mode the envoys' speeches are constructed, the role that Odysseus played in the unsuccessful outcome of the mission, and the flaws of his speech. "Aeneas, *pater, errans et oboediens*" discusses the formation of Aeneas' character, the way the brave but impetuous fighter became obedient and observant of the Gods' will, and turned into a true leader of the Trojans. "War and Justice according to Cicero and Virgil" juxtapos-

es Cicero's ideas about the war ethics, expressed in the treatise *On Duties*, with Virgil's conception presented in the *Aeneid*. "Aeetes' Image in Greek Sources" provides a portrait of the king Aeetes of Colchis: his origins, personal qualities and the difficult tasks the king assigns to Jason. "Jason, an Impetuous or a Realistic Hero?" is an attempt to make out who Jason truly is: is he an anti-hero who obtained the Golden Fleece solely thanks to Medea, or maybe he possesses traits characteristic of a true hero: courage, persistence, wisdom and integrity. How does he stand out from other Argonauts?

ON SOME ASPECTS OF INNOVATION IN THE CULTURE OF THE HELLENIC PERIOD *(in Georgian)*

RISMAG GORDEZIANI

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Antiquity, which left a substantial legacy of literary works and teachings on almost every aspect of culture, does not offer a more or less structured theory on innovations. This is not surprising as "new" has always been accepted as a relative concept. The ancient world always held the belief, which was conceptualized by Pythagoras in the following way: after certain specified periods, the same events occur again; that nothing was entirely new (*Vit. Pyth.* 37 = DK 14.8).

In the age of Geometric renaissance following the cultural decline and pause of the so-called Dark Ages, we can observe principal novelties in every area of social life accomplished through the creative reinterpretation and adaptation/reception of local and eastern traditions: these novelties first of all are the phonetic alphabet, transition from somewhat centralized political system to the *polis* structure, common Hellenic religion, and sports or poetic and literary agons, geometric vase painting decorated with belts featuring coordinated and subordinated geometric figures, and before geometrism, schematic human figures and mass scenes having a semantic import, and of course, written literary works, which are most important for the history of culture. Irrespective of their degree of novelty, these manifestations of the innovative spirit were not perceived by the Greeks as revolutionary confrontation against the old, but as the continuation or reshaping of what already existed. This was supported by the mythopoetic tradition which en-

sured that the spread of alphabet in Hellas, formation of renowned *polises*, the pantheon of multiple deities, sports and poetic competitions, art and poetry did not lose its links with the past. This tendency persisted over centuries.

After the cultural revolution brought by the vigorous emergence of individual in the Archaic period, i.e., the first phase of plastic art, the concepts of "new" and "old" were applied for the appreciation of a work of art to indicate distinctiveness rather that quality. Lyrics emerged in opposition to epics, with multiple forms of performance, a variety of meters, and diverse worldview perspectives allowing the expression of emotions. The style of ceramic painting and plastic art was essentially changed to black and red-figure style focusing on imagery; the new wave of kouros and kore, with their unparalleled archaic smile, represents sculpture which is not yet free from staticity; order architecture emerged with Doric and Ionic orders, to which the Corinthian order was added later, in Classical antiquity. Naturally, all this was a major novelty in the history of culture, although the poets and artists appreciated works of art from the internal dimension rather than external. According to the surviving poetry of Archilochus, Semonides of Amorgos, Callinus, Tirteus, Mimnermos, Solon, Hipponax, Alceus, Sappho or Anacreon, they did not credit themselves as innovators. However, from the perspective of modern literary studies, their names can be associated with a number of novelties. The situation is different in choral lyrics, where there was more emphasis on novelty due to high competition. Already Alcman was well aware of the significance of νεὰς ἀοιδᾶς or νεομάχος, while the old rivals, Simonides of Ceos and Pindar argue about old and new wines, that is, the privilege of novelty or tradition in poetry. Pindar's poetry even reveals his self-appreciation as an innovator, but at the same time warns against the criticism one may incur if the new things one discovers are put to a test.

Unlike the poetry dealing with the dominance of the irrational, the role of novelty is relatively more distinct in critical-analytical literature, which recognizes the so-called plus one principle, which means, it suffices to add to the existing opinion a new detail, even if small or insignificant, to make it a novelty, considering the nature of one's area of intellectual activity. And truly, if we follow the path Greek philosophy took from Thales to Socrates, we will see it as a powerful stream of innovations where each intellectual aspires to say something new. However, none of them dealt with novelty as

an objective phenomenon deserving philosophical attention. Those who approached this theme were more concerned with the dialectics of universal processes, and the shaping and resolution of oppositions rather than the impassable conflict between the opposition members.

The highly vigorous innovative spirit of the following, classic stage of the *polis* culture was manifested through the perfection of processes started in the Archaic period. Greek tragedians and comedy writers, painters and sculptors skilled in ponderation and contrapposto, architects, whose surprising awareness of proportions and symmetry seems fabulous even nowadays, the extensive scope of theorization and many other achievements shaped the first Classical period on the European continent, i.e., the paradigmatic period of advanced refinement and maturity, which established itself as the universal system of culture. In the course of 150 years of the Classical period, the binary opposition of old and new starts to gradually develop for the appreciation of cultural facts. Each member to the opposition gains supports and opponents, the symbols representing novelty and tradition. Along with the meaning of subsequence to the old, new also acquired a meaning of the opposition to the old. Change meant the replacement of old with new, however, not through confrontation but through "peaceful" substitution. However, each of these changes could have been essential on the way of tragedy towards its τέλος. The fact that Greek tragedy fulfilled itself within one century points to the significance, profundity and intensity of the changes, which actually implies the replacement of the old with the new. The same is true about art: classical sculpture evolved from the Kritios boy to quasi-avant-gardist Lyssipos through a remarkable transformation of style, i.e., the replacement of old with new, which did not, however, mean confrontation. As mentioned, distinct signs of avant-garde appear on the cultural scene already in the Classical period. Timotheus' poetic declaration to oppose the old and give priority to the new obviously had a revolutionary character (PMG 796).

The transition of the new vs. old opposition from a harmonious relationship to disharmonious was reflected on the criteria by which works of literature and art were appreciated in the society. Public attention was soon transferred from the force of the creative potential to the sings of novelty. Novelty became the central criterion for appreciating a work of art and literature. This was opposed by another, neophobic trend, which culminated in Plato's dialogues and shaped as a neophobic concept. In his *Republic* and

more broadly in the *Laws*, Plato explains why novelty can be dangerous for his theoretical state. Plato says nothing about the novelty at the level of practice and daily application. He finds more important areas related to politics, religion and spiritual culture, as only these areas may produce threatening impulses for a state. Plato's neophobic radicalism suggests that innovative trends must have become very important in the society and the old vs. new opposition took an irreversible turn. Although the impulse of the Classical Period was still remarkable, the significance of creative potential, so typical of the Classical Period, was gradually receding, giving a way to novelty as the central criterion for appreciating works of art and literature. The balance between mastery and talent gradually altered in favour of mastery marked by formalist innovations.

Major changes brought by the Hellenistic period transformed Greek *poliseis* into a part of the Hellenistic world, which had the ambition to be a centralized monarchical empire. Here the criteria for appreciating works of art were essentially different. This contributed to the promotion of novelty as the central value of creative culture and fostering public preference for novelty over the gift-driven creative potential. The trend proved inversely proportional of the number of artists who today are appreciated as the peaks of Hellenic culture. This trend not only typologically parallels with the processes unfolding in our contemporary culture, but contrary to the belief of the supporters of absolute innovations in art, even shows essential affinity with the latter.

"UNBEARABLE" WOMEN *(in Georgian)*

SOPHIE SHAMANIDI

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The book explores the transformation of ancient female characters – Medea, Helen, and Clytemnestra – in the Modern Greek and Georgian literature. The question the author is addressing is why would a writer attempt to justify a woman who betrays her homeland and takes vengeance on her husband by killing her children, or a woman whose love story sparks the Trojan War, or a woman, who was an unfaithful wife, murdering her husband in concert with her lover.

FROM COLCHIS TO COLCHIS – MEDEA. THREE ASPECTS OF MEDEA'S MYTHICAL IMAGE (*in Georgian*)

RUSUDAN TSANAVA

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The analysis of the versions of the Argonaut myth and the related artifacts revealed several contexts for the interpretation of Medea's image: 1. She is a goddess. 2. She is a mortal woman but with special faculties and powers. 3. Medea does not fit either into the model of a goddess or a model of a mortal with special abilities, which compels us to assign her a different status. Medea is Helios' grand-daughter and the priestess of the supreme Colchian goddess Hecate (in the Greek Pantheon Hecate is represented as the full moon. Out of the goddesses belonging to the rank of the Mother Goddess (Great Mothers) Hecate is the closest to the moon) – not in the traditional sense of the word, but if interpreted as Avatara, an incarnated substitute of a deity. Medea introduced into the Hellenic world a more profound and important knowledge of medicine than was available in Thessaly (Chiron, Asclepius). From this perspective, Medea is a "cultural hero," which is the central characteristic feature of Avatara.

Medea's main mission in the Argonaut myth is to act as a *helper*. According to the model of the classical monomyth, the role of a helper can be assumed by everyone and everything starting from gods and ending with things. A hero may have several helpers during the heroic cycle (the hero's journey). Medea outstands even in this role. Unlike other helpers, she invariably prevails as she participates in heroic deeds or other challenges. She crosses the limits and terms set for a *helper*, which may leave us with an impression that Jason's deheroization starts right in the myth, after he meets Medea. However, scholars will agree that mythical narratives do not "tolerate" quasi-heroes. Myths are created about heroes. The following two versions can be discussed regarding Jason's myths: 1. According to the traditional myth, Jason is the hero and Medea is a helper (this version is supported by several written sources and the scene on the Etruscan vase). 2. We could assume that according to a different myth, Jason must have angered a goddess and incurred punishment. The fusion of these two independent myths into a single legend results in a narrative in which the goddess dom-

inates, while the hero recedes to a subordinate position. Jason's deheroization started and developed in literary narratives (where the myth transformed into a legend). Medea's supremacy over her Greek father-in-law triggered a negative attitude towards the Colchian woman.

Myths offer two versions regarding the fate of Medea's children: a) She does not kill her children. Her son(s) become(s) the ethnarch(s) of a new ethnos. b) Filicide is part of the model of the ritual wrath of a goddess, which, as the analysis shows, is inherent with the structure of the Argonaut myth (the models of Tyro and Athamas' wives). Of the eight filicide mothers of Greek myths, four belong to the Argonaut cycle. Maternal filicide repeats almost in all generations of Jason's ancestry. Medea is the fifth representative of the genealogical line and the fourth filicide mother. The most prominent female character in this respect is Jason's grandmother, Tyro, who became the paradigm of ruthless woman in ancient tragedy. We should not rule out that child-murder can be an integral part of the Argonaut myth in the same way as murder and dismemberment in the Pelopides' myths. According to the mythoritual model of goddess' wrath, it will disappear as soon as its cause is eliminated. After the revenge, the goddess is completely appeased. This perspective may explain all controversial points of the Argonaut myth: Medea, having the function of a goddess, is freed from the divinely inspired mania of passion and cuts all the threads that tie her to Jason. Her wrath is similar to the wrath of a goddess: in the final scene of Euripides' play, she appears surprisingly calm, standing in a dragon-driven chariot of Helios.

Medea leaves her home as she hears the divine call. She brings new knowledge into a new land and returns home – these points turn her story into a complete cycle. Medea is the only female mythical character whose story follows the model of the classical monomyth.

EVENTS 2017

On 17-20 September 2017, the Institute of Classical, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies of the Tbilisi State University hosted an international conference *Medea's Image in World Artistic Culture*. The conference was dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Institute and the 25th anniversary of Georgian-Greek diplomatic relations. More than sixty papers were presented at the conference by the scholars from thirteen different countries. Within the auspices of the conference, several thematic exhibitions were also organized: an exhibition on Georgian-Greek diplomatic relations; a photo exhibition *Medea on Georgian Stage*; and an art exhibition *Medea in Modern Georgian Art*.